As Lebanon
plunges deeper into ruin and chaos as a result of
Hizballah’s “gang war” tactics against Israel’s
expanded military campaign to degrade the power of
the Islamist party, Hizballah, Syria, and its allies
in Lebanon are devising plans to subvert an
international agreement on a multinational force to
guard the Israel-Lebanon border. They are also
preparing for a political comeback in a postconflict
Lebanon by riding the wave of the victory Hizballah
is sure to claim whatever the outcome—a supposed
triumph that in reality will be at best a Pyrrhic
victory.
Hizballah’s
Political Offensive
From the time
the hostilities erupted between Hizballah and Israel
on July 12, following a cross-border Hizballah
attack on Israeli soldiers, Lebanon’s political
parties have attempted to sound out a reformed
relationship between Hizballah and the state.
Hizballah leaders brushed aside these concerns as
untimely and divisive at a time when the country is
under attack. But as the government of Lebanese
prime minister Fouad Siniora tried to come up with a
ceasefire plan, these concerns evolved into sharp
disputes threatening the collapse of the government.
At the heart of these concerns are interconnected
questions about the nature and mission of the
international force that would police the
Lebanon-Israel border pursuant to a diplomatic
resolution of the conflict and whether Hizballah
would employ its “projected victory” in a
postconflict Lebanon to change the political
equation.
Sensing the
charged political atmosphere, Hizballah
secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah tried to allay
the concerns of the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition.
In a calculated gesture he signed off on Siniora’s
plan to help bring about a ceasefire, which included
provisions to extend the authority of the Lebanese
state throughout the country and to strengthen and
expand the role and mission of UN forces along the
Lebanon-Israel border. In a televised speech,
Nasrallah appealed to all Lebanese “not to be afraid
from the victory of the resistance.” This prompted
Druze and March 14 coalition leader Walid Jumblat to
ask “to whom Hizballah would give its victory,” an
implicit reference to pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon.
Though Hizballah
had signed off on Siniora’s plan, it expressed
reservations about expanding the mission of the UN
forces and it rejected out of hand an international
force with power to intervene. Simultaneously, Syria
also rejected the idea, depicting the prospective
force as an occupation force. Syria’s foreign
minister, Walid Mouallem, predicted that Lebanon
could become another Iraq, “attracting the al-Qaeda
organization to fight the occupation forces
(international force) in the event they were
deployed without a consensus from all Lebanese
parties.” He also forewarned that the fighting could
spread and involve Syria.
This coincided
with a flurry of activities apparently designed by
some Lebanese parties to undermine Siniora’s plan
and thus potentially lead to the collapse of
Siniora’s government. At a time when France has been
trying to help set up an international force, which
some countries have already expressed reservations
to join, President Emile Lahoud lambasted the idea
as a “new French Mandate over Lebanon.” He also
implied that French and American troops could become
targets by stating that “he does not want to see the
1982 bombings repeated,” a reference to suicide
bombings against the French and American troops who
were then part of a multinational force to pacify
Beirut. At the same time, Aounist leader Michel Aoun
called for an emergency government to replace
Siniora’s government, and pro-Syrian leader Suleiman
Franjieh announced that the March 14 coalition had
been defeated and called upon them to recognize
their defeat. He also supported Aoun’s call for an
emergency government.
All these
activities are related to Hizballah’s plan to
capitalize on its Pyrrhic victory in postconflict
Lebanon; Hizballah seeks to change the country’s
political equation by strengthening its pro-Syrian
allies and depriving the March 14 coalition of the
political capital it needs to implement UN Security
Council Resolution 1559. Not surprisingly,
Muoallem’s statements show that Syria has never
given up on Lebanon, nor it has accepted Resolution
1559, which calls for Syria’s complete withdrawal
from Lebanon and Hizballah’s disarmament. In fact,
one cannot rule out a plan by Iran, Syria, and
Hizballah to provoke this conflict to help each
party achieve its strategic objectives. The Syrian
regime has historically relied on its strident
nationalist discourse and regional confrontation
with Israel to buttress its rule at home and silence
its opposition. With its regional role reduced to
insignificance following the loss of Iraq as a
strategic partner and its humiliating evacuation
from Lebanon, Damascus has been trying to reclaim
its regional role, especially in Lebanon. In fact,
prior to the eruption of hostilities on July 12, a
series of subversive activities, bearing the
fingerprints of Syrian intelligence, almost plunged
Lebanon into chaos.
The Cedar
Revolution in Jeopardy
Notwithstanding
that the UN accused Syria of smuggling weapons into
Lebanon, “unidentified” rockets were launched in
early 2006 into Israel. All fingers pointed to the
pro-Syrian Palestinian Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), which has a
presence in south Lebanon. Moreover, in January
2006, members of PFLP-GC shot two Lebanese municipal
workers outside the Palestinian base in Naameh. In
May, the pro-Syrian Fatah-Intifada attacked a
Lebanese patrol unit in the area of Eita al-Fakhar-Yanta
near the Syrian border. All of this coincided with
heated debate in Lebanon about disarming Hizballah
and Palestinians outside of their refugee camps.
Meanwhile, Hizballah extended its initial assertion
that it would keep its arms until all Lebanese
territories are liberated from Israel’s occupation
to an insistence on keeping its arms to defend
Lebanon’s sovereignty against Israeli aggression.
Taking all this
under consideration, it becomes clear that Syria has
been trying to instigate a crisis to revive its
regional role. However, all these plans and
activities could hardly be achieved with an
international force with the power to intervene,
strengthening the political will of the March 14
coalition to disarm Hizballah.
Therefore, it is
safe to argue that Hizballah, which has emerged as a
champion in the Muslim world, will have little
incentive to disarm or to incorporate its armed wing
into the Lebanese army if a ceasefire is reached
without an international force strong enough to keep
the peace. In fact, Hizballah may ride the wave of
its Pyrrhic victory not only to impose its will on
Lebanon and cement the Iran-Syria-Lebanon axis but
also to reverse the progress of democracy in the
region in the interest of safeguarding the Syrian
and Iranian regimes. Similarly, by reclaiming its
role in Lebanon, Damascus and its pro-Syrian allies
would have returned Lebanon to Syria’s “trusteeship”
and put the final nail in the coffin of the Cedar
Revolution, which many Lebanese celebrated as a
democratic rebirth for Lebanon.
Commenting on
Hizballah’s role in the ongoing developments in
Lebanon, Jumblat said, “We will be a weak state next
to a very strong militia. Our government will be
like the government of Abu Mazen [Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas] next to Hamas—or maybe
worse, like the government of [Nouri al-] Maliki in
Iraq.”
As U.S.
secretary of state Condoleezza Rice speaks of a “new
Middle East,” the reactionary forces there are
planning their own dark vision of the region’s
future. This is why an international force strong
and committed enough to deny Hizballah the freedom
to operate militarily and to prevent rearmament from
Syria or Iran is essential to protect the peace for
both Israelis and Lebanese.
