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Statement of Mr. Stephen Stanton

Cedarwatch

GEAGEA'S CELL HAS BECOME HIS CITADEL

Cedarwatch thanks the Lebanese Information Centre and Christian Solidarity International for the opportunity to speak today at the National Press Club, Washington DC.

The topic for the conference is titled "Lebanon: An Imprisoned Homeland". Essentially the organisation that I represent, Cedarwatch, has been committed, since its formation in Montreal in June 1995, to the dissemination of developments concerning political prisoners and the effective repression of fundamental rights and freedoms in Lebanon since the occupation by Syria on and from its purported legitimation of its presence, following on the Taif Accord which was executed in 1990.

Dr Samir Geagea

Prominent amongst the political prisoners in Lebanon is the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Dr Samir Geagea, his plight has been well documented and who has remained in solitary confinement, for most of his period of incarceration since 21 April 1994, three floors below ground level and until recently, when in 2004 he was moved to a cell, still in solitary confinement, on the ground floor.

He, along with Jirjis al-Khouri have become the focus of many human rights activists and in particular the organisation Amnesty International, which has released several reports on the plight of Dr Geagea and recently, Dr Geagea and Mr al-Khouri. The Amnesty report titled "Lebanon - Samir Geagea and Jirjis al-Khouri: Torture and Unfair Trial" was published on 23 November 2004 and has the Amnesty index for reference AIR Index: MBE 18/003/2004. I commend to all interested parties a reading of this report which effectively concludes that Dr Geagea and his co-defendants were denied natural justice and more importantly were unfairly tried and wrongly convicted and their imprisonment has been nothing short of a gross miscarriage of justice.

More importantly, it is what Dr Geagea represents to Lebanon and more particularly as a principal player within the Opposition forces which are now united and have been for some time since the amendment to clause 49 of the Constitution. This effectively entrenched the current Lebanese President, Mr Emile Lahoud, to another term of office without the need to stand for election and more importantly, in breach of the provisions of the Constitution that prohibit a presidential incumbent from standing for more than two terms of office until there has been a six year waiting period.

The trammelling of the Constitution by Lahoud, the partisan government which is effectively a puppet regime for Syria's dictator, acting under the guise of its President, Bashar al Assad (hereafter "Assad") was the culmination in a series of political and constitutional calamities that have had the effect of unifying the Opposition to seek the removal of the current regime and to have fair, free and open elections to restore Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and democratic form of government. Equally, they have also sought the removal of all of Syria's troops and its intelligence cadres, which collectively number in excess of 50,000, who operate in Lebanon.

The United Nations has, in passing UNSCR 1559, indicated that the presence of Syria in its armed occupation can no longer be tolerated and this is apart from, but in addition to, the disapproval by France, the United States of America and many other nations who have objected and voiced their disapproval that Syria continues to remain in Lebanon as an occupying force, having outlived any stabilising presence that was required following the Taif Accord.

The purpose in discussing Dr Samir Geagea today and, more importantly, in the context of Lebanon, an imprisoned homeland, is to highlight and assist an understanding to be arrived at concerning the plight of the Opposition in Lebanon today and the position that Dr Geagea plays within those ranks of the Opposition, but more importantly, from his prison cell which he has occupied for nearly eleven years, since he was first arrested on 21 April 1994.

The role of Samir Geagea has been likened to that of Nelson Mandela, and not without a readily discernible parallel. They were both freedom fighters, they both sought to restore democracy, sovereignty and to allow the independence of their beloved homelands to flourish; and both were rewarded for such activity by being wrongly tried, unjustly convicted and sentenced to lengthy periods of imprisonment in barbaric, harsh and unjust conditions.

Amnesty International and Dr Geagea

The report released for publication by Amnesty International in November 2004 effectively concluded that the trials of Dr Samir Geagea and Jirjis al-Khouri were in violation of international standards for the conduct of a fair trial and that their conditions of detention were found to be cruel, inhuman and degrading. The conditions under which they were held at the military prison known as Yarize, and also referred to as the Ministry of Defence Detention Centre (MDDC) are worthy of close analysis and I commend them to all interested observers who wish to pursue the injustice done to Dr Geagea and his co-defendants.

It is proposed to examine in this paper the manner in which Geagea's imprisonment highlighted, rather than quelled, the cause for freedom in Lebanon for not only Dr Geagea and his co-defendants, but more importantly for the Lebanese populace generally, who have suffered as a result of the Syrian occupation and the manner in which they have been governed by the puppet regime installed by Syria, under President Lahoud.

What Geagea's incarceration epitomises is the very real cause for concern, not only as to the absence but rather the endemic deprivation by which Lebanon has been plagued by a failure to have made available to its citizens the following institutions which we take for granted in a democratic and independent system of government, namely:

(a) the rule of law;

(b) the right to a fair trial;

(d) the ability to have self-determination whereby a government is elected by a ballot that is fair and without impediment.

At the time of writing this paper there was no electoral law in place, despite the elections which are to be scheduled in May 2005. The prospect of the "come-back kid", Omar Karami, resuming his position as Lebanon's Prime Minister, having resigned, is not a prospect that fills one with confidence that the caretaker government will ensure that the electoral law that it promulgates will be both fair, free and open.

More to the point, irrespective of whether President Jimmy Carter and his team, having been agreed to, to monitor as international observers, the conduct of the election to be held in May 2005, there is no guarantee that such a proposition will be continued and more importantly, that the parties can enjoy the right to openly campaign under the freedom and in the pursuit of their various political groups without interference and the hindrance that the presence of the Syrian forces and their intelligence apparatus will frustrate both the campaign and the ballot.

Inevitably, time will tell whether Karami, a staunch ally of Syria, in extending what must be at this stage only a de facto invitation to President Carter, is nothing more than a "goodwill gesture" to the anti-Syria Opposition which has repeatedly rejected his re-appointment as a "second assassination of Hariri". It is nothing more than a ploy to keep Lebanon under Syria's tutelage, even after the withdrawal of its army and its purported redeployment of its dreaded secret service apparatus.

Whilst it is welcomed that the Carter Center, which has monitored elections, including the recent Palestinian elections in January 2005, will do an admirable job, if allowed to, the prospect of it being enabled to conduct its monitoring activities without interference and with full and free access is about as optimistic as leaving the landing lights on for Amelia Erhart.

The confidence that I repose in such an observation is borne out by the statement by Karami that if no new government could be formed within an adequate time frame then the elections would have to be postponed. This was a comment attributed to him by the paper Asharq Al Awsat, which is London-based, and to which he spoke on 12 March 2005.

A critical chronology, culminating in the Opposition of the willing

Samir Geagea and his party, the Lebanese Forces, have been a central plank in the Opposition ranks, playing an integral if not pivotal role in mustering the Lebanese populace, and in particular its Christian constituents. Along with the Free Patriotic Movement, led by General Aoun in exile and other Christian parties, they have united with Sunni adherents, the Druze, led by Walid Jumblatt and other Islamic and non-sectarian factions, to constitute a united Opposition - united to the withdrawal of Syria in its military and intelligence presence. Further, they are committed to the withdrawal of the puppet regime under Lahoud and to the restoration of a free, open and democratic government to be elected as soon as is possible.

The events that culminated in this emergence of the Opposition and its unification can be time-logged in the following chronology:

• 1 September 2004 - the Maronite Bishops' Council Fifth Appeal, where their Excellencies, inter alia, stated:

"Today, everybody knows that the final say in Lebanon is not for the Lebanese, but for the Syrians, although Lebanon is a country which the United Nations, following French mandate, had recognised its independence and sovereignty before Syria ... We frankly say it: Syria alone is to account for what has been going on in Lebanon, since it entered into Lebanon in 1976 as if it were a Syrian province, especially after the Taif Agreement. ..."

• 2 September 2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory and further declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential election conducted according to the Lebanese Constitutional rules devised with foreign interference or influence.

• 13 September 2004 - Mass to commemorate Lebanese Forces Martyrs' Day held at Notre Dame du Liban, attended by over 40,000 people, including Strida Geagea, wife of the imprisoned Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea.

• 1 October 2004 - Samir Geagea is moved to a ground-level cell in the Defence Ministry Prison MDDC at Yarize after spending 10 years and 5 months of solitary confinement in a 3 storey underground cell.

• 1 October 2004 UN Secretary General Anan finds Lebanon and Syria guilty of overtly defying Security Council Resolution 1559, in the case of Lebanon by succumbing to Syrian pressure to extend President Lahoud's tenure by 3 extra years and in the case of Syria by failing to withdraw its 15,000-strong army from Lebanon.

• 1 October 2004 - President Chirac informs Prime Minister Hariri that France would not compromise on the "full and absolute" implementation of UNSCR 1559 in a formal meeting between the two men held at the Elysee.

• 1 October 2004 - A car bomb explodes in western Beirut wounding former Lebanese Cabinet Minister, Marwan Hamadeh, he being one of four ministers who resigned in early September to protest parliament's decision to extend the Syrian-backed president, Emile Lahoud's term by three years.

• 5 October 2004 - Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze and the Chouf MP declared that his parliamentary bloc would not participate in any cabinet during President Emile Lahoud's term and that he would refuse to join the Cabinet as would members of his party, in support of Jumblatt's stance. Qornet Shehwan, an Opposition group indicated it would fall into line with Jumblatt and Hariri's stance that they would not serve in view of Lahoud's extended term which they viewed as unconstitutional.

• 6 October 2004 - Their Excellencies, the Maronite Bishops, in their monthly meeting held at Bkerkeh, denounced the Constitutional Crisis brought about by the amendment to the Lebanese Constitution to prolong the term of the President of the Republic against the UN Security Council's Resolution.

• 6 October 2004 - Lebanon and Syria reject any request for compliance with UNSCR 1559 and Hariri indicates that he will not make any decision as to whether he remains in government until the Security Council meets on Thursday, 7 October 2004.

• 19 October 2004 - UN Security Council urged Syria to withdraw its remaining 14,000 troops from Lebanon and called for a report from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan every six months on its compliance.

• 20 October 2004 - Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri resigned, his Cabinet was annulled and he indicated he would not head a new government due to internal political differences. Hariri tendered his written resignation to President Emile Lahoud, which was accepted.

• 29 December 2004 - Walid Jumblatt visited Samir Geagea's suburban house in Zouk Mosbeh and signed, in Strida Geagea's presence, a parliamentary petition for the release of the Lebanese Forces Commander, and after signing it was quoted as saying: "My move brings an end to a dark chapter of Lebanon's history and sets the grounds for a new era of co-operation and national reconciliation". The petition for Geagea's release sought effectively a Presidential pardon by the enactment of a Decree which would also provide for General Aoun to return to Lebanon from a 13 year exile in France.

• 11 January 2005 - The Human Rights Committee of the Lebanese Parliament, after visiting the Defence Ministry prison criticised the conditions of the confinement of Samir Geagea and Jirjis al-Khouri, requesting that they be transferred to the Roumieh Prison.

• 18 January 2005 - Lebanon is still without an electoral law, as required under the Constitution to enable the conduct of elections of members of the Lebanese Parliament. This development is noted as indicative of the non-functioning of the Lebanese Government, the requirement for general elections is governed by Article 42, requiring that they take place within a 60 day period preceding the expiration of the mandate.

• 14 February 2005 - car bomb kills 9 people, including former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al Hariri as they pass along a section of Beirut's waterfront Corniche. Hariri's death is deplored throughout Lebanon and by President George W. Bush, who issued a statement by his Press Secretary indicating that he was shocked and angered to learn of the terrorist attack that murdered the former Prime Minister. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Anan similarly issued a statement, expressing great sadness and shock at the brutal murder of the former Lebanese prime minister and noting it was an immense loss to Lebanon, the region and the international community. Immediate responsibility is attributed to Syria and its agents.

• 14 February 2005 - Opposition forces commence mass demonstrations which have continued to date, requesting Syria's withdrawal, the promulgation of a fair electoral law and the holding of open, free and democratic elections for the Lebanese Parliament forthwith.

• 1 March 2005 - Prime Minister Omar Karami resigns in a speech to the Lebanese Parliament, announcing that his government would resign with him.

• 10 March 2005 - Karami accepted a re-designation to form a new government, just 10 days after submitting the resignation of his previous Cabinet, in the face of the mass demonstrations publicly staged after the assassination of Ex-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005.

• 13 March 2005 - UN Emissary Terje Roed-Larson announces he has received from President Assad a pledge for the complete withdrawal of Syrian troops and intelligence personnel to be completed by April 27 2005. The pledge was given in a meeting held in Aleppo on Saturday, 12 March 2005.

• 13 March 2005 - Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister, Walid Moallem announced that the Assad regime was considering opening an embassy in Beirut - seen as a move that would enhance the perception that Lebanese sovereignty was at last being recognised by Syria by virtue of the fact that there has been no embassy open in Beirut, nor have there been any diplomatic relations established since Lebanon's independence.

The chronology set out above effectively highlights the developments in Lebanon and in what has been a very vivid, but nevertheless swift series of developments, even for international relations, the factor that springs to mind is the unification of the Opposition some time shortly before UNSCR 1559 and its augmentation in terms of its aggregation, both as to numbers and its sense of solidarity after Hariri's resignation, Jumblatt's signing of Geagea's petition and more importantly after Hariri's assassination.

In all of these events there is no doubt that a singular thread that runs through them is the coalescing of the Opposition forces to resolve to withstand any attempt to be fragmented and to be lulled back into the Syrian regime and the puppet government of Lahoud.

Karami, properly labelled "the come back kid" is suitably seen as the Syrian stooge, along with Lahoud, in seeking to maintain the ties with Syria, despite international disapproval. The refusal to seek the implementation and performance of the Taif Accord which provided for the withdrawal of Syrian troops by 1992 was one of the key demands that Geagea made and which ultimately was a factor that caused him to remain defiant by openly refusing to become a member of the government of Lahoud's predecessor, Elias Hrawi.

Significantly, it was Geagea who maintained the defiance and refused to co-operate. It was he who stood steadfast. Certainly, the other members of the Opposition and their constituent groups and parties who are now resolved to seek the deployment of the Syrian troops and intelligence cadres was a stance that Geagea had adopted long ago.

Geagea was arrested, tried and subsequently gaoled effectively for the term of his natural life, having capital sentences commuted for many crimes, notably the bombing of the Church of Our Lady of Deliverance, having an accessorial liability in the killing of Danny Chamoun and his family and the assassination of Rachid Karami, the then Prime Minister of Lebanon.

The trials are documented in the Amnesty International report referred to above.

It is Geagea's fate, and the manner in which he came to be a victim of the Lebanese judicial system undertaking the work of the government as neither an independent branch and in defiance of the rule of law, that necessitates a close look at why Geagea and the fate of Lebanon are so inextricably linked.

It is his position as an imprisoned leader of the Opposition and in particular a key constituent force of that Opposition, the outlawed Lebanese Forces Party, that warrants a very close examination of his fate as it will shed light on the malaise that is affecting Lebanon, even up to the present time.

The assassination of Hariri poses the question: "Where will it stop?" The events following Hariri's death show no signs of vanishing into historical inertia. On the contrary, they seem to be replicating themselves throughout the defenceless yet defiant body politic of the Lebanese Opposition - the new Coalition of the Willing. It is precisely this scenario into which Geagea factors prominently and figures pivotally.

Geagea has many parallels in history. One, obviously is Mandela. Another can be found in the political prisoners of Russia.

For Geagea, consolation comes to the political prisoner in the form of Philosophy. Like Boethius, in his dungeon at Pavia, out of favour with his ruler, accused of "using unholy means to obtain officers' property" and awaiting the "confiscation of [his] property", Mikhail Khodorkovsky has turned to the "remedies of reasoning".

In not too strained an analogy, we have recently seen the trials and tribulations through the internet, of the Russian oil billionaire, in prison for over a year, facing charges of fraud, and his statement that he has conveyed the regret that he had not relieved himself of "the tyranny of property" years ago, to enhance his "inner freedom" by devoting most of his time to studying world history and idealist philosophy.

While Geagea has no such regret in terms of the commission of any fraud, it cannot and has never been said of him that he ever acquired conspicuous wealth or any wealth for that matter, through devious means or otherwise. It is pertinent to note that incarceration inevitably produces contemplation.

In Russia, the contemplation of abstract and ultimate questions has long been a provocation to tyrants, as well as consolation to prisoners. The same can be said of Geagea and the source of discontent it represents to Lahoud and ultimately Assad.

Continuing with the Russian theme, soon after the French Revolution, Russia's outstanding Enlightenment thinker, Aleksandr Radischev, who had written an ode in defence of tyrannicide and embraced the concepts of natural law, universal rights, and a social contract, was banished to Siberia. Thus ended Russia's "Age of Reason". Similarly, Geagea's defiance of the tyranny of Assad and his late father and their puppet presidents has seen him banished to an intolerable incarceration.

Lebanon's Judiciary and the Rule of Law

The Judicial Council of Lebanon is at the apex of the judicial hierarchy. As such, under the Constitution it is revered as the body that in exercising judicial power pursuant to Article 20, they would do so as: "... Judges [who] are independent in the exercise of their duties. ..." By virtue of Article 8, it provides that:

"Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No-one may be arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except in accordance with the provisions of the law. No offence may be established or penalty imposed except by law."

How then, could the Judicial Council try Dr Geagea and Jirjis al-Khouri in circumstances where Amnesty International concluded that they should be released, or promptly retried before an ordinary and independent criminal Court, that applied regular provisions of the criminal law, in proceedings which adhered to an international standard for a fair trial, including the rights of the defendants to have adequate time and facilities for preparation of their defence and a counsel of their own choosing and to communicate with them in private and without any hindrance? To be tried with undue delay and to examine or have examined witnesses against them and to obtain the attendance and examination of those witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against them, and that they not be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. Further, that they have an appeal and/or review of the Court ruling before a higher Court, which is similarly independent of government. In short, the Judicial Council which tried them had no right of appeal.

Essentially, the trial was a farce and the judiciary that purported to try them were a mockery, en masse, of the institution of a judicial officer masquerading as they were in the purported solemnity of a courtroom.

Effectively, Lebanon's Judicial Council did not possess, nor did it adhere to the exercise of judicial power as provided for in Article 20 of the Constitution and it denied Geagea and his co-defendants the provisions of Article 8 and Article 7, which decree that all Lebanese are equal before the law and that they will equally enjoy civil and political rights and be bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction.

There is no doubt that the Constitution of Lebanon provided, as one of its great abiding themes, that the content of the substantive law enacted pursuant to the Constitution, together with the mechanics of the procedural law and the institution of the administration of justice, would be characterised by the omnipresence of both continuity and change.

Recently, the Chief Justice of Israel, commenting on the quality of justice, referred to stability but indicated that that did not mean stasis as a factor that would determine the concept of justice as practised. Chief Justice Aharon Barak said that:

"Like the eagle in the sky that maintains its stability only when it is moving, so too is the law stable only when it is moving." - Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy" (2002) 116 Harvard Law Review, 16 at 29.

Dr Geagea's trial was characterised by a gross and consistent denial of fairness. That Amnesty International has so found is a sad and poor reflection on the judiciary and the prosecutors who perpetrated, in the name of justice, the proceedings that tried Dr Geagea and his co-defendants. The Lebanese judicial system did not adhere to the dictate that many judges have commented on and in particular Mr Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court who, when addressing Magistrates at their annual conference, concluded that: "Like fairness, legitimacy should be constantly on display in Courts": "The Rise and Rise of the Magistracy" (2003) 15 Judicial Officers' Bulletin 1.

The Judicial Council of Lebanon did not live up to the expectation of the public that there should be confidence in the judiciary and that it should be unquestioned. Again, I refer to the statement of the Australian Chief Justice, the Honourable Murray Gleeson AC who, writing in the Australian Law Journal, had the following to say concerning confidence in the judiciary:

"Confidence in the judiciary does not require a belief that all judicial decisions are wise, or all judicial behaviour impeccable, any more than confidence in representative democracy requires a belief that all politicians are enlightened and concerned for the public welfare. What is required, however, is the satisfaction that the justice system is based upon values of independence, impartiality, integrity and professionalism, and that, within the limits of ordinary human frailty, the system pursues those values faithfully.

Courts and judges have a primary responsibility to conduct themselves in a manner that fosters that satisfaction. That is why judges place such emphasis upon maintaining both the reality and the appearance of independence and impartiality." (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal, 558 at 561.

Sadly, the Lebanese judiciary has not lived up to this perception and as a result the rule of law must suffer. Regrettably, Geagea and his co-defendants were the principal casualties.

In this scenario it is, if not fairly obvious, that Syria's hand in manipulating Lebanon to in effect quell Geagea so early in the piece, i.e. 1994, when he was calling for the implementation of the Taif Accord and there mysteriously occurred, soon after that, a series of criminal acts tantamount to murder, destruction of property and assassinations of notable individuals, much like what occurred with Hariri. The thread is so similar as to remove from it any idea that it was serendipitious. In fact and in truth, it was a criminal connivance of no small coincidence.

The denial by Syria of any involvement in any crime that has occurred to a prominent political figure in Lebanon, as recently as the denial by Assad, concerning Hariri's death, is but a perfect example of what George Orwell called "the double think".

A "double think" is primarily how Syria and the current regime in Lebanon exists whereby they exercise the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in the one mind, but accepting both of them. In essence, they purport to protest that they are not democratic by referring to and openly highlighting that Lebanon has a Constitutional democracy and that Syria's presence is only there because Lebanon requests that they stay on and any tutelage by Syria over Lebanon is neither in force, but willingly sought out.

It is much of the same hypocrisy that allegedly is boasted as the application of the rule of law in Lebanon. The sad reality is, of course, that it is nothing like the rule of law as constitutionally provided.

Geagea's fair trial

Again, another Constitutional myth exploded by the Amnesty International report and justly and rightfully denounced as an abject abnegation of the judicial responsibility by members of the Court and a perversion of the course of justice by the Prosecutor General, Addoum (as he then was) and until recently, Minister of Justice in the former Karami government.

In all of Geagea's trials there is no doubt that the hand of Addoum, as Prosecutor-General, was deftly in place to enable and in fact to contrive and bring about a gross perversion of the course of justice whereby he ensured that verdicts improperly obtained were the only result that could come about as a result of which Geagea was wrongly convicted, along with his co-defendants.

When one looks at the Amnesty International report it is patently obvious that Geagea and his co-defendants were denied a fair trial. They had nothing like the semblance of a fair trial, according to Lebanese law.

What is entailed in a fair trial? There are many statements, but possibly one of the best is that of Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce who, when giving judgment in 1846 in Pearse v Pearse 63 English Reports 950 at 957, defined a fair trial as follows:

"The discovery and vindication and establishment of truth are main purposes certainly of the existence of Courts of Justice; still, for the obtaining of these objects, which, however valuable and important, cannot be usefully pursued without moderation, cannot be either usefully or creditably pursued unfairly, or gained by unfair means, not every channel is or ought to be open to them. The practical inefficacy of torture is not, I suppose, the most worthy objection to the mode of examination ... Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely, may be pursued too keenly, may cost too much."

Geagea's convictions were as a result of evidence which has been obtained at a price which was unacceptable, having regard to the prevailing community standard. From such a fallacious foundation, Geagea cannot be allowed to be imprisoned any longer and his release must occur in order to provide a national reconciliation, bearing in mind his position within the Opposition.

Looked at from another perspective, the Lebanese judicial system is a pathetic parody when it comes to whether the rule of law exists, let alone whether it has been applied. A core characteristic of the rule of law is that the law must operate to constrain the arbitrary exercise of power, both private power and public power. Persons and institutions who have power, whether social, religious, political or economic, must exercise that power within, and subject to, a comprehensive framework of binding rules.

In both respects, i.e. economic and governmental, there have been quite dramatic developments in Lebanon since Syria's assumption of power that have led inevitably to the finding that the gross abuses by the Lebanese domestic government at the instigation of the Syrian mentor, has all but eroded any confidence that the rule of law exists.

While there is no universally accepted content of the "rule of law", nevertheless, in the jurisprudence of the Lebanese constitution, the concept encompasses forms of government, economic systems and human rights.

Equally, experience over many generations, and in many different societies, of which the Lebanese society is no different, has identified requirements of institutional design of the judiciary for a rule of law system. In the Lebanese context, one of the most significant of these requirements is the need for judicial independence - Article 20 of the Lebanese Constitution. At the very least, it is essential that the judiciary, as the ultimate guardians of the rule of law, have the level of competence, the integrity and the status that enables Courts to act as an effective constraint on the exercise of power and as a rational and fair dispute resolution mechanism.

Provisions such as Article 20 of the Lebanese Constitution, together with all of the other values associated with the rule law, such as accessibility, certainty, stability, are of little moment if the practical significance of the law is not high. If there is a wide gap between "law on the books" and "law in action" then unless that gap narrows, the rules contained in law will not provide a clear signal about what is permitted and what is proscribed. Persons will never acquire the requisite degree of security and predictability in their dealings with others.

This then is essentially what has occurred in Lebanon and as a State it cannot claim to be operating under the rule of law unless the laws are administered fairly, rationally, predictably, consistently and impartially. The presence of Syria is nothing more than an improper external influence which has attendant with it inducements and pressures which are inconsistent with each of these objectives.

Looked at further, the concept of fairness, in order to underpin the rule of law, requires a reasonable process of consideration of the rights and duties asserted. Rationality requires a reasoned relationship between the rights and duties and an outcome. Predictability requires a process by which the outcome is directly related to the original rights and duties. Consistency requires similar cases to lead to similar results. Impartiality requires the decision-maker to be indifferent to the outcome.

Lebanon's judiciary, and in particular since the time of the Syrian assumption of power, has been robbed of each of these qualities. Concomitant with the judiciary is the infection with the Office of Prosecutor General, and especially under the auspices of Prosecutor General Addoum. He is an out and out pariah. His sum total to the administration of justice is the exercise of improper influence, through political pressure, bias and corruption, which effectively has distorted all of the objectives referred to above and has led to incompetence and inefficiency and worse still, corruption of the judicial process.

Geagea's convictions are all as a result of the judicial process miscarrying on account of the manner in which the government has allowed the judiciary to become pawns in the political process.

Reflecting on Geagea's plight, one is reminded of the Analects of Confuscius, which record the Master saying that there were three matters that are essential for government: weapons, food and a trust of the people. Of the three, he said, trust was the most important. The significance of public confidence in the administration of justice is a manifestation of this fundamental proposition.

Over the recent years in Lebanon, and more particularly since the assumption of Syrian hegemony, there have been frequent and well-justified expressions of concern about what many detect to be a decline in the level of public trust within governmental institutions and in particular the judiciary.

It is no coincidence that the level of trust in the Lebanese society has been sadly misplaced and brought into doubt by the recent events which have been capped off with the assassination of Hariri. The presence of Geagea's incarceration has effectively juxtaposed the level of trust by the Lebanese as a form of social capital in their government and in particular the judicial system. As a resource, trust, as a form of social capital, is equally as important as physical capital, for the effective and efficient operation of an economy and society.

The unification of the Opposition and the role that Geagea has played whilst incarcerated represents a reinvestment of social capital in the concept and the belief that institutions are the fundamental bases for all forms of social interaction.

It is Cedarwatch's submission that Geagea's incarceration, denied his fundamental right to a fair trial, has enabled a reassessment of the social capital that the Lebanese society had, up to that stage, lacked. It is as if Hariri, like the Russian magnate, had realised that despite rebuilding Lebanon, in terms of the bricks and mortar, that his Clean Air Corporation had sought to bring about, finally realised that unless there was a restoration of the trust of the people by way of social capital, all the investment in terms of monetary and physical capital would come to nought. In that regard, Geagea adhered to that concept. If one were to develop this theme, it is patently obvious that the social capital that has been reaffirmed in Lebanon in the form of the Opposition uniting, as it is, is but a realisation that like other forms of capital, social capital is subject to a process of depreciation and it requires continuing investment to replenish its capital base. So said, the re-emergence of the Opposition unified is but a re-affirmation that Lebanon's administration is long overdue for a re-assessment of its capital needs. In that regard, the administration of justice does not differ from other spheres of public conduct in this respect.

This much having been said, it then remains to be opined that in any stable polity there is a widely accepted concept of how governance should operate in practice.

The Lebanese Opposition has now realised and, more importantly, what Geagea had been bemoaning for many, many years, both before he was incarcerated, and whilst incarcerated, that the role of the integrity branch of government was to ensure that the performance of governmental functions was not carried out in a corrupt manner. This is not merely to say that the narrow sense should be accepted by officers not taking bribes, but rather in a broader sense of observing proper practice. It is further a fact that institutional integrity goes beyond a narrow concept of illegality to encompass at least two additional considerations. First, the maintenance of fidelity to the public purposes for the pursuit of which an institution is created. Secondly, the application of the public values, including procedural values, which the institution was expected and/or required to obey.

Again, the Lebanese system fails both concepts and effectively stands guilty of being a government that has thrived on illegality and a lack of integrity. Is it any wonder that Cardinal Sfeir, the Maronite Patriarch, has commented that Geagea's incarceration is not limited solely to his imprisonment but represents the imprisonment of Lebanon.

I certainly concede, and do not resile from the fact that these comments may be general, if not perhaps vague statements. They may also suffer from the infirmity, which is not unusual in this kind of discourse, on the purpose of fidelity to public values, such as integrity, which can amount to nothing more than an amorphous concept. However, where the focus must inevitably turn to executive decision-making, together with much of the legislative and judicial decision-making which has led to the present torment that Lebanon is labouring under, then in that regard the complaints made by the Opposition, and more importantly those complaints which Geagea proffered as long ago as 1990 and thereafter, must place him in a rather special position that he had the foresight to at least note, if not highlight, what he believed to be the real problem with the Lebanese administration, which others have only recently come to accept and denounce. Their delay is not regretted, nor is it seen as an impediment, but what is important is to focus on the timely manner in which Geagea realised that unless and until there was an adherence to the terms of the Taif Accord, there could be no peace, let alone any integrity, in the government of Lebanon.

The Opposition in Lebanon - the Cedar Revolution

The Opposition in Lebanon is constantly reminded that Assad, like his father, is obsessed, relentless and seized with an almost reptilian vindictiveness. How then does one deal with a despot determined to lie, cheat and steal, to impose his will, even as late as March 13, by advising the UN Secretary-General's envoy that all troops and intelligence operatives will leave Lebanon by 27 April?

Lebanon's Opposition is on the move, there is no doubt about that. It is like a social Tsunami. It has the hallmarks of a popular revolution. To characterise the momentum and the direction of the "Cedar Revolution", as it has come to be termed, one must reflect on what could be defined, if not discerned as the sense of momentum in the Cedar Revolution.

Looking for analogues in history, I am reminded of Charles Kerrsman's recent study of the genesis of Iran's 1979 revolution. Writing in his epic work "The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran" he drew a conclusion that may well be applicable to the Lebanese movement when he wrote:

"If we want to change the world - and who doesn't - then we are marching boldly toward a situation of confusion, the moment when old patterns begin to be disrupted and new ones take their place. For a change as significant as a revolution, we cannot know in advance who will cling to the old ways and who will embrace the new. All that remains is to pursue the goal for its own sake, because we consider it the right thing to do. All we can do is to try to make the unthinkable thinkable. That is what Khomeini did. Whether or not we agree with goals, we can learn from his pursuit of them."

The impetus that the Opposition has gained from its rejection of the unilateral imposition of the constitutional amendment to clause 49 and the attempted interference with the rigged electoral law, yet to be proclaimed, but effectively seeking to yet again deliberately determine the outcome of the elections of the Deputies to the Lebanese Parliament, is what this Opposition must confront and what it must direct its momentum to, in order to bring about the stability and the integrity of the Cedar Revolution.

Again, one is reminded of the revolution in Paris, with the students declaring, in May 1968: "L'imagination au pauvoir" - all power to the imagination? But imagination is not enough. How power is shaped and exercised is absolutely crucial. The Cedar Revolution would run the risk of opening the door to the kind of disaster that has occurred again and again in modern revolutions: idealists taking advantage of confusion to seize power and then imposing fascist, communist or theocratic tyrannies; as happened in Iran. Those hoping for moderate and liberating change get swept along by the tide of revolution, then subject to a new regime that will brook no Opposition. This has been a great flaw of all the radical revolutions, since that in France in 1789. They failed abysmally in the task of creating constitutions of liberty and ended up, in short order, magnifying rather than overcoming tyranny. The twentieth (20th) century ended with this lesson being, at least, more or less absorbed. The East European revolutions of 1989 were democratic ones, not radical ones. So it is now in the Middle East - or so it has begun. The vital task for the Cedar Revolution is to keep things developing on these lines. It may be said that Iraq is a work in progress; the Palestinian authority has made the merest of beginnings and Egypt and Syria are beginning to feel the pressure.

Lebanon would be the greatest breakthrough if the Cedar Revolution can seize the moment and more importantly, seize the day.

To that end, the work of Geagea is a vital component to the achievement of these aims and to the realisation of the aspirations of the Cedar Revolution. The momentum is well and truly under way, the vitality is present and the commitment is beyond question. As a phenomenon the Cedar Revolution is an expression of the doctrine of national sovereignty.

The critics of the fostering of democracy in the Middle East all point to the fact that it cannot be imposed from outside by legions of Washington think-tankers. This of course than nothing more than an ill-informed rhetoric. Lebanon's existence was well before and independent of any Washington think-tanker. It has always been held up to be a very worthy example of a democracy existing for a pluralist community, where despite the diverse sects, all of its inhabitants existed harmoniously.

That argument against the restoration of democracy and independence in Lebanon has been mooted by Assad himself. He has often decried the reluctance to leave by citing that the presence of his troops are to assuage the concern of the ordinary Lebanese that the return to the civil war will not be accompanied by their retreat. Assad refers to the fact that many of today's humanitarian disasters arise from civil wars. It is not the dictators who cause these wars, but the extreme difficulty in some States of reconciling competing claims to ethnic or religious self-rule within a single polity. Indeed, dictatorship is the only thing which stops such States from breaking up: it was the emergency of democracy in Yugoslavia which led directly to ethnic cleansing. Europe had to undergo a 30-year civil war in the 17th century to establish the principles of political liberty and religious tolerance, and even then they were not fully secure. Again, Assad refers to the fact that it is no coincidence that western-leaning Muslim states are autocracies, such as Saudi Arabia.

If one must look for the irony that comes about from a popular movement turning against itself, one need go no further than to point out that The French Revolution showed how comprehensively the new order that emerged in the summer of 1789 betrayed the peasants and workers who created it. Threatened by the collapse of all authority in the countryside, the constituent assembly famously abolished feudalism on the night of August 4. Yet appearances were deceptive, the main seigneurial dues were not simply commuted, but had to be redeemed by the peasants for a lump sum of roughly 20 or 30 times the annual rate. To add insult to injury, when the recently nationalised church lands went on sale, in late 1790, the lions share went not to the peasantry, but to former officer-holders of the old regime flush with the compensation payments for the abolition of their offices. In the first years of the revolution, taxation actually rose as the equity crisis continued unabated.

Even these blunders paled into insignificance beside the constituent assembly's greatest mistake - to obliged all the French clergy to take an oath of obedience in January 1791 to the radical reforms being imposed on the Church. Roughly half refused. This posed no great problem in the generally anti-clerical cities, but in the countryside, the priest was often the leader of the community, and his refusal automatically pitched his flock into opposition to the new regime. The result in these areas was a conservative popular mobilisation that exactly mirrored the radical one of 1789.

Critically, so seen and so delicately balanced, the Cedar Revolution must take account of the potential to derail itself and in that regard must further take action to ensure that it does not become morbidly fascinated with extreme and that the unity that it avows and espouses for all Lebanese people will be maintained confidently and constructively. I am reminded of what W.B. Yeats began to claim on the fact that as he was Irish he could not help being a hater. In fact he said, as an Irishman it was congenital to hate. The famous bard, writing in "A Prayer for My Daughter" on his propensity for hatred as being attributed to his Irish nationality said:

"Out of Ireland have we come.

Great hatred, little room,

maimed us at the start.

I carry from my mother's womb

a fanatic heart."

How then do the Lebanese react to the years of torment, torture and tyranny? Do they carry with them the propensity for hatred that Yeats, as if possessed by a demon, so readily acknowledged? The answer must be that in order to survive they must dispel such concepts and such feelings of revulsion, as difficult as they may be.

Again, Geagea, as the fulcrum for the Opposition, from his prison cell provides a template for the manner in which all oppressed Lebanese must react. They must not be possessed of blind optimism, that overlooks what are effectively facts on the ground, for such optimism is no better than despair.

Syria, in its desperation, has now decided that "with the knife at its throat" it is going to obey the Taif Accord and purport to perform UNSCR 1559. In that sense, Syria, as the totalitarian order, has been dealt a serious, but possibly not a fatal blow and in its hour of desperation is seeking to depart from Lebanon, but there must be a degree of caution attendant to such an announcement.

Syria is attempting to defend itself by its typical means which inevitably will produce or see the manufacture of a crisis, thereby misleading the people and subverting civic values. What the Opposition must not commit is the personal guilt of encouraging these tendencies, but rather it must check them by attempting to rapidly resurrect the State which is predisposed not to illegality and the abuse of rights, but the preservation of the rule of law and the restoration of democracy. Certainly, this is easier said than done, but what must be monitored now is that Syria is lying when it says it will leave by April 27, 2005. What is certain is that between now and April 27, 2005 a crisis will be borne and mercifully which Lebanon will be able to cope with and overcome, but nevertheless, Syria will not leave without incident and it is that incident, in whatever form it takes, that must be realised by the Opposition to be confidently confronted and dealt with constructively.

Prior to his arrest and from his prison cell Geagea has shown that he has much in common with George Washington. There was no doubt that Washington, and in particular his willingness to take risks, led him into rash actions in both the French and Indian wars and the early stages of the Revolution. Such errors forced on him a Fabian strategy of attrition and strategic withdrawal, which went against all his instincts and seemed to earn him the galling accusations of dishonour or cowardice that were directed at him.

While Geagea may not suffer from such accusations, there certainly is no doubt that he has borne the brunt of the unfounded and unjustified criticism that he was in some way culpable in the calamitous crimes with which he was charged and unjustly convicted. In that regard his role and his performance while in custody are on a par with the efforts made by Washington to check his headlong ways by consulting with others and practising restraint on a heroic scale.

Geagea's resistance and his refusal to give in to the Lebanese at the behest of Syria is restraint on a heroic scale. Geagea has, like Washington, held firm to his principles, thereby holding together all of his political party members and in the process giving example to all of the Lebanese people who are dismayed and disenchanted with the tyrannical regime under which they are labouring. Geagea, like Washington, never left his men when they went into winter quarters. Washington did not return to Mt Vernon for seven years. Geagea has remained in custody and refused to be released unless and until the Government withdraws, thereby adhering to his principles. He has left the company of his wife and family, remaining incarcerated. If Geagea had left his prison cell there would be no followers for him to return to. In essence, like Washington was to his army, he is the glue of the Lebanese Forces, its ground, its reason for being, a role he could only sustain by denying himself his liberty, and herein lies his strength. It has been that example which has provided the inspiration and the impetus to the Opposition.

Contrast Geagea to Lahoud and there is no comparison. Lahoud is, if one needs to have a comparable, much like Robert Mugabe. Mugabe's fate lay in the fact that he is not, and never has been, half the man that people took him for. People say "Get rid of Mugabe and we will get back on course". But he has created a whole caste of greedy people like himself, get rid of him and there will others as bad. If this is the merest pessimism, and the crooks can be got rid of, then there will remain the damage that has been done. This is Lahoud's legacy to Lebanon.

What Lahoud has done to Lebanon, unlike Geagea, is the personification of the adage dulled with age which comes startlingly to life when one realises the pathetic performance that he has brought to bear as President, and it is in the saying "There is a tide in the affairs of men". Had Lahoud ridden the tide that was running, and has been in Lebanon, it could have been an example to all of the Middle East. Alas, Lahoud didn't and the shallows and the miseries are there as evidence. Nothing can recover that opportunity for him. Those of us who are old enough can only count lost possibilities and yet all people are naturally optimistic and believe in and have, at all times, a romantic obsession with what could be. In that regard, Geagea and the Cedar Revolution is such a personification of that optimism.

Incarceration of a figure as familiar as Geagea for crimes which were unbelievably without foundation, and for which he has paid a high price, are but a reflex of his national appeal and the threat he poses to Syria and its puppet regime.

Familiar words carry a history lesson as sharp as the bitterest experience. There are indeed tides that will never repeat themselves. The Cedar Revolution is such a tide and the Lebanese people must ride it and not drown in it.

Again, looking at a figure with which Geagea equates, in terms of the struggle and the performance of that struggle, is Vaclav Havel the President of the Czech Republic, who was imprisoned by the communist regime.

Havel's spokesman, Michael Zantovski, who was the Czech Ambassador to Washington from 1992 to 1997, summarised Havel's contribution in a quote attributed to him by Paul Wilson, writing in the New York Review of Books (April 10, 2003). Zantovski, in the course of the interview, said:

"As Speaker O'Neill used to say, all politics is local, and that goes for presidents as well."

Zantovski said:

"Havel could never have what he did for the good name of the country abroad if he had not played a major role in the transformation of the former socialist country to a democratic country, a stable country, a tolerant country, a country that observes human rights, that is part of a western political and security structures. Every one of those notions involved fight, a major fight that had to be fought at home and not abroad, and Havel was active and often instrumental in most of those fights."

The parallel with Geagea is uncanny.

In November 2002 Havel gave a speech to the Aspen Institute at the NATO Summit in Prague. In the audience were Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. Havel referred to two tragic experiences that his people had undergone in the course of his lifetime and the consequences which had stayed with them for a long time. One of the experiences he referred to was the western capitulation to Hitler at Munich and the other was the Soviet invasion, which he went on to describe quite vividly as follows:

""But", he went on, "we have another experience: that of being occupied by the Warsaw Pact States in 1968. At the time, the whole country repeated the word ‘sovereignty' and condemned the official Soviet claim that the invasion was "fraternal assistance" carried out in the name of values higher than State sovereignty; that is, in the name of socialism, which they claimed was threatened here and that thereby, the very hope of mankind for a better life was threatened as well. Almost all of us knew then that it was really about Soviet hegemony and economic exploitation, nothing more. Still, millions of people in the Soviet Union probably believed that our sovereignty was being suppressed in the name of higher values, human values. This "second experience", he said, "urges me to great caution ... We have to weigh, again and again, on a delicate apothecary's scale, whether the issue here is really to help people confronting a criminal regime, and the protection of humanity against its weapons, or whether it just might happen to be another version - far more sophisticated, of course, than the Soviet versions in 1968 - of fraternal assistance."

How reminiscent is it of the statement by Assad when, on 11 October 2004 he publicly contended that Syria has no tutelage over Lebanon. He said that Syria got no rewards for its domineering military presence in Lebanon, he went on to say to a conference of Syrian immigrants abroad, speaking in the Syrian parliament, that:

"Certain forces speak of Syrian domination of Lebanon. We have no interest in such domination."

He then continued:

"... We did not ask for any wealth, oil or electricity (from Lebanon). If we wanted to impose a hegemony, then why did we stage redeployments of our forces over the last 5 years?"

Further, Assad referred to promulgation of UNSCR 1559 as "... blatant interference in Lebanese affairs". He then continued: "What did these forces which have been expressing their attachment to Lebanon do for this country?" He said "Where were these forces at the start of the war when some Lebanese were being massacred in the name of socialism, justice and reform of the political regime?"

Continuing, he then said: "Where were they ... in 1982 when thousands of Lebanese were killed and when Syria lost thousands?" he said, referring to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The parallels with the Soviet justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia are uncanny and in the dialect of a dictator it is the same forked tongue that is speaking, even as recently as March 12 2005, in assuring the United Nations that all Syrian troops and intelligence operatives will leave Lebanon by 27 April 2005.

Parallels between the Cedar Revolution and the Ukrainian Revolution

The Cedar Revolution has its own distinctive character and what, if any, parallels it may have with the Ukrainian position are certainly a matter that we must explore and more importantly from a perspective that essentially Geagea's incarceration is a primary source of inspiration for this revolution. It is his insistence to remain incarcerated that has effectively given heart and courage to Jumblatt and to Hariri and others who now comprise the Cedar Revolution.

When one considers revolution one is reminded of the concept of a staircase. In that regard I refer you to the incident in February 1848 where the poet, Lamartine, found himself in charge of a Paris revolution, from an upper floor in the Hotel De Ville. He identified on the staircase something as specific as a tornado, a rolling double helix formed of those fighting their way upwards and those pressing downwards. It appears whenever a society mutinies and decides to make a new world.

This has often been repeated throughout history and some instances of recent times include the Sorbonne in May 1968 and Solidarity's first Warsaw strike headquarters in 1980 and the White House Parliament during the 1991 Moscow putsch.

In January 2005 it came to Kiev, on the staircase of the Trade-Union building taken over by the Orange Revolution, at the corner of Maidan Nezalezhnosti-Independence Square. Here is the same spiral tumult, which has now found itself on a more level playing field in Beirut without a staircase but rather a chess board in the form of Martyrs' Square.

Hariri's death preceded by Jumblatt's declaration of support for Geagea, and prior to that, the attempted assassination of one of his deputies, following on the extended tenure of Lahoud's term as President and Hariri's resignation as Prime Minister was indeed the genesis of the Cedar Revolution. There is no doubt that the genus revolution rightly describes the movement, the question is what species is it?

The Cedar Revolution, like the Kiev Revolution, or Orange Revolution, is termed in Soviet speak ‘Demokratura'. It is this species that evolved after the fall of the Soviet Empire. Most of them have democratic furniture: constitutions, parliaments, a formally separate judiciary, regular elections, guarantees of free expression and assembly.

In practice, these institutions are manipulated to maintain the privilege of a post-communist elite. In some demokraturas, like the Asian ones, manipulation is total and shameless. In others, like Ukraine or Russia, the falsification of elections and the use of State violence against political challengers has usually been undertaken with some discretion. The important thing is to keep your own mob in power while persuading the people and the outside world that the political process at least roughly reflects the popular will.

In the Ukraine, in January 2005, demokratura hit the limits set by its own hypocrisy. A President election result had to be cooked, and yet there was no practical way to exclude foreign election monitors while maintaining a pretence of fairness. Worse still, with TV only partly under State control, Ukrainians had been warned to expect fraud at the final run-off vote. When the foreign observers loudly confirmed that fraud had taken place, the lid blew off.

There were two conflicting views - one hopeful, the other ‘realistic' and dismissive - about the second-round revolutions. The hopeful version is that these uprisings begin the transition from demokratura to democracy, at the completion of 1989. The pessimistic version is that these are merely succession laws, what the Germans call a "diadochenkampf" - between members of governing elites and clans who stir up popular passion for their own temporary purposes. The sceptics suggest that what really matters in a demokratura change of guard is not largesse with human rights (freedom scattered to the crowd like handfuls of small change) but the dirty trade in immunities.

The Cedar Revolution must not allow itself to become such a development. In conversations had with Ukrainians at the time of the agitation, they were quoted as saying things like:

• "To be normal means not to have a criminal as a prime minister"

• "It means to have votes which aren't falsified, to pay for what you want instead of bribing for it, to trust the currency, to get ahead on merit instead by corruption, and to have natural resources run the public interest and not by selfish dinosaurs"

• "It means those who steal from the State, even Presidents, must stand trial"

• "It means having a clean country"

• "Thirteen years since independence and we still don't have the confidence to be a real, normal European nation. Until now"

Do these sentiments sound familiar? Are these not the utterances of the every-day Lebanese that we have seen and heard in the TV coverage and the newspaper reports.

The great Kiev protest functioned as a street university, much the same as what is occurring in the street university in Beirut. In that forum people from all over the country have met, debated and discovered that what they held in common was true for all Lebanese as it was for all Ukrainians. It was reminiscent of what Lech Walesa said in 1980 when he was telling his followers from Solidarity that: "A Pole must be able to talk to a Pole!" Among other things, normality and unity mean that Lebanese should learn to talk to Lebanese, regardless of their sect and/or political persuasion. Why is it that to date there's been no violence in Lebanon and further, why was it that with the Ukraine there was an absence of violence? The lack of aggression was because there was a lack of fear. For the first time in the experience of the everyday Lebanese, men and women who had gone into the street to overthrow a regime seemed not to consider that they might be fired on by security forces, that there might be a state of siege and a military putsch, that there would be mass arrests and persecutions if they failed, that Syrian tanks were amassing on the front tier.

It is amazing that in a country like the Ukraine, it has a history very much similar to, if not identical to Lebanon. In the Ukraine, the emergence of this fearlessness is both new and wonderful, as it equally is for Lebanon. The Ukraine was always a battlefield between occupiers and a corridor for contending armies, the Ukraine was seen as a perpetual victim. Its options were limited to a gambler's choice between one conqueror or another. The similarity with Lebanon is too close for comfort.

The Ukraine, in January 2005, was faced with a regime that they despised, rather than feared - doesn't Lahoud come within this same revulsion? It necessitated action by the people and as a result millions of people poured into the street. They had been profoundly insulted by what they had seen done to their votes. They wanted to have the wrong put right, and nobody would shoot them for it. That confidence, and that touchy civic honour, are surely part of what it means to be modern and normal. Again, the Lebanese are equally sensitive to what has been done to them and more importantly their civic honour.

The coverage of the Ukrainian revolution would not be complete, in terms of its similarities with what lies ahead for Lebanon, if we did not concentrate on what had emerged from the feedback from the students within the university on the street. At a city called Postup, there was quoted a journalist who, referring to the developments in the mass demonstrations that had been organised, indicated to a commentator that: "Our trouble is we are so extreme. Everything has to be black or white. And in the same way, huge enthusiasm blazes up like this, then subsides entirely so that old bad things and people can crawl back.

How true this is of Lebanese politics on a national, local and even communal stage. How endemic is it that the cronies and ratbags who have nothing to offer invariably entrench themselves to be recreated and/or reformulated at an appropriate time after they had been discarded. They resurrect, like mushroom spores, overnight, only to come back an wreak havoc on the victims who had them eradicated in the first place.

This phenomenon must not be allowed to occur with Lebanon and more importantly is the responsibility of the Opposition to see put to rest, once and for all, was a factor that occupied the minds of many Ukrainians.

The question was posited: was this to be the story of the Orange Revolution of 2004? Those who took part still feel that something has changed for ever, in their country and in themselves. But no movement to embody and enforce the will of the Maidan has emerged. The Pora group, although it helped to direct and organise the first eruption of protest, is too small and vague in its aims to do this job. Apart from a loose parliamentary coalition called "Our Ukraine" President Yuschenko would have no political troops of his own.

When looking at how the President of the Ukraine will now seek to govern and how will he protect himself from those who tried to murder him four months ago, should they try again, would he need to rely upon the people to return to the street to save him? Or if he betrayed them, would they return to the street in an effort to depose him?

Such considerations also would be apposite for a Lebanese leader who democratically came to power. The Ukraine, like Lebanon has undergone a proliferation of corruption which has become systemic. Effectively, that is how the Ukraine and Lebanon both work. It's a sort of service industry in itself, stretching from the billionaire oligarchs who respectively owned the Ukraine and Lebanon's resources, through the clientship and clan network of local power, down to the millions of underpaid bureaucrats and policemen who must extort bribes to feed their families. The result is an unreal economy.

In the Ukraine, Yuschenko could follow Putin's example in Russia, and used the police to terrorise the oligarchs into flight or submission. Would this work in Lebanon? I think not.

In the Ukraine, the cost of that would be dictatorial lawlessness and the super-rich of Kieve and Donetsk are clever, much like their