The assassination of Ex-prime minister Rafic Hariri
on February 14th has led to major (and
probably unpredicted by those who committed the
crime) Teutonic shift in the political scene in
Lebanon. The roots of this shift have been present
since the Syrian complete dominance over Lebanon in
1990, but it was mostly exclusive to Christian
leaders and the silent majority.
Over the last decade, the Syrians have created a
ruling class that held a tight control over most
Lebanese establishments including judiciary,
security, administrative, economy and through
arbitrary fabrications of electoral law, imposed a
majority in the Parliament. This class of
collaborating officials and public “leaders” are all
under the tight control and direct supervision of
one supreme master, the Chief of Syrian military
intelligence in Lebanon presiding in the true seat
of power in Anjar.
In 2001, the opposition to the Syrian rule expressed
itself in more public forum that resulted in the
brutal beating and jailing of demonstrators. It then
extended to include the closing of opposing TV
stations and the forced alteration of a key criminal
law that enables the prosecution of anyone who
speaks against Syria.
Despite many rumors to the contrary there is no
disagreement among the Syrian Ba’ath leadership on
the absolute necessity of the continued occupation
and indeed the ultimate goal of annexing Lebanon to
greater Syria. The so called old and new guards,
ideologists and pragmatists in Syria all have a list
of vested interest in the small neighbor.
The Syrian ideologists have regarded the creation of
Lebanon as a historic mistake enforced by western
conspiracy through the Sikes-Picot agreement. The
Ba’ath ideology itself, as was the case in Iraq, is
founded on correcting this “mistake” and follows an
ultimate goal of an Arab unity. The annexation of
Lebanon has always been considered by the Syrian
regime as the stepping stone for such a plan.
Politically, the common belief is that the control
of Lebanon enables the Syrian regime to play a
regional super power role. The ability to undermine
any peace initiative and to have a dual voice in
international forums has always been a key component
of Syrian political strategy.
Economically, Lebanon is the primary market for
Syrian agricultural and textile goods. Through
one-sided treaties, Syrian producers have the
ability to flood the market while creating
disadvantageous conditions for Lebanese counterparts
who are unable to export to Syrian markets or even
enjoy the same conditions in their own market. The
same treaties and official blessing have allowed
Syrian cheap labor to flood the Lebanese market, in
some estimates close to a million Syrians work today
in Lebanon. It is not by accident that in the last
ten years the Lebanese Labor secretary has always
been chosen from either the Lebanese branch of the
Syrian Ba’ath Party or the
Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
Financially, much of Syria’s hard currency is
received through Lebanon. Besides the huge amount of
illegal deals that many in the Syrian regime and
intelligence services are involved in and have been
enriched from it, the regime itself has become
financially dependent on the ability to pump
billions of dollars from Lebanon. It is a common
knowledge that a big part of the $40 billion dollars
in Lebanon’s public debt has made its way to Syria’s
treasury and to the pockets of Ba’ath officials.
Indeed, there is no dispute among the Syrian Ba’ath
Party. The loss of control of Lebanon, in their
view, is the end of the Syrian regime. It is
inconceivable to Bashar or any one else around him,
to envision any scenario in which they would be able
to maintain power in Syria without the Lebanese
benefits. Since their mere survival is at stake, all
measures are permissible in order to eliminate any
clear danger that threatens their absolute hold. An
added advantage to Assad is that he inherited a
wealth of measures taken by his father in the past
which have led to indisputable successes.
Was Hariri a threat to Syria?
After the brutal treatment of the Opposition in 2001
and the events of 9/11, many leaders who had
previously allied themselves with Syria have begun
examining their stand. The US determination to
spread democracy in the Middle East and the resolve
of President Bush have given hope to many that
change is possible. The deterioration of the
Lebanese economy through corruption under Syrian
tutelage and the degradation of many institutions by
the constant micromanagement of Syrian intelligence
have led to a general feeling of disgust among those
Lebanese leaders who were trying to build a modern
and strong state. Chief among those leaders were
Rafic Hariri, the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir
and Walid Jumblatt. The disgust turned into anger
when Bashar decided to extend the term limit of
President Lahoud. To make matters worse the manner
in which the decision was communicated to Lebanese
leaders, including Hariri, was coupled with threats
and coercion that shut off any room for dispute and
gravely insulted any sense of sovereignty left in
the heart of the Lebanese.
With his immense political, international and
financial power, Hariri saw a way to implement a
dramatic change in the way Lebanon was being ruled
by Syria. Even though, he was far from being alone
in the opposition scene, no one else had the
resources necessary to tip the balance of power in
favor of the opposition. As a defacto leader of the
Lebanese Sunnis and with the ability to sweep many
areas through any form of election law imposed by
the Syrians, Hariri became the critical element in
the formula. If he were to stand by Syria, the
opposition had no hope of winning any kind of
majority in the upcoming spring election. His
possible stand with the opposition, on the other
hand, assured them success and eventual loosening of
the Syrian grip over Lebanon. The Syrians had no
doubts about where Hariri stood; they had already
blamed him for advocating UNSC Resolution 1559, and
considered his influence to be a grave threat. They
no longer could rely on his total and unconditional
allegiance to Syria. With Syrian influence already
at risk by the rising voice of opposition in
Lebanon, and the coming tide of democracy in the
region, the Ba’ath regime considered the Hariri
factor a serious threat to the Syrian regime’s
stability and survival.
The assassination of Hariri resolved for the Syrians
the imbalance in the Lebanese formula. Even though
the immediate aftermath of the assassination might
not be considered by an independent observer to have
benefited Syria, it is not hard to imagine that the
risk associated with an imminent Hariri election
victory, had surely been considered in the view of
the Syrian leadership to far outweigh any possible
damage as a consequence of such elimination.
Additionally, the considerable Intelligence Services
authority and power under Syria’s control in
Lebanon, does not necessarily result in
“intelligent” decisions, a case in point is the
Lahoud extension. History will tell if the
assassination was a catastrophic blunder by the
Syrians, but it is already evident to many that the
Machiavellistic calculation ability of the late
Hafez Assad was not inherited by the son.
Faced with the overwhelming and peaceful revolt of
the people in Lebanon, the international outcry
against the brutal assassination and the demand for
the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Syrian
forces, the Syrian regime still considers itself
able to maneuver out of the current situation with
minimal losses. Handicapped by the filtration of
information that typically occurs in totalitarian
regimes and the one sided arguments delivered by an
orchestra of yes-men, all evidences indicate that
the Syrians have a high level of confidence in their
ability to ignore international will. In an
interview with the Italian La Republica on
February 28th, Bashar stated “they (meaning the
Americans) will discover sooner or later that we are
the key to the solution in Iraq and to the Arab
Israeli conflict…they will be soon coming to knock
on our doors” Violent acts in the same week in Iraq
and Israel “coincidently” were ordered to highlight
his argument.
A common analysis in the Syrian ruling circles is to
compare today’s situation again to the climate in
1982. At that time, Syria was surrounded by a
hostile Saddam Hussein, unfriendly Jordan, a dispute
with Turkey, an Israeli invasion in Lebanon and
political and military unrest in Syrian cities.
Syria was also getting pressured by the
international community for its active role in
terrorist activities around the globe. In 1982,
Bashir Gemayel the young President-Elect of Lebanon
forced the Syrians to face what seemed to be an
imminent loss of their control over Lebanon. His
assassination in September of that year enabled the
Syrians to set in motion a series of events that
ultimately resulted in their overall dominance.
Through cruel and effective means and by playing
many of his cards brilliantly, Hafez Assad was able
to turn the table and within two years he assured
himself a bigger role in the region and solidified
his regime.
Today, and regardless of what appears to be an
overwhelming tide against the Syrians, it is the
strong belief of many in the regime that the Syrians
will be able to absorb the pressure and indeed
prevail to become stronger as they did in 1982.
Another strong belief is the fact that Syria by its
firm stand against the US and other western powers
is solidifying its influence among the Arab masses
and hence gaining further leadership role as the
flag bearer of Arab nationalism. The obvious
futility of such views especially after the
consequences of Saddam Hussein’s identical
convictions is somehow still lost on Syrian
leadership. Such ignorance is not only dangerous but
catastrophic to a fragile region going through the
first meaningful transition since World War II.
Whatever the risks are, the Syrian Ba’ath leadership
is proceeding with the same tactics that granted
them success back in 1982. Among those being
implemented or considered are:
§
Further elimination
of opposition leaders and perhaps loyalist figures
to cause a national rift and intimidation.
§
Void peace overtures
that waste time and lead to no where.
§
Holding back on any
withdrawal until they receive guarantees for
resuming direct peace talks with Israel.
§
Attempts to make a
deal with the US by accepting some of the
demands in lieu of freeing their hand in Lebanon.
§
Handing some
elements of the Iraqi regime or implementing
better control of the Syrian-Iraqi border in order
to prompt better cooperation by some officials in
the US.
§
Coordinating with
other Arab leaders to ease the pressure on
Syria by a smokescreen of Arab initiatives.
§
Strengthening
relationships with other nations that have vested
interest in gaining more influence in the Middle
East, such as Iran, Russia and China.
§
Support a higher
degree of violent acts in Iraq to deepen
the need for Syria’s support in combating the
insurgency.
§
Undermining the
fragile truce in Israel by prompting more
terrorists acts directed against the Israeli
population.
§
Encouraging
Hezbollah to direct terror acts in Israel
and/or to cause border clashes.
§
Sacrificing the
Lebanese cabinets or even President Lahoud to
absorb public pressure and replace them with
candidates with the same allegiance to its role.
§
Change of key Syrian
officials involved in the Lebanese file, including
heads of intelligence services and key officials
to shift the blame to “renegade” elements.
§
A series of
redeployment that nets little and maintains all
the Security Intelligence Services in
Lebanon.
§
Rearming small bands
of trouble makers (including Palestinians) in
Lebanon to disturb the peace and create
conditions that enforce the claim of Lebanon’s
instability.
§
Forcing Lebanese
leaders to publicly dispute notions of unity and
spread threat of civil war.
§
Use the controlled
Lebanese judicial system to prosecute opposition
leaders and their supporters.
§
Create a
constitutional void in Lebanon by halting
any process to replace the resigned government.
§
Induce elements of
the Lebanese army to clash with the peaceful
demonstrators to rein public sentiment and promote
national division.
§
Commit an aggression
act against Israel, that prompts the
Israeli to respond and automatically allowing
Syria to take advantage of a sympathetic Arab
public opinion and Emergency laws.
The bottom line is that the Syrian regime will try
every card at its disposal instead of accepting a
complete withdrawal from Lebanon, a move that they
perceive as fatal to their existence. Their
confidence and wide array of their options should
not be underestimated. The Syrians are so entrenched
in Lebanon, that even a military strike against
their forces that might result in military
withdrawal would still leave much of their
Intelligence and collaborators apparatus intact.
What
could be done?
The Lebanese public and popular opposition has
benefited from the US forward-strategy of freedom in
the Middle East. By committing themselves against
many odds upon Hariri’s assassination and by
unifying their ranks under the flag of democracy and
freedom, Lebanon has become the latest stage in on
our drive for democratizing the region. Indeed the
ingredients were always rich in that land. Lebanon,
as evident in current events, has enjoyed one of the
most vigorous spirits of freedom in the Middle East.
The current struggle is a test for us today as well
as the Lebanese. Are we able to support and
strengthen this spirit in order for the momentum to
continue? Failure to do so will surely result in a
complete failure of President Bush strategy of
freedom and democracy. Failure will surely give much
boost to the other totalitarian regimes and the
forces that are adamant on fighting what we stand
for.
Our support can take shape in many venues:
Diplomatic:
-
Continued public
insistence on an immediate and complete withdrawal
of all Syrian troops and Intelligence apparatus.
-
Pressuring the Saudis and
Egyptians to exert pressure of their own on the
Syrians rather than be disillusioned by their
rhetoric.
-
Require public Arab
condemnation of Syria’s policy in Lebanon and work
for a declaration by the Arab summit asking the
Syrians to comply with 1559.
-
Maintain coordination with
France and other European countries to intensify
diplomatic pressure on the Syrians.
-
Pass a new UN resolution
with a clear demand for a complete and immediate
Syrian withdrawal.
-
Shutting out the Syrian
overtures for peace until the US demands are met.
-
Further reduce the US
embassy personnel in Damascus and prompting allies
to do the same.
-
Supporting the Lebanese
opposition through international forums in the US
and allied nations to recognize their struggle and
leadership.
-
Disarming all militias,
Lebanese and non-Lebanese, and protecting the
safety of the Lebanese people through the use of
multinational forces, if needed.
-
Organizing a national
conference under American-French or UN patronage
to achieve the true national reconciliation which
never took place after the end of the Lebanese
war, and to ensure the fair participation of all
Lebanese political movements and parties.
-
Relentless demand for a
thorough investigation in the Hariri’s
assassination preferably by a U.N. team.
Economical:
-
Take further measures as
stated in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act to eliminate any
economical transaction with Damascus.
-
Prohibit any financial
transaction with anyone in Lebanon who actively
supports the Syrian occupation.
-
Indefinitely suspend the
participation of Syria in the European Economic
partnership.
-
Work with Jordan, Iraq and
other Arab countries to reduce the amount of
transferable goods among those states and Syria.
-
Financially support any
institution actively involved in promoting our
values in Lebanon and working to end the
occupation. Including those with presence in the
US and Syrian groups opposing to the regime.
Other:
-
Active involvement of our
intelligence services in evaluating the status of
the Syrian regime and in support of those who
oppose it.
-
Permitting our armed
forces to pursue Iraqi insurgent elements inside
the Syrian border.
-
Increased financial and
academic support to Lebanese academic institutions
especially Christian and pro western universities
and schools.
-
Concentrate the
utilization of the US public relations effort in
the Middle East on promoting democracy in Lebanon.
-
Never rule out the use of
force against the Syrians.
Today, Lebanon represents a wonderful opportunity
for the United States to effectively support what
our President has preached. By their heroic and
unified stand, the freedom loving people of Lebanon
have proven the strength of our argument for
democracy. We have the moral obligation not to let
them down.
In a region where millions of oppressed people are
watching and taking note from the unfolding events
in Beirut, our commitment to our declared principles
is being tested. The beauty of the Cedar Revolution
is that it does not require the blood of our troops
to succeed, only our resolve and support.
