As
Syrian troops continue to withdraw from parts of
Lebanon, three bomb attacks have occurred within
eight days in predominantly Christian areas: a March
19 car bomb wrecked the front of a building in New
Jdeideh, wounding nine; a March 22 bomb ripped
through an elite shopping center in Kaslik, killing
three; and a March 26 car bomb in the industrial
sector of Sadd el-Bouchrieh wounded five and
destroyed several buildings. Many Lebanese see the
bombings as an attempt by Syria and its loyalists to
derail the growing movement for democracy and
independence in Lebanon, while at the same time
deepening fears of renewed sectarian conflict.
Syria's
History in Lebanon
Syria has a long
history of using violence to accomplish its purposes
in Lebanon. During the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war,
for example, Damascus liquidated those it perceived
as obstacles. Syria was allegedly behind the 1976
assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in the attempt to
end his leadership of the National Movement (which
combined Arabist, leftist, and Muslim forces) and to
facilitate a rapprochement between Syria and the
Muslim political camp. No less important, Damascus
has liquidated those it perceived as potential links
to foreign powers, such as president-elect Bashir
Jumayil in 1982, who was viewed as an ally of
Israel. In 2002, Syria is also thought to have
assassinated Elie Hobeika, whose loyalty to Damascus
came into question following the September 11 terror
attacks, when Hobeika appeared to revive past
connections with the CIA.
Car bombs in Lebanon
became almost daily occurrences during the civil
war, and were meant to push the country into
socio-politico-economic paralysis. The current wave
of bombings is reminiscent of this past Syrian use
of violence. In addition, there are now disturbing
indications that Syria is attempting to activate its
loyalists inside Lebanon to provoke sectarian
troubles. For example, on March 5, a convoy of cars
circled Sassin Square in Aschrafieh (the Christian
capital of East Beirut during the civil war),
carrying pictures of President Bashar al-Asad and
firing into the air among a crowd that had gathered
there. (It is noteworthy that the shooting of a bus
transporting Palestinians in a Christian Beirut
suburb sparked the civil war.)
After the civil war,
Syria maintained its grip on Lebanon by pursuing a
divide-and-rule policy among and between Lebanon's
sectarian communities. For example, it balanced the
rising power of the late former Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri by supporting traditional Sunni leadership
such as Salim al-Huss and Tamam Salam. It also tried
to co-opt sectarian party leaders like Karim
Pakradouni in order to fragment communal unity and
leadership. As head of the Christian Phalange party,
Pakradouni reversed party policy by emerging as an
ardent supporter of the status quo, especially of
pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud.
Throughout
Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations (1991-2000),
Damascus used Hizballah to put pressure on Israel
militarily. In the current scenario, it is
distinctly possible that Syria, through Hizballah,
may inflame the Lebanon-Syria border in order to
deflect domestic and international attention.
Indeed, according to press reports, King Abdullah of
Jordan recently warned Israel and the United States
about such a likelihood.
Syria's
Strategy
Given this
background, Damascus will most likely try to
fragment the opposition by employing a combination
of terror, appeasement, and Arab intercession. Its
first objective will be to drive a wedge between the
two historic Mount Lebanon political communities,
the Druze and the Maronites, who form the core of
the opposition and who are led respectively by Walid
Jumblatt and Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Syria will
play on the differences and concerns of these two
communities, which revolve around Druze pan-Arab
sentiments and Maronite pro-U.S. sentiments.
For example, if
Syria completes its withdrawal from Lebanon,
Jumblatt will come under pressure from Arab leaders
as well as his own Progressive Socialist Party to
soften his demands and walk a mainstream Arab line.
Following a March 22 meeting with President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt, Jumblatt asserted that removing
the pro-Syrian president was not a priority. At the
same time, he pledged to “protect the resistance,”
meaning Hizballah. Damascus will likely play on
Jumblatt's sensitivities by promising to prevent the
election of a pro-U.S. Maronite president—such as
former president Camile Chamoun—who identifies with
the major Christian forces.
Damascus will try to
appease Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir by
promising him honest elections. However, given the
fact that he is a spiritual leader who prefers to
rise above the factional political rivalries of the
Christian community, Damascus may try to weaken the
Qornet Shehwan Gathering (a mainstream Christian
opposition group) by increasing Syrian support for
both former interior minister Michel el-Murr (in the
Metn district of Mount Lebanon) and the Syrian
Socialist Nationalist Party leaders in Mount
Lebanon, as well as for Phalangist leader Karim
Pakradouni.
At the same time,
Syria will try to sever the potential links between
Lebanese opposition leaders and foreign states,
particularly the United States. For example,
Damascus could threaten former Lebanese president
Amin Jumayil, who has cordial relations with the
Bush administration (especially with Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld). Syria will try to regain
its traditional Sunni allies while at the same time
persuading them to stop anti-Syrian demonstrations.
Already, Bahia Hariri, a parliamentarian deputy and
sister of the slain former prime minister, has
canceled the celebration procession commemorating
forty days since the death of her brother. Damascus
may also try to appease the Sunnis by playing on
their fears of Shiite demographic power,
notwithstanding Syrian support for the Shiite
Hizballah and Amal parties in Beirut.
The Security
Services and the Army
Despite the presence
of Syrian troops in Lebanon, Damascus has controlled
Lebanon primarily through Lebanese institutions that
it fills with pro-Syrian loyalists. In fact, the
removal of pro-Syrian officials from their posts is
a core demand of the Lebanese opposition. Following
a meeting on March 3 in Jumblatt's stronghold of
Mukhtara, the opposition called for the removal of
Adnan Addoum as state prosecutor, Brig. Gen. (ret.)
Jamil Sayyed as director general of general
security, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Edward Mansour as
director general of the state security apparatus,
Gen. Ali Hajj as director general of internal
security, Gen. Mustafa Hamdan as commander of the
army's Presidential Brigade, Gen. Raymond Azar as
director of military intelligence, and Col. Ghassan
Tufeili as chief of the military intelligence
espionage unit. (Members of the opposition have
expressed fear that General Sayyed might be planning
a coup d'etat. In an audacious and unprecedented
move, Sayyed held a press conference in which he
attacked the opposition as a “political mafia” that
has caused Lebanon's woes.)
In contrast to the
slavishly pro-Syrian stance of the security
services, the army has allowed demonstrators to
stage large anti-Syria rallies despite an official
ban. Indeed, while rallying, many Lebanese have been
seen embracing army personnel. Michel Suleiman,
commander of the army, has emerged as a stabilizing
force, counteracting the power of the security
chiefs. The army—Suleiman in particular—will be the
target of the security authorities, who are now
waging a campaign to establish that the army is
incapable of filling the security vacuum created by
the departing Syrian soldiers. For example, Defense
Minister Abd al-Rahim Murad has recently stated,
“The numbers in the army [are] not enough to replace
the Syrian forces, which will leave the Bekaa
completely. . . . The members of the army are still
young [and inexperienced] to handle this mission.”
The recent bombings are not only a sign that Syria
and its Lebanese loyalists are intent on heightening
sectarian tension, but also mark the beginning of a
new round of intimidation against the opposition,
carried out under the pretext of compliance with UN
Security Council Resolution 1559 and the Taif
Accord. The international community must vigilantly
monitor Syria and its loyalists while supporting the
imperative of removing those security chiefs
enforcing the Syrian order in Lebanon.
