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‘Trust Allah, Not Nasrallah’: The Hizballah
Crisis Reshapes Lebanese Politics |
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By Robert Rabil
August 2, 2006
With the ongoing
clashes between Israel and Hizballah raging without
respite and Lebanon sustaining significant human and
material losses, the sociopolitical scene in Beirut is
bursting with both centrifugal and centripetal forces.
While these forces threaten the country with
implosion, they are sparking a national debate on
Lebanese national identity that may prevent Lebanon
from disintegrating as a sovereign state. While many
Western observers see the civilian deaths in Qana as
galvanizing Lebanese support for Hizballah, national
solidarity against Israeli attacks should not be
mistaken for a widespread embrace of Hizballah.
Crisis Deepens Lebanese Divisions
From the moment
Hizballah sparked hostilities with Israel on
July 12 with a crossborder raid, Lebanon’s
multicommunal society has been torn by divergent
views on Hizballah. The conflict has deepened
the divides between Lebanon’s political factions
and communities. Central to this has been the
question of how a nonstate entity, Hizballah,
could monopolize the decision of war and peace
for the whole country. Significantly, the
majority of the March 14 coalition, which
sparked the Cedar Revolution, has regretted its
inability to implement UN Security Council
Resolution 1559, which calls for Hizballah’s
disarmament. Many Lebanese believe that their
country has become an arena for settling
regional scores between Israel and the United
States on one side and Iran on the other, with
Hizballah fighting Iran’s war.
As the
fighting continued and Lebanese infrastructure
was targeted, criticism of Hizballah receded
but did not dissipate. Druze leader Walid
Jumblat questioned Hizballah secretary-general
Hassan Nasrallah’s talk of victory by asking,
“To whom are you going to give the victory?”
Echoing some of his colleagues in the March 14
coalition, Dory Chamoun of the Christian
Liberal National Party criticized Nasrallah’s
“uplifting talk of dignity” while the country
suffers under Israel’s air raids to degrade
Hizballah’s power.
But as
the level of destruction and internal
displacement from the south of Lebanon
reached a crisis level, the government of
Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora,
came close to collapsing, potentially
plunging the country into a dangerous
political vacuum. Torn by its inability to
bring about a ceasefire and sidelined
politically by Hizballah’s independent
actions, Siniora’s government was further
crippled by infighting among cabinet
members. Siniora could communicate with
Nasrallah only through parliamentary
speaker Nebih Berri. But as the ministers
grasped the danger of the government’s
collapse, they rallied around Siniora in a
show of unity. This was made possible by
the flurry of international activity that
took Siniora to Rome to present his plan
for a ceasefire, and most importantly by
Hizballah’s agreement to the plan. The
plan has four essential points: returning
the disputed territory Shebaa Farms to
Lebanon, extending Lebanese authority
throughout the country, con fining arms
and authority to the Lebanese state, and
increasing the responsibilities of UN
force in south Lebanon.
Hizballah’s Domestic Position Slips
Hizballah’s speedy agreement to
Siniora’s plan came as a surprise to
analysts and politicians. Yet
Hizballah’s ministers, Trad Hamadeh
and Muhammad Fneish, expressed
reservations only about the mission
of the UN force. Hizballah, like
Syria, does not want to see a
powerful international force
guarding Lebanon’s borders. Despite
Hizballah’s uplifting talk of
“steadfastness, dignity, and
victory,” the organization has
suffered significantly from Israeli
strikes and has come under criticism
from within the Shiite community.
Saddened by the level of destruction
wrought on Lebanon, the prominent
Shiite political columnist Jihad al-Zein
published a letter addressed to
Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei
in the Lebanese daily An-Nahar last
week. The crux of al-Zein’s letter
questioned Iran’s use of Shiite
groups in the Middle East to advance
Tehran’s political interests without
regard for the consequences local
Shiite groups may face. Al-Zein also
emphasized that although comm
unities in Lebanon have connections
with foreign powers, only Hizballah
has a military relationship with a
foreign state.
The letter sparked an immediate
debate within the Shiite
community. Participants in a
forum organized in Beirut
stressed that the Shiite
community is first and foremost
Lebanese. They recalled the
statement issued by Imam Mahdi
Shams al-Din in 1976 during the
Lebanese Civil War, which was
embraced by the Higher Shia
Islamic Council in 1977. The
statement asserts, “Lebanon is a
final country for all its
children,” implying Shiite
allegiance to Lebanon and
readiness to coexist with all
other communities. The
participants contrasted the
Lebanese Shiite community’s
tradition of relying on various
sources of religious emulation
with Iran’s concept of direct
rule by clerics. They also
faulted Hizballah for pursuing a
flawed policy in the aftermath
of Israel’s withdrawal from
Lebanon in 2000. This, no doubt,
was an attempt to loosen
Hizballah’s grip on the Shiite
community.
On the other end of the
political spectrum, Samir
Jaja of the Christian
Lebanese Forces reflected
the opinion of many of his
colleagues in the March 14
coalition by calling for
intervention by a powerful
international force and for
Hizballah’s disarmament. In
contrast, the Aounist
Christian leader Michel Aoun
announced a position close
to Hizballah, questioning
the utility of an
international force. He
called for resolving of what
he considers the root of the
problem—a return of the
disputed Shebaa Farms and an
exchange of prisoners—before
dealing with the question of
disarming Hizballah. Despite
the polarization of these
political positions,
Lebanon’s major political
forces decided to support
Siniora’s political agenda
rather than let the
government collapse.
Apparent Unity
Masks Increasing
Polarization
The unfortunate
civilian deaths in a
July 30 Israeli air
raid on Qana further
polarized Lebanon.
Coming under immense
pressure from the
public responses to
the Qana attack,
Siniora cancelled a
meeting with U.S.
secretary of state
Condoleezza Rice and
called for an
“immediate and
unconditional”
ceasefire. Internal
political dynamics
following the raid
apparently forced the
prime minister to
bypass some of the
arguments over an
international force
and to call for a
ceasefire on
humanitarian grounds.
Members of the
international
community that had not
already done so,
including the United
States, also came
under pressure to call
for an immediate
ceasefire. This played
into Hizballah’s
hands, and many in the
Arab world hailed the
organization as the
only Arab force to
withstand Israel’s
military power.
Consequently, the
regional and
international media,
driven by raw emotions
and some signs of
support for Hizballah,
confused Lebanon’s
show of unity in the
face of the deepening
hum anitarian crisis
with solidarity with
Hizballah.
In fact, Lebanon
is threatened by
implosion no less
by the divergence
of views on
Hizballah than by
the internal
sectarian dynamics
brought about and
deepened by the
ongoing
hostilities. As
Lebanese took to
the street and
ransacked the UN
headquarters in
response to the
Qana raid, units
of the army and
groups from
Christian areas
guarded the
entrances of their
towns from
demonstrators bent
on instigating
sectarian strife
(Christian
neighborhoods have
been ransacked in
the recent past,
such as during
protests against
Danish cartoons of
the Prophet
Muhammad and a
television satire
of Nasrallah).
Meanwhile,
under the
veneer of
unity, the
political
positions of
Lebanon’s
political
parties have
hardened.
Senior
political
figures have
been
frantically
whispering
their concerns
about a civil
war while
publicly
expressing
Lebanon’s
unity. A
senior
Christian
political
figure even
sent an urgent
message to
Lebanese
Americans to
help bring
about an
immediate
ceasefire.
Christians,
Druze, and
some Sunnis
are extremely
worried that
the large
number of
Shiites who
have moved to
their
neighborhoods
in Mount
Lebanon and
the Shouf
might unleash
their anger at
them because
they cannot
direct it
either at
Israel or
Hizballah.
A hopeful
sign that
has gone
unnoticed
is that
some
independent
Shiites
are now
trying to
reclaim a
voice in
their
community.
Although
Hizballah
appears to
have won
the day,
the
reality is
that the
organization’s
power has
been
degraded.
Hizballah
is
exploiting
the
hardship
of the
Lebanese
people and
the
miscalculation
of the
international
community
to win the
hearts and
minds of
the Arab
world.
This
reality
has not
gone
unnoticed
by the
silent
majority
of
Lebanon.
As one
Druze told
my wife
before we
were
evacuated
from
Lebanon,
“Trust
Allah, not
Nasrallah.”
Author approved the reprinting at licus.org
© 2006
Lebanese Information Center – www.licus.org
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