Wednesday, November 29, 2006

Ambassador John Bolton on Lebanon-Nov 28

Ambassador John R. Bolton                                                     
Remarks in the Security Council                                               
New York City                                                                  
November 28, 2006        
 
Reporter: On Lebanon, is there a deadline that you are willing to wait for the Lebanese to get out of this deadlock in basically ratifying the agreement --                                                                       
Ambassador Bolton: I'm not sure there is a deadlock. As I understand it, the matter lies before the president for a 15-day period. That period has begun. He
either acts to endorse the agreement and send it to the parliament or it goes automatically to the parliament, where the parliament will then take a decision. So we're in a period that is sort of a statutory hold on the government's consideration, but then when it goes to the parliament, they'll make their decision.    

Ambassador Bolton on Lebanon

Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Remarks in the Security Council                                               
New York City                                                                 
November 27, 2006         
 
Reporter: In the aftermath of the Lebanese government's approval, what
are the next steps as far as you see them? Are they supposed to be a signature
between the United Nations and the Lebanese government first, and then it goes
to the Parliament for ratification? Or is the president of the republic's     
position changed that -- has it changed that?                                 
                                                                        
And in that case, would there be Plan B, Chapter VII resolution, if that cannot
happen? And lastly, there is a Syrian letter, if you don't mind telling use   
your action to it and whether you are worried about further assassinations.   
                                                                       
Ambassador Bolton: Yeah. The question of how the government of Lebanon proceeds
to undertake its own constitutional procedures is really a matter for that    
government to decided. And when they have finished those pr ocedures, then we  
can move to the question of signature and so on. But this is something that's 
now in the hands of the government of Lebanon, and as I say, we await their   
response.                                                                     
                                                                        
I think that the danger that the White House forecast of Iranian and Syrian   
interference in Lebanon forecast some weeks ago remains very much on our minds.
And I think it'll be the subject of discussions on the president's trip.      
Certainly when he goes to the region, this could well be a decisive point in  
Lebanon's history and hopefully its progress toward a freely elected and      
democratic government and a stable situation. And if it -- if that's          
unsuccessful there, it will obviously have dramatically negative consequences 
for the region as a whole.                                              
                                                                       
So we're following it very carefully and want to do everything we can to      
support the democratically elected forces in the government of Lebanon.        
                                                          
Reporter: Syrian letter -- can you give us your reaction to the Syrian letter,
in which the said that basically they don't see a purpose of a tribunal before
the investigation is set up, and that they will not cooperate, basically. The 
bottom-line answer is --                                                       
                                                               
Ambassador Bolton: Yeah. Well, that's certainly nothing new from Syria. They  
haven't cooperated adequately from the beginning. And if I were in their shoes,
I guess I'd worry even more about establishing a tribunal than the            
investigation. So no surprises there from Syria, as usual.                    
                                                                        
Reporter: Yeah. We know that the opposition, especially Hezbollah and Amal,   
have made a statement over the weekend stating that they are not against the  
international tribunal and they support that. Don't you think that a national 
unity government in Lebanon is a prerequisite here for the stability of Lebanon
to prevent any change or any coup that may happen, since the current government
is illegitimate, does not represent the people? And we have seen that, and we 
are expecting an escalation this week in Lebanon in order to change the       
situation there.                                                               
                                                                       
Ambassador Bolton: Well, if Hezbollah and Amal support the establishment of the
tribunal -- which they signaled when they agreed to the negotiators and agreed
to the process -- then presumably they can express that by voting in favor of 
the agreement in parliament, where i t will then receive -- will receive an    
overwhelming vote.                                                            
                                                                       
I mean, this is -- we are doing nothing more than was forecast, really, from  
the beginning of the p rocess beginning with Resolution 1595 and other         
resolutions, so it should come as no surprise to anybody. This has been       
negotiated between the lawyers for the secretariat acting on behalf of the    
Security Council and senior jurisprudents from Lebanon, very well-respected   
individuals. I think it's a very straightforward agreement, and the statute   
creating the tribunal is very straightforward. So I would hope that all the   
various confessional elements within Lebanon would agree to this.             
                                       ;                                 
Reporter: There are many in Lebanon, Mr. Ambassador, skeptical about the      
possibility of ratifying the agreement with the United Nations because of     
dilly-dallying of Nabih Berri, the speaker of the parliament, to call the     
parliament into session because of the president's bias to Syria.              
                                                           
In the absence of ratifying it, there are -- many are speaking about the      
possibility of the Security Council moving and issuing a resolution to Chapter
VII. Is this at all a possibility, taking in consideration that Lebanon       
requested for a tribunal in the first place?                                   
                                                        
Ambassador Bolton: Yeah. Well, I'd rather not speculate on what might or might
not happen if the government of Lebanon is prevented one way or another from  
following its own constitutional procedures. We have done what was required of
the Security Council, to put this back in the government's court in Beirut, and
the cabinet has now approved the draft agreement and the statute establishing 
the tribunal. As I understand it, it awaits the president's decision; if he   
does not decide within, you know, a 15-day period, then it's -- the government
may submit it to the parliament, and the parliament has the authority to ratify
with a simple majority. So I think -- as I said, I'd rather not speculate about
what else might be out there. We'll wait and see if this doesn't play out inside Lebanon.  

Monday, November 27, 2006

Security Council Meeting Nov. 21 2006 regarding situation in the Middle East

United Nations S/PV.5569
Security Council

Sixty-first year
5569th meeting

Tuesday, 21 November 2006, 4.20 p.m.
New York

Provisional

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the
interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in
the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original
languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature
of a member of the
delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
C-154A.
06-62526 (E)
*0662526*

President: Mr. Voto-Bernales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . (Peru)
Members: Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . Mr. Mayoral
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . Mr. Liu Zhenmin
Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . Mr. Biabaroh-Iboro
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . Ms. Løj
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . Mr. De La Sablière
Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . Mr. Yankey
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . Mrs. Papadopoulou
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . Mr. Shinyo
Qatar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . Mr. Al-Nasser
Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . Mr. Churkin
Slovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . Mr. Burian
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . Mr. Williams
United Republic of Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mr. Manongi
United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Mr. Bolton

Agenda

The situation in the Middle East

S/PV.5569
2 06-62526

The meeting was called to order at 4.20 p.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation in the Middle East
The President (spoke in Spanish): I should like
to inform the Council that I have received a letter from
the representative of Lebanon, in which she requests to
be invited to participate in the discussion of the item
on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual
practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to
invite that representative to participate in the
consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter
and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of
procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
At the invitation of the President, Ms. Ziade
(Lebanon) took a seat at the Council table.
The President (spoke in Spanish): The Security
Council will now begin its consideration of the item on
its agenda.
Following consultations among the members of
the Security Council, I have been authorized to make
the following statement on behalf of the Council.
“The Security Council unequivocally
condemns the assassination in Beirut on
21 November 2006 of Industry Minister Pierre
Gemayel, a patriot who was a symbol of freedom
and of the political independence of Lebanon.
The Security Council expresses its deepest
sympathy and condolences to the family of the
victim and to the people and Government of
Lebanon.
“The Security Council condemns any
attempt to destabilize Lebanon through political
assassination or other terrorist acts. The Security
Council is gravely concerned by this
assassination and its possible impact on ongoing
efforts by the Government and people of Lebanon
to solidify democracy, extend the authority of the
Lebanese Government throughout its territory
and complete the reconstruction process.
“The Security Council calls upon all parties
in Lebanon and the region to show restraint and a
sense of responsibility with a view to preventing
any further deterioration of the situation in
Lebanon. The Security Council urges all States,
in accordance with its resolutions 1373 (2001),
1566 (2004) and 1624 (2005), to cooperate fully
in the fight against terrorism.
“The Security Council welcomes the
determination and commitment of the
Government of Lebanon to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this and
other assassinations and underlines its
determination to support the Government of
Lebanon in its efforts to this end.
“The Security Council reaffirms its previous
calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully
and urgently with the Security Council for the
full implementation of all relevant resolutions
concerning the restoration of the territorial
integrity, full sovereignty and political
independence of Lebanon, in particular
resolutions 1559 (2004), 1595 (2005), 1664
(2006), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006).
“The Security Council requests the
Secretary-General to continue to follow closely
and report regularly to the Council on the
situation in Lebanon. The Security Council
underlines its readiness to continue to act in
support of the legitimate and democratically
elected Government of Lebanon.”
This statement will be issued as a document of
the Security Council under the symbol
S/PRST/2006/46.
The Security Council has thus concluded the
present stage of its consideration of the item on the
agenda.
The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

U.N. OKs report on Somali Hezbollah links

November 24, 2006
U.N. OKs report on Somali Hezbollah links
By Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor

A U.N. Security Council sanctions committee has formally adopted a report
linking Hezbollah with Islamic militias in Somalia.

The endorsement came despite doubts voiced by experts about such a link.

U.N. Spokesman Yves Sorokobi told United Press International that the
committee -- set up by the Security Council to monitor its arms embargo --
had adopted the report, prepared by an experts group it appointed, on
Wednesday.

The report, a draft of which was leaked to the media last week, said that in
July, during fierce fighting with Israel, more than 700 fighters from one of
the Islamic militias that now control much of Somalia had traveled to
Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah and that hundreds remained behind for
special training from the group, a designated terrorist organization.

The fighters were said to be from a militia group dubbed al-Shabab, "the
youth" in Arabic. The group had attracted the attention of U.S.
counter-terrorist officials because its leader trained in al-Qaida camps in
Afghanistan and is believed to maintain links with Osama bin Laden.

But several experts on the region told UPI that they were doubtful about the
claims, said to be based on intelligence reporting from the embassies of
Security Council member states in Nairobi.

"I am very skeptical," said former senior U.S. diplomatic official in the
region David Shinn.

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon - Addendum

United Nations S/2006/893/Add.1
Security Council
Distr.: General
21 November 2006
English
Original: French
06-62604 (E) 211106 211106
*0662604*

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a
special tribunal for Lebanon

Addendum

Statement by Mr. Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for
Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, at the informal consultations
held by the Security Council on 20 November 2006
Mr. President,
Ladies and Gentlemen members of the Security Council,
It is both a great honour and a heavy responsibility for me to submit this
introductory report to you today. The issue before you is an important and
sensitive
one, and the stakes are substantial, both in Lebanon and elsewhere. I will
begin by
recalling various aspects of the process that is under way. I will then
point out the
key features of the draft document before you. Lastly, I will highlight the
principal
challenges involved.
By Security Council resolution 1664 (2006) you requested the Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at
establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the highest
international standards of criminal justice, taking into account the
recommendations
in the report of the Secretary-General of 21 March 2006 and the views that
had been
expressed by Council members. The negotiations were conducted on that basis
and
in that spirit. The report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of
the
tribunal provides a glimpse of the negotiations. The following additional
information will be useful. First, it must be emphasized that the Lebanese
negotiators were designated by a consensus decision of the Government of
Lebanon,
under the leadership of the President himself. Accordingly, the Lebanese
delegation
was fully empowered to negotiate on behalf of the national authorities.
Secondly,
both the principle and the substance of the negotiations benefited from the
unanimous support for the establishment of the tribunal expressed by the
Lebanese
national dialogue at its first meeting. Thirdly, the Lebanese constitutional
process
for the conclusion of an agreement with the United Nations has not been
completed.
Major steps remain to be taken, in particular formal approval by the
Government,
which is the prerequisite for the signature of the treaty and its submission
for
parliamentary approval and, ultimately, its ratification. Only after this
process has
been completed will Lebanon have entered into an internationally binding
S/2006/893/Add.1
2 06-62604
commitment. Although the decision by the Government on Monday, 13 November
2006, to support the draft agreement and statute is of considerable
political
importance, it is not a formal step in the process of concluding the treaty.
Accordingly, and pending a decision by the Government, at this stage the
Republic
of Lebanon has not entered into an internationally binding commitment. It
will have
done so only once the constitutional process has been completed and the
treaty has
been ratified.
I will turn now to the second part of my introductory statement. Before
going
into some of the specifics of the agreement and the statute I would note
with
satisfaction that the draft documents before you meet the criterion you
established in
calling for a tribunal based on the highest international standards of
criminal justice.
As currently envisaged, the tribunal will be a purely jurisdictional entity
whose
independence and impartiality will be guaranteed in full.
I shall focus on six characteristics of the tribunal, although this is not
an
exhaustive list:
(1) Jurisdiction of the tribunal. The tribunal will be competent to try
those
responsible for the attack on former Prime Minister Hariri. It will have
jurisdiction over the perpetrators of other attacks only under very strict
conditions: the attacks must be on the list of 14 attacks annexed to the
report; they must be connected to the attack on Mr. Hariri, in accordance
with the principles and criteria set out in the agreement and the statute;
they must be similar to that attack in nature and gravity; and, lastly, the
tribunal itself, that is, the judges, ultimately will determine whether
these
conditions have been met.
(2) Applicable criminal law. The prosecution and punishment of the crimes
under the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be governed by Lebanese
criminal law, specifically the provisions mentioned in article 2 of the
draft statute. Early in the negotiations the possibility was raised of
incorporating legal grounds that would enable the judges, in certain
circumstances and with sufficient proof, to qualify crimes as crimes
against humanity. The draft document before you does not include this
possibility. The text of the statute, the language of the report, the
preparatory work and the background of the negotiations clearly
demonstrate that the tribunal will not be competent to qualify the attacks
as crimes against humanity.
(3) Appointment of judges. In the initial phase, the procedure for
appointing
Lebanese judges will differ slightly from the procedure for appointing
international judges. However, the international phase of the selection
process will be the same for all judges. The Government and the
Secretary-General will consult each other in this regard. The objectivity
and impartiality of the process will be assured through the establishment
of a selection panel consisting of two international judges and a
representative of the Secretary-General, who will have indicated his
intentions to the Security Council prior to the panel's establishment.
Finally, the Secretary-General will appoint the judges upon the
recommendation of the selection panel. The same procedure will be
followed for the appointment of the prosecutor.
S/2006/893/Add.1
06-62604 3
(4) Funding. The Council had requested the Secretary-General to submit
funding options. This is why article 5 of the draft agreement was left
blank. The options are given in the report, which indicates that the list is
not exhaustive.
(5) Entry into force of the agreement and commencement of the functioning
of the tribunal. The agreement draws a clear distinction between these
two phases. Entry into force is contingent upon the completion of
domestic constitutional procedures in Lebanon and the notification of
such completion to the United Nations. The tribunal is to commence
functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in
consultation with the Government of Lebanon, taking into account the
progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation
Commission. Practical arrangements will be made to ensure that there is
a coordinated transition from the activities of the Commission to the
activities of the tribunal, with a view to achieving efficiency and
costeffectiveness
in the tribunal's operation.
(6) Duration of the agreement. The agreement includes provisions designed
to keep the duration of the process under control. It is envisaged that the
agreement will remain in force for three years from the date of the
commencement of the tribunal's functioning. Subsequently, the
agreement provides for a review of the progress of the tribunal's work.
This review will be conducted by the parties in consultation with the
Security Council. If at the end of this three-year period the activities of
the tribunal have not been completed, the agreement provides for an
extension to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with
the Government and the Security Council.
In the third part of my introduction, I should like to touch upon certain
aspects
of the issues at stake in your deliberations on the draft texts before you.
When the Council unanimously decided to request the Secretary-General to
negotiate an agreement with Lebanon, it was responding to a request for
assistance
from the Lebanese authorities. Faced with a series of heinous attacks, in
particular
the highly symbolic one that took the life of former Prime Minister Hariri,
those
authorities, with the support of an entire people, called for justice to be
done. But
they were convinced that, given the circumstances, the national justice
system
would not be able to meet that objective. Let us recall that Lebanon has
suffered
greatly for too many years. It had embarked on a reconstruction effort, with
remarkable courage and effectiveness. It was advancing on the path to
greater wellbeing,
the independent exercise of its sovereignty and a more stable domestic
peace,
when the attacks were perpetrated. Since then, Lebanon has sought to resume
progress towards a prosperous and peaceful future, but the difficulties and
obstacles
seem to be multiplying. Today, Lebanon needs the help of the international
community to lay the foundation for lasting peace in the country and to
become a
force for peace in the region. As a precondition for this, steps must be
taken to end
the impunity of the perpetrators of odious crimes such as the assassination
of former
Prime Minister Hariri. To that end, the truth must be revealed and justice
must be
done. Lebanon has called upon you to help. You have before you today a draft
text
that will enable you to make a decisive contribution to justice and peace in
Lebanon.
The Lebanese authorities have asked you to establish an international
tribunal. On
S/2006/893/Add.1
4 06-62604
behalf of the Secretary-General, I invite you today to take a decisive step
in that
direction by supporting the draft text on the tribunal's establishment and
by fully
supporting the rest of the process.
It is true that this process has not been completed. As I said at the
beginning of
my statement, a number of major hurdles in the domestic constitutional
process
remain to be cleared. Given the situation, of which we are all aware, this
process
must be pursued with both determination and wisdom: with determination
because
there are obscure forces that will stop at nothing to prevent the tribunal's
establishment, and with wisdom because, in order to advance the cause of
peace, the
judicial process must enjoy the necessary support. In this connection,
however, it is
important to recall that prudence consists not of retreating in the face of
difficulty,
but of choosing the best ways of reaching the legitimate goal.

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon

United Nations S/2006/893
Security Council
Distr.: General

15 November 2006
English
Original: English/French
06-61797 (E) 161106 171106
*0661797*

Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a
special tribunal for Lebanon

I. Introduction
1. In my report to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of its
resolution
1644 (2005) (S/2006/176), I set out at the Council's request the nature and
scope of
the international assistance needed to try before a tribunal of an
international
character those responsible for the terrorist bombing that killed former
Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others. In so doing, I put forward the
general
principles of a tribunal of an international character, its personal and
subject matter
jurisdiction, composition, location and the question of financing, on the
basis of
consultations between the United Nations Secretariat and the Lebanese
authorities.
2. By resolution 1664 (2006), the Security Council endorsed the report and
requested me to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed
at
establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the highest
international standards of criminal justice, taking into account the
recommendations
of my report and the views that have been expressed by Council members. The
Council also requested me to submit for its consideration a report on the
implementation of the resolution, in particular on the draft agreement
negotiated
with the Government of Lebanon, including options for a funding mechanism
appropriate to ensuring the continued and effective functioning of the
tribunal.
3. Following initial consultations with the Lebanese authorities in Beirut
on
26 and 27 January 2006 and with two senior Lebanese judges from 24 to
28 February at United Nations Headquarters in New York, negotiations on the
legal
framework for the establishment of the special tribunal for Lebanon on the
basis of
the Security Council's mandate proceeded at the expert level between members
of
the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat and the Government of
Lebanon,
represented by the Lebanese judges. The two delegations met between 31 May
and
1 June 2006 at Headquarters and between 3 and 7 July 2006 in The Hague. In
this
latest round of negotiations the two delegations benefited from the advice
and
wealth of knowledge and experience of two former Presidents of the
International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991. On 6 September, the Legal Counsel travelled to Beirut
and
presented the initial draft agreement and statute to the Prime Minister and
to the
Minister of Justice of Lebanon for their consideration.
S/2006/893
2 06-61797
4. Requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1664 (2006) to take
account of the views that have been expressed by Council members, the
Secretariat
has, in the course of negotiations, taken into account the views expressed
by
interested members of the Council on the progress of the negotiations and
the
principles of the legal framework for the establishment of the special
tribunal. These
consultations have in many ways shaped the legal choices made in the
tribunal's
founding instruments.
5. The present report analyses the main features of the statute of the
special
tribunal and the agreement between the United Nations and the Government of
Lebanon. It examines the legal nature and specificities of the tribunal, its
temporal,
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, its organizational structure and
composition, the conduct of the trial process, the location of the seat, the
funding
mechanism and cooperation with third States.
II. The legal nature and specificities of the special tribunal
6. The legal basis for the establishment of the special tribunal is an
agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon, to which the
statute of
the tribunal is attached (see annex I). As a treaty-based organ, the special
tribunal is
neither a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, nor is it a part of the
Lebanese
court system.
7. The Security Council mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate an
agreement aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character
based on the
highest international standards of criminal justice. Although the features
of such an
international character were not specified, the constitutive instruments of
the special
tribunal in both form and substance evidence its international character.
The legal
basis for the establishment of the special tribunal is an international
agreement
between the United Nations and a Member State; its composition is mixed with
a
substantial international component; its standards of justice, including
principles of
due process of law, are those applicable in all international or United
Nations-based
criminal jurisdictions; its rules of procedure and evidence are to be
inspired, in part,
by reference materials reflecting the highest standards of international
criminal
procedure; and its success may rely considerably on the cooperation of third
States.
While in all of these respects the special tribunal has international
characteristics, its
subject matter jurisdiction or the applicable law remain national in
character,
however.
8. The special tribunal for Lebanon is distinguished from other
international
criminal tribunals established or assisted by the United Nations in two
respects:
(a) in the conduct of the trial process, more elements of civil law are
evident than of
common law; and (b) the investigative process conducted by the International
Independent Investigation Commission constitutes, in fact, the core nascent
prosecutor's office.
9. With the exception of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia,
the conduct of the trial process as reflected in the constituent instruments
of all
other United Nations-based or assisted tribunals has included more common
law
elements. The special tribunal for Lebanon is the first United
Nations-assisted
tribunal to combine substantial elements of both legal systems. The
applicability of
the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure as a guiding principle alongside
other
S/2006/893
06-61797 3
reference materials reflecting the highest standards of international
criminal
procedure (art. 28), the enhanced powers of the Tribunal to take measures to
ensure
expeditious hearing and prevent any action that may cause unreasonable delay
(art. 21) and the introduction of trials in absentia (art. 22) are the most
notable
manifestations of civil law elements.
10. The establishment of the special tribunal for Lebanon will have been
preceded
by the Commission established by Security Council resolution 1595 (2005) to
assist
the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the
terrorist attack
that killed former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others. In establishing
the
Commission first, the investigative process has, for all intents and
purposes, begun.
In so doing, it will have the effect of reducing the lifespan of the
tribunal and
increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of its operation.
III. The jurisdiction of the special tribunal: temporal, personal
and subject matter
A. Temporal jurisdiction
11. In its resolution 1664 (2006), the Security Council envisaged the
prosecution
of those responsible for the single terrorist bombing that killed former
Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and others on 14 February 2005. The Hariri
assassination,
however, was committed in a context of other attacks bearing the same or
similar
characteristics committed between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005.
Extending the jurisdiction of the tribunal beyond the assassination of Rafiq
Hariri to
other attacks is not, strictly speaking, an extension of the temporal
jurisdiction of
the tribunal, but rather an extension of its jurisdiction to include, within
a specified
period, other attacks that the tribunal might find to be connected to the
Hariri
assassination and similar to it in nature and gravity. The list of such
attacks is
included in the third report of the Commission (S/2006/161, para. 55;
attached to
this report as annex II).
12. The reasons for the inclusion of these other attacks are threefold:
(a) As the investigation of the Commission has progressed, potential links
have emerged between the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and other attacks;
(b) The expansion of the mandate of the Commission to provide technical
assistance to the Lebanese authorities in respect of the 14 other attacks is
an
indication of interest on the part of the Security Council in judicial
accountability
beyond the Rafiq Hariri assassination;
(c) Singling out for prosecution one attack in a context of other similar
attacks is bound to create a perception of selective justice.
1. Linkage among the attacks
13. Article 1 of the statute of the special tribunal for Lebanon (see annex
I,
attachment) provides as follows:
"The Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over persons responsible for
the
attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. If the
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4 06-61797
Tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October
2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with
the consent of the Security Council, are connected in accordance with
principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to
the
attack of 14 February 2005, it shall also have jurisdiction over persons
responsible for such attacks. This connection includes but is not limited to
a
combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive), the purpose
behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the
attacks
(modus operandi) and the perpetrators."
14. In investigating the potential links between some or all of these
attacks, the
Commission has identified certain potential linkages, notably the mode of
operation,
or the general pattern of using explosive devices; the nature of the crime
or the
criminal intent underlying the attacks, namely, targeting politicians or
influential
journalists, as well as creating widespread fear and anxiety among elements
of the
population by targeting public locations, destabilizing the security
situation and
causing damage to infrastructure; and the identity of perpetrators, of at
least some
of the attacks.1 In its fourth report, the Commission reached the
preliminary
conclusion that the 14 cases were not commissioned and executed by 14
disparate
and unconnected persons or groups with an equal number of separate motives.
Analytically, the cases can be linked in a number of different ways and from
varying
perspectives, notably their similarities in the modus operandi, and their
possible
intent.2
2. The expanded mandate of the Commission
15. The mandate of the Commission was originally limited to the
investigation of
all aspects of the terrorist attack of 14 February 2005 that killed former
Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and others (resolution 1595 (2005)). On 13 December
2005, a
day after the assassination of Gebran Tueni, the Government of Lebanon
requested
the establishment of a tribunal of an international character and the
expansion of the
mandate of the Commission, or the establishment of another international
investigation commission, to investigate the assassination attempts and
assassinations and explosions that took place in Lebanon starting with the
attempt
on the life of Minister Marwan Hamadeh on 1 October 2004. In response to
that
request, the Security Council, in its resolution 1644 (2005), expanded the
mandate
of the Commission to include the provision of technical assistance as
appropriate to
the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations on the
terrorist attacks
perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004.
16. While the resolution expands the Commission's mandate with respect to
the
other 14 attacks for the purpose of extending its technical assistance to
the Lebanese
authorities and not for the purpose of its own investigation, it is an
indication
__________________
1 In the view of the Commission, the comparable modus operandi of each
attack could point to a
single group of perpetrators who aimed to conduct a series of sustainable
repetitive attacks with
a minimum of complications (S/2006/375, para. 69).
2 Ibid., para. 83. In its fifth report, the Commission confirmed its
preliminary conclusion
regarding the interconnectivity between the 14 cases and stated that, as it
was developing
evidence that linked the cases into differing groupings, it was anticipated
that further links
between the cases might become evident upon further collection of
information and evidence
(S/2006/760, para. 67).
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06-61797 5
nonetheless that the Security Council is interested in judicial
accountability for
those responsible for those attacks as well.
3. A perception of fairness, impartiality and objectivity of the special
tribunal
17. In establishing the temporal jurisdiction of any United Nations-based
tribunal,
the Organization strives to strike a balance between a temporal jurisdiction
comprehensive enough to include the most serious crimes committed by those
most
responsible throughout the relevant period and a jurisdiction reasonably
limited so
as not to overburden the prosecutor's office and the tribunal as a whole. It
is a
balance struck, in fact, between fairness, objectivity and impartiality of
the trial
process, and its efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
18. In the present circumstances, singling out for prosecution the
assassination of
Rafiq Hariri, while disregarding a score of other connected attacks could
cast a
serious doubt on the objectivity and impartiality of the tribunal and lead
to the
perception of selective justice.
B. Personal jurisdiction of the special tribunal
19. In its resolution 1664 (2006), the Security Council did not prescribe
the
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal, although it was mindful of the demand
of the
Lebanese people that all those responsible for the terrorist bombing that
killed
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others be identified and
brought to
justice.
20. Article 1 of the statute accordingly provides that the tribunal shall
have
jurisdiction "over persons" responsible for the crimes falling within its
subject
matter jurisdiction, whose modes of criminal responsibility are further
elaborated
upon in article 3. Within the all-inclusive definition of the personal
jurisdiction of
the tribunal, the prosecutor will be free to pursue her or his prosecutional
strategy
and to determine the list of potential indictees according to the evidence
before him
or her.
C. Subject matter jurisdiction
21. Article 2 of the statute provides as follows:
"The following shall be applicable to the prosecution and punishment of
the crimes referred to in article 1, subject to the provisions of this
Statute:
"(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the
prosecution and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against
life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report
crimes and
offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime,
criminal participation and conspiracy; and
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"(b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on
'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith
struggle'."3
22. While the Lebanese criminal law is the applicable law, its applicability
is
limited to the crimes and offences provided for in article 2 of the statute.
It is also
subject to the provisions of the statute and therefore to the exclusion of
penalties
(e.g. death penalty and forced labour) otherwise applicable under Lebanese
law.
23. In keeping with the Security Council mandate requesting the Secretary-
General to establish a tribunal of an international character and in the
circumstances
of Lebanon where a pattern of terrorist attacks seems to have emerged, it
was
considered whether to qualify the crimes as crimes against humanity and to
define
them, for the purpose of this statute, as murder or other inhumane acts of
similar
gravity causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental
health, when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the
civilian
population.
24. Mindful of the differences in scope and number of victims between the
series
of terrorist attacks committed in Lebanon and the killings and executions
perpetrated on a large and massive scale in other parts of the world subject
to the
jurisdiction of any of the existing international criminal jurisdictions, it
was
nevertheless considered that the 14 attacks committed in Lebanon could meet
the
prima facie definition of the crime, as developed in the jurisprudence of
international criminal tribunals. The attacks that occurred in Lebanon since
1 October 2004 could reveal a "pattern" or "methodical plan" of attacks
against a
civilian population, albeit not in its entirety. They could be "collective"
in nature, or
"a multiple commission of acts"4 and, as such, exclude a single, isolated or
random
conduct of an individual acting alone. For the crime of murder, as part of a
systematic attack against a civilian population, to qualify as a "crime
against
humanity", its massive scale is not an indispensable element.
25. However, considering the views expressed by interested members of the
Security Council, there was insufficient support for the inclusion of crimes
against
humanity within the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal. For this
reason,
therefore, the qualification of the crimes was limited to common crimes
under the
Lebanese Criminal Code.
__________________
3 Article 314 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
"The term 'acts of terrorism' includes all acts that are intended to cause a
state of alarm
and have been committed by means such as explosive devices, inflammable
substances,
toxic or corrosive products or infectious or microbial agents that are
liable to pose a
public threat."
Articles 6 and 7, respectively, of the 1958 law provide:
"All acts of terrorism shall be punishable by hard labour for life. Capital
punishment
shall be incurred if there were human fatalities or if a building has been
wholly or
partially destroyed when a person was inside, or if the act results in the
destruction, even
partial, of a public building, industrial installation, ship or other
structure or damage to
communications or transport links."
"Conspiracy to commit one of the crimes mentioned in the preceding articles
shall be
punishable by hard labour for life."
4 Article 7, paragraph 2 (a), of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court defines an
"attack directed against any civilian population" as "a course of conduct
involving the multiple
commission of acts ... against any civilian population pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack".
S/2006/893
06-61797 7
D. Individual criminal responsibility
26. Under article 3, paragraph 1, of the statute, all those who committed,
participated as accomplice, organized or directed others to commit the
crime, or
otherwise contributed to the commission of the crime, shall be individually
responsible. This is a reflection of the Lebanese Criminal Code and general
criminal
law principles, evidenced, inter alia, by article 2, paragraph 3, of the
International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 (General
Assembly
resolution 52/164, annex). Article 3, paragraph 2, reflects the principle of
command
responsibility both under international law and national criminal and
military codes
as more fully articulated in article 28, subparagraph (b), of the Statute of
the
International Criminal Court. Under article 3, paragraph 3, obedience to
superior
order is no defence, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.
IV. Organizational structure of the special tribunal
A. The organs of the special tribunal
27. The special tribunal for Lebanon will consist of the following organs:
the
chambers (a pre-trial judge, a trial chamber and an appeals chamber), the
prosecutor,
the registry and the defence office. The composition of the chambers is
mixed, with
a majority of international judges in the trial and the appeals chambers. An
international prosecutor, assisted by a Lebanese deputy prosecutor, is
responsible for
the investigation and prosecution of persons who may have committed the
crimes
falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The registrar is appointed
by the
Secretary-General and is a staff member of the United Nations. The
establishment of
the special tribunal with a majority of international judges, an
international
prosecutor and a registrar is consistent with the long-established United
Nations
position that in the establishment of any mixed tribunal a substantial
international
component is a guarantee for the independence, objectivity and impartiality
of the
trial process.
B. Pre-trial judge
28. Pre-trial proceedings exist in different forms in all international
criminal
tribunals. However, unlike the pre-trial judge of either of the ad hoc
tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, who
is
designated by the presiding judge of a trial chamber from among the members
of
that chamber, the pre-trial judge of the special tribunal for Lebanon is a
dedicated,
single international judge serving as a pre-trial judge only and not as a
member of
any of the chambers.
29. The role of the pre-trial judge is primarily to review the indictment
and, if a
prima facie case is established, to confirm the indictment. At the pre-trial
phase and
throughout the investigation, the pre-trial judge may issue any orders or
warrants of
arrest, detention or transfer of persons as may be requested by the
prosecutor for the
purpose of the investigation. In the decade-long experience of United
Nations-based
tribunals, the role of the pre-trial judge has proved crucial to ensuring
the efficiency
and expediency of the trial process.
S/2006/893
8 06-61797
C. Defence office
30. The need for a defence office to protect the rights of suspects and
accused has
evolved in the practice of United Nations-based tribunals as part of the
need to
ensure "equality of arms", where the prosecutor's office is an organ of the
tribunal
and is financed in its entirety through the budget of the tribunal. The
statute of the
special tribunal institutionalizes the defence office. The head of the
office is
appointed by the Secretary-General, although, in carrying out its functions,
the
office is independent. The defence office of the special tribunal is to
protect the
rights of the defence, draw up the list of defence counsel and provide
support and
assistance to defence counsel and persons entitled to such legal assistance.
V. Conduct of the trial process
A. Due process of law
31. With all the specificities of the special tribunal for Lebanon, its
standards of
justice and guarantees of due process of law are modelled on the highest
international standards of criminal justice. In addition to listing the
rights of the
accused, including an elaborated provision on the presumption of innocence
and the
burden of proof, the statute provides for the rights of suspects during
investigation,
including the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself, to be
informed of the
charges against him or her, to have legal assistance and to be questioned in
the
presence of counsel. The statute also protects the rights of victims whose
personal
interests are affected and, while not recognizing them as "parties civiles",
it permits
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at all stages of the
proceedings.
B. Elements of civil law and common law systems combined
32. The proceedings before the special tribunal, while essentially
adversarial,
contain elements of both civil and common law systems. While distinctive
features
of civil law, namely, the institution of an investigating judge and the
participation of
victims as "parties civiles" are absent, the trial process before the
special tribunal is
inspired by the civil law system in the following two respects, the active
role of the
judges and the conduct of trials in absentia:
(a) The judges of the special tribunal will take a more active role in the
conduct of the trial process and the examination of witnesses. Under article
20 of
the statute, unless otherwise decided by the trial chamber, "examination of
witnesses
shall commence with questions posed by the presiding judge, followed by
questions
posed by other members of the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor and the
Defence". The
trial chamber may also proprio motu "decide to call additional witnesses
and/or
order the production of additional evidence";
(b) The institution of trials in absentia is common in a number of civil law
legal systems, including Lebanon's. In addition, in the present case, where
the
conduct of joint trials for some or all of the cases falling within the
jurisdiction of
the tribunal is likely, it would be crucial to ensure that the legal process
is not
unduly or indefinitely delayed because of the absence of some accused.
S/2006/893
06-61797 9
33. In introducing the institution of trials in absentia on the conditions
that the
accused has waived his or her right to be present, that he or she has not
been handed
over or absconded, or otherwise cannot be found, the statute of the special
tribunal
takes account of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human
Rights,
which determined the regularity of trials in absentia in full respect for
the rights of
the accused.5 Accordingly, and as a supplement to the Lebanese Criminal
Procedure,
article 22 of the statute provides that, where hearings are conducted in the
absence
of the accused, the special tribunal shall ensure that the accused has
designated a
defence counsel to be present in the trial or that, if he or she has refused
to do so,
one will be assigned to him or her by the tribunal's defence office. In case
of
conviction, the accused shall have the right to be re-tried in his or her
presence, if
the accused has not designated a defence counsel of his or her choosing in
the first
trial. Otherwise, the conviction will stand.
C. Receivability and admissibility of evidence collected prior to the
establishment of the special tribunal
34. It will be necessary to have a coordinated transition between the work
of the
Commission and the special tribunal. While the modalities of such transition
would
be determined taking into account the progress of work of the Commission, it
is
necessary at this stage to ensure that the work of the Commission is
preserved and
that evidence collected by it prior to the establishment of the tribunal is
nevertheless
receivable by the tribunal.
35. In this connection, the Commission noted in its fourth report
(S/2006/375,
para. 111), that:
"While based on relevant international standards, the internal procedure
takes into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures, as well as the
practice of the Commission since its establishment. In defining the
standards
to be applied, the Commission considered the procedures of international
criminal jurisdictions and the minimum guarantees afforded by international
criminal law and international human rights law. The internal procedure will
therefore help ensure that any information collected or obtained by the
Commission is admissible in future legal proceedings, notably before a
tribunal of an international character".
36. In the circumstances, it is necessary to provide for the receivability
of
evidence collected by the national authorities of Lebanon and by the
Commission in
accordance with its mandate, on the understanding that its admissibility and
the
weight to be given to such evidence shall be determined by the tribunal in
accordance with international standards on the collection of evidence.
__________________
5 Case of Krombach v. France, European Court of Human Rights, Application
No. 29731/96,
Judgment, 13 February 2001; and Case of Sejdovic v. Italy, European Court of
Human Rights,
Application No. 56581/00, Judgment, 1 March 2006.
S/2006/893
10 06-61797
VI. Agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of Lebanon
37. The agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon
would govern the terms of United Nations cooperation in establishing the
tribunal. It
stipulates the composition of the tribunal, the procedure for the nomination
and
appointment of judges (both international and Lebanese), of the
international
prosecutor and the Lebanese deputy prosecutor and of the registrar and other
members of the tribunal, as well as the privileges and immunities to which
they are
entitled.
38. As a non-United Nations organ, the special tribunal would not be
entitled to
the privileges and immunities of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of
the United Nations of 1946. For the special tribunal, its premises, funds,
archives
and all members of the tribunal, to enjoy comparable privileges and
immunities, the
agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon, as well
as
the future headquarters agreement between the United Nations, the Government
of
Lebanon and the host State, will have to provide for the necessary
privileges and
immunities.
39. The agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon
draws, for the most part, upon the agreements signed between the United
Nations
and the Governments of Cambodia and of Sierra Leone. The provisions relating
to
the location of the seat and the funding mechanism, however, are
Lebanon-specific.
A. Location of the seat
40. For a variety of reasons, the parties share the view that it would be
desirable to
locate the seat of the tribunal outside Lebanon. In the choice of the seat,
considerations of justice and fairness, administrative efficiency, the
rights of victims
and proximity to witnesses, existence of suitable facilities - both for the
tribunal
and its detention facilities - security arrangements and affordable costs,
would be
fully taken into account.
41. The location of the seat outside Lebanon will require the conclusion of
a
headquarters agreement between the United Nations, the Government of Lebanon
and the host State. It is envisaged that when an agreement, in principle, is
reached
on the location of the seat, the Secretariat will dispatch a United Nations
planning
mission to identify adequate premises and negotiate the terms of the
headquarters
agreement.
42. Like the "split seat" of the Office of the Prosecutor of the
International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between
1 January and 31 December 1994, where the Prosecutor conducts some
investigations through his office in Kigali, while the seat of the Tribunal
is in
Arusha, the choice of the seat of the special tribunal outside Lebanon will
not affect
the operation of the prosecutor's office and the conduct of investigations
in
Lebanon, as necessary and subject to the conclusion of appropriate
arrangements
S/2006/893
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with the Government of Lebanon. The arrangements governing the presence of
the
Commission in Lebanon under the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of the Republic of Lebanon and the United Nations regarding the
Modalities of Cooperation for the International Independent Investigation
Commission, signed on 13 June 2005 (see S/2005/393), depending on the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the establishment of the tribunal,
may be
expanded to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the presence of an office of the
prosecutor
in Lebanon.
43. As is customarily the case with respect to tribunals of all kinds, the
possibility
that the special tribunal for Lebanon will meet away from its seat when it
considers
it necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions is provided for in
article 8,
paragraph 2, of the agreement.
B. Funding mechanism
44. In its resolution 1664 (2006), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-
General to submit options for a funding mechanism appropriate to ensure the
continued and effective functioning of the tribunal. Without prejudice to
the
authority of the General Assembly in budgetary matters under Article 17 of
the
Charter of the United Nations, several options are, in principle, available
in the
determination of the funding mechanism of the special tribunal: assessed
contributions in whole or in part; voluntary contributions; or assessed and
voluntary
contributions combined. As the Government of Lebanon has expressed its
willingness to bear a substantial part of the expenses of the tribunal,6 all
options but
one include a provision that 49 per cent of the expenses of the tribunal
would be
borne by the Government of Lebanon. An indication of possible options and a
proposed corresponding article are described below.
1. Assessed contributions
45. The merits of assessed contributions - the funding mechanism of the two
ad hoc tribunals, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda - were debated at the time of the
establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In his report to the
Security
Council (S/2000/915), the Secretary-General expressed the view that only
regular,
predictable, assessed contributions could produce a viable and sustainable
mechanism affording secure and continuous funding. It was also his view
(para. 70)
that:
"A financial mechanism based entirely on voluntary contributions will not
provide the assured and continuous source of funding which would be required
to appoint the judges, the Prosecutor and the Registrar, to contract the
services
of all administrative and support staff and to purchase the necessary
equipment. The risks associated with the establishment of an operation of
this
kind with insufficient funds, or without long-term assurances of continuous
availability of funds, are very high, in terms of both moral responsibility
and
loss of credibility of the Organization, and its exposure to legal
liability."
__________________
6 A firm commitment by the Government of Lebanon on defraying its share in
the expenses of the
tribunal would be required before the agreement could be signed by the
Secretary-General.
S/2006/893
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46. Funding through assessed contributions could be either in whole or in
part. If
considered an expense of the Organization under Article 17 of the Charter of
the
United Nations, it should be financed from assessed contributions. Any
voluntary
contributions, including the contribution of the Government of Lebanon,
would be
supplemental and be used to implement specific non-core activities. It is
recalled in
this connection that if a decision to fund the special tribunal through
assessed
contributions is adopted, it would be for the General Assembly, as the
authority
entrusted under Article 17 of the Charter with the responsibility to
consider and
approve the budget, to decide on the source of funding, as well as on any
budgetary
and administrative arrangements to be put in place. It is also recalled that
funding
through assessed contributions would trigger the applicability to the
special tribunal
of the United Nations Financial and Staff Regulations and Rules.
47. If the mechanism of assessed contributions in whole is accepted, the
relevant
provision of the agreement would read:
"The expenses of the Special Tribunal shall be considered expenses of
the Organization in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United
Nations."
48. If the mechanism of assessed contributions in part is accepted, the
relevant
provision in the agreement would read:
"The expenses of the Special Tribunal shall be borne in the following
manner:
"(a) Fifty-one per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be
considered expenses of the Organization in accordance with Article 17 of the
Charter of the United Nations;
"(b) Forty-nine per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne
by the Government of Lebanon."
2. Voluntary contributions
49. Voluntary contributions was the funding mechanism of the Special Court
for
Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
although
in the former case a one-time subvention was granted by the General Assembly
to
replenish the dwindling reserves of the Special Court. If the option of
voluntary
contributions, as the sole funding mechanism of the tribunal, is adopted,
then the
corresponding article would read:
"The expenses of the Special Tribunal shall be borne in the following
manner:
"(a) Fifty-one per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by
voluntary contributions from States;
"(b) Forty-nine per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne
by the Government of Lebanon."
3. Combined funding mechanism
50. While the Secretary-General maintains his principled position in support
of
assessed contributions as the funding mechanism of international criminal
jurisdictions, the uniqueness of the special tribunal for Lebanon may
warrant a
S/2006/893
06-61797 13
different approach to the establishment of the financial mechanism. The
formula
proposed is a combined formula of both voluntary and assessed contributions.
It
provides for a continuation of assessed contributions to fund investigations
(as is
currently the case with the Commission) and this may be considered more
viable
and sustainable than other options wholly reliant on voluntary
contributions. If
accepted, the corresponding article would read:
"The expenses of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall be borne in the
following manner:
"(a) The expenses incurred for investigations shall continue to be
considered expenses of the Organization in accordance with Article 17 of the
Charter of the United Nations;
"(b) Fifty-one per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal, excluding those
related to investigations, shall be borne by voluntary contributions from
States;
"(c) Forty-nine per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal, excluding those
related to investigations, shall be borne by the Government of Lebanon."
51. With regard to the options described in paragraphs 49 and 50 above, both
of
which involve voluntary contributions, the sufficiency of funds must be
guaranteed
before the Secretary-General can be expected to commence the process of
establishment of the tribunal. In any of these options, therefore, the
following text
should be inserted as paragraph 2 of the corresponding article:
"It is understood that the Secretary-General will commence the process
of establishing the Tribunal when he has sufficient contributions in hand to
finance the establishment of the Tribunal and twelve months of its
operations,
plus pledges equal to the anticipated expenses of the following twenty-four
months of the Tribunal's operation. Should voluntary contributions be
insufficient for the Tribunal to implement its mandate, the
Secretary-General
and the Security Council shall explore alternate means of financing the
Tribunal."
C. Cooperation with the special tribunal
52. Article 15 of the agreement places an obligation on the Government of
Lebanon to cooperate with the tribunal at all stages of the proceedings and
to
comply with its requests for assistance in the identification and location
of persons,
service of documents, arrest and detention of persons, and the transfer of
indictees
to the tribunal.
53. In maintaining the logic of Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005),
1636
(2005) and 1644 (2005), under which Member States are obliged to cooperate
fully
with the Commission in its investigation of the Hariri assassination, the
Council
may wish, at the appropriate stages and as necessary, to consider similar
measures to
enable the special tribunal more effectively to prosecute those responsible
for the
attack against Rafiq Hariri and for other attacks falling within the
jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
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VII. Conclusion
54. On 10 November 2006, I transmitted to the Prime Minister of Lebanon the
draft agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon on
the
establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon, to which was annexed a
draft statute
for such a tribunal. By his letter to me of 13 November 2006, the Prime
Minister
informed me that the Lebanese Council of Ministers had agreed in its session
of that
date to the draft and looked forward to the completion of the remaining
steps
leading to the establishment of the tribunal. By a note verbale dated 14
November
2006, the Permanent Mission of Lebanon forwarded to me a copy of
observations
made by the President of the Lebanese Republic, including a challenge to the
decision of the Council of Ministers. The negotiated instruments are now
submitted
to the Security Council for its consideration.
S/2006/893
06-61797 15
Annex I
Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese
Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal
for Lebanon
Whereas the Security Council, in its resolution 1664 (2006) of 29 March
2006, which responded to the request of the Government of Lebanon to
establish a
tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found
responsible for
the terrorist crime which killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri
and others, recalled all its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions
1595 (2005)
of 7 April 2005, 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005 and 1644 (2005) of 15
December
2005,
Whereas the Security Council has requested the Secretary-General of the
United Nations (hereinafter "the Secretary-General") "to negotiate an
agreement
with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing a tribunal of an
international
character based on the highest international standards of criminal justice",
taking
into account the recommendations of the Secretary-General's report of 21
March
2006 (S/2006/176) and the views that have been expressed by Council members,
Whereas the Secretary-General and the Government of the Lebanese Republic
(hereinafter "the Government") have conducted negotiations for the
establishment
of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereinafter "the Special Tribunal" or
"the
Tribunal"),
Now therefore the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic (hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "Parties") have agreed as follows:
Article 1
Establishment of the Special Tribunal
1. There is hereby established a Special Tribunal for Lebanon to prosecute
persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the
death of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of
other
persons. If the tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon
between
1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the
Parties and
with the consent of the Security Council, are connected in accordance with
the
principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to
the attack of
14 February 2005, it shall also have jurisdiction over persons responsible
for such
attacks. This connection includes but is not limited to a combination of the
following elements: criminal intent (motive), the purpose behind the
attacks, the
nature of the victims targeted, the pattern of the attacks (modus operandi)
and the
perpetrators.
2. The Special Tribunal shall function in accordance with the Statute of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Statute is attached to this Agreement and
forms
an integral part thereof.
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Article 2
Composition of the Special Tribunal and appointment of judges
1. The Special Tribunal shall consist of the following organs: the Chambers,
the
Prosecutor, the Registry and the Defence Office.
2. The Chambers shall be composed of a Pre-Trial Judge, a Trial Chamber and
an
Appeals Chamber, with a second Trial Chamber to be created if, after the
passage of
at least six months from the commencement of the functioning of the Special
Tribunal, the Secretary-General or the President of the Special Tribunal so
requests.
3. The Chambers shall be composed of no fewer than eleven independent judges
and no more than fourteen such judges, who shall serve as follows:
(a) A single international judge shall serve as a Pre-Trial Judge;
(b) Three judges shall serve in the Trial Chamber, of whom one shall be a
Lebanese judge and two shall be international judges;
(c) In the event of the creation of a second Trial Chamber, that Chamber
shall be likewise composed in the manner contained in subparagraph (b)
above;
(d) Five judges shall serve in the Appeals Chamber, of whom two shall be
Lebanese judges and three shall be international judges; and
(e) Two alternate judges, of whom one shall be a Lebanese judge and one
shall be an international judge.
4. The judges of the Tribunal shall be persons of high moral character,
impartiality and integrity, with extensive judicial experience. They shall
be
independent in the performance of their functions and shall not accept or
seek
instructions from any Government or any other source.
5. (a) Lebanese judges shall be appointed by the Secretary-General to serve
in
the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber or as an alternate judge from a
list of
twelve persons presented by the Government upon the proposal of the Lebanese
Supreme Council of the Judiciary;
(b) International judges shall be appointed by the Secretary-General to
serve
as Pre-Trial Judge, a Trial Chamber Judge, an Appeals Chamber Judge or an
alternate judge, upon nominations forwarded by States at the invitation of
the
Secretary-General, as well as by competent persons;
(c) The Government and the Secretary-General shall consult on the
appointment of judges;
(d) The Secretary-General shall appoint judges, upon the recommendation of
a selection panel he has established after indicating his intentions to the
Security
Council. The selection panel shall be composed of two judges, currently
sitting on
or retired from an international tribunal, and the representative of the
Secretary-
General.
6. At the request of the presiding judge of a Trial Chamber, the President
of the
Special Tribunal may, in the interest of justice, assign alternate judges to
be present
at each stage of the trial and to replace a judge if that judge is unable to
continue
sitting.
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7. Judges shall be appointed for a three-year period and may be eligible for
reappointment for a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General
in
consultation with the Government.
8. Lebanese judges appointed to serve in the Special Tribunal shall be given
full
credit for their period of service with the Tribunal on their return to the
Lebanese
national judiciaries from which they were released and shall be reintegrated
at a
level at least comparable to that of their former position.
Article 3
Appointment of a Prosecutor and a Deputy Prosecutor
1. The Secretary-General, after consultation with the Government, shall
appoint a
Prosecutor for a three-year term. The Prosecutor may be eligible for
reappointment
for a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General in
consultation with
the Government.
2. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Prosecutor, upon the
recommendation
of a selection panel he has established after indicating his intentions to
the Security
Council. The selection panel shall be composed of two judges, currently
sitting on
or retired from an international tribunal, and the representative of the
Secretary-
General.
3. The Government, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the
Prosecutor, shall appoint a Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor to assist the
Prosecutor in
the conduct of the investigations and prosecutions.
4. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor shall be of high moral character
and
possess the highest level of professional competence and extensive
experience in the
conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor
and the
Deputy Prosecutor shall be independent in the performance of their functions
and
shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other
source.
5. The Prosecutor shall be assisted by such Lebanese and international staff
as
may be required to perform the functions assigned to him or her effectively
and
efficiently.
Article 4
Appointment of a Registrar
1. The Secretary-General shall appoint a Registrar who shall be responsible
for
the servicing of the Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor, and for the
recruitment and administration of all support staff. He or she shall also
administer
the financial and staff resources of the Special Tribunal.
2. The Registrar shall be a staff member of the United Nations. He or she
shall
serve a three-year term and may be eligible for reappointment for a further
period to
be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government.
Article 5
Financing of the Special Tribunal
To be completed.
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Article 6
Management Committee
The parties shall consult concerning the establishment of a Management
Committee.
Article 7
Juridical capacity
The Special Tribunal shall possess the juridical capacity necessary:
(a) To contract;
(b) To acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property;
(c) To institute legal proceedings;
(d) To enter into agreements with States as may be necessary for the
exercise
of its functions and for the operation of the Tribunal.
Article 8
Seat of the Special Tribunal
1. The Special Tribunal shall have its seat outside Lebanon. The location of
the
seat shall be determined having due regard to considerations of justice and
fairness
as well as security and administrative efficiency, including the rights of
victims and
access to witnesses, and subject to the conclusion of a headquarters
agreement
between the United Nations, the Government and the State that hosts the
Tribunal.
2. The Special Tribunal may meet away from its seat when it considers it
necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions.
3. An Office of the Special Tribunal for the conduct of investigations shall
be
established in Lebanon subject to the conclusion of appropriate arrangements
with
the Government.
Article 9
Inviolability of premises, archives and all other documents
1. The Office of the Special Tribunal in Lebanon shall be inviolable. The
competent authorities shall take appropriate action that may be necessary to
ensure
that the Tribunal shall not be dispossessed of all or any part of the
premises of the
Tribunal without its express consent.
2. The property, funds and assets of the Office of the Special Tribunal in
Lebanon, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from
search,
seizure, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of
interference,
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
3. The archives of the Office of the Special Tribunal in Lebanon, and in
general
all documents and materials made available, belonging to or used by it,
wherever
located and by whomsoever held, shall be inviolable.
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Article 10
Funds, assets and other property
The Office of the Special Tribunal, its funds, assets and other property in
Lebanon, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process, except insofar as in any particular case the
Tribunal has
expressly waived its immunity. It is understood, however, that no waiver of
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Article 11
Privileges and immunities of the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy
Prosecutor,
the Registrar and the Head of the Defence Office
1. The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the
Head
of the Defence Office, while in Lebanon, shall enjoy the privileges and
immunities,
exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic agents in accordance with
the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.
2. Privileges and immunities are accorded to the judges, the Prosecutor, the
Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar and the Head of the Defence Office in the
interest
of the Special Tribunal and not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves. The right and the duty to waive the immunity in any case where
it can
be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which it is accorded shall
lie with
the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Tribunal.
Article 12
Privileges and immunities of international and Lebanese personnel
1. Lebanese and international personnel of the Office of the Special
Tribunal,
while in Lebanon, shall be accorded:
(a) Immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and
all acts performed by them in their official capacity. Such immunity shall
continue
to be accorded after termination of employment with the Office of the
Special
Tribunal;
(b) Exemption from taxation on salaries, allowances and emoluments paid to
them.
2. International personnel shall, in addition thereto, be accorded:
(a) Immunity from immigration restriction;
(b) The right to import free of duties and taxes, except for payment for
services, their furniture and effects at the time of first taking up their
official duties
in Lebanon.
3. The privileges and immunities are granted to the officials of the Office
of the
Special Tribunal in the interest of the Tribunal and not for their personal
benefit.
The right and the duty to waive the immunity in any case where it can be
waived
without prejudice to the purpose for which it is accorded shall lie with the
Registrar
of the Tribunal.
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Article 13
Defence counsel
1. The Government shall ensure that the counsel of a suspect or an accused
who
has been admitted as such by the Special Tribunal shall not be subjected,
while in
Lebanon, to any measure that may affect the free and independent exercise of
his or
her functions.
2. In particular, the counsel shall be accorded:
(a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of personal
baggage;
(b) Inviolability of all documents relating to the exercise of his or her
functions as a counsel of a suspect or accused;
(c) Immunity from criminal or civil jurisdiction in respect of words spoken
or written and acts performed in his or her capacity as counsel. Such
immunity shall
continue to be accorded after termination of his or her functions as a
counsel of a
suspect or accused;
(d) Immunity from any immigration restrictions during his or her stay as
well as during his or her journey to the Tribunal and back.
Article 14
Security, safety and protection of persons referred to in this Agreement
The Government shall take effective and adequate measures to ensure the
appropriate security, safety and protection of personnel of the Office of
the Special
Tribunal and other persons referred to in this Agreement, while in Lebanon.
It shall
take all appropriate steps, within its capabilities, to protect the
equipment and
premises of the Office of the Special Tribunal from attack or any action
that
prevents the Tribunal from discharging its mandate.
Article 15
Cooperation with the Special Tribunal
1. The Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special Tribunal,
in
particular with the Prosecutor and defence counsel, at all stages of the
proceedings.
It shall facilitate access of the Prosecutor and defence counsel to sites,
persons and
relevant documents required for the investigation.
2. The Government shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance by the Special Tribunal or an order issued by the Chambers,
including,
but not limited to:
(a) Identification and location of persons;
(b) Service of documents;
(c) Arrest or detention of persons;
(d) Transfer of an indictee to the Tribunal.
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Article 16
Amnesty
The Government undertakes not to grant amnesty to any person for any crime
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal. An amnesty already
granted in
respect of any such persons and crimes shall not be a bar to prosecution.
Article 17
Practical arrangements
With a view to achieving efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the operation
of
the Special Tribunal:
(a) Appropriate arrangements shall be made to ensure that there is a
coordinated transition from the activities of the International Independent
Investigation Commission, established by the Security Council in its
resolution
1595 (2005), to the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor;
(b) Judges of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber shall take office
on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the
President of the Special Tribunal. Pending such a determination, judges of
both
Chambers shall be convened on an ad hoc basis to deal with organizational
matters
and serving, when required, to perform their duties.
Article 18
Settlement of disputes
Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application
of
this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation or by any other mutually
agreed upon
mode of settlement.
Article 19
Entry into force and commencement of the functioning of the Special Tribunal
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the day after the Government has
notified the United Nations in writing that the legal requirements for entry
into force
have been complied with.
2. The Special Tribunal shall commence functioning on a date to be
determined
by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government, taking into
account
the progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation
Commission.
Article 20
Amendment
This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties.
Article 21
Duration of the Agreement
1. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of three years from the
date
of the commencement of the functioning of the Special Tribunal.
2. Three years after the commencement of the functioning of the Special
Tribunal
the Parties shall, in consultation with the Security Council, review the
progress of
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the work of the Special Tribunal. If at the end of this period of three
years the
activities of the Tribunal have not been completed, the Agreement shall be
extended
to allow the Tribunal to complete its work, for a further period(s) to be
determined
by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government and the
Security
Council.
3. The provisions relating to the inviolability of the funds, assets,
archives and
documents of the Office of the Special Tribunal in Lebanon, the privileges
and
immunities of those referred to in this Agreement, as well as provisions
relating to
defence counsel and the protection of victims and witnesses, shall survive
termination of this Agreement.
In witness whereof, the following duly authorized representatives of the
United Nations and of the Lebanese Republic have signed this Agreement.
Done at __________ on __________ 2006, in three originals in the Arabic,
French
and English languages, all texts being equally authentic.
For the United Nations: For the Lebanese Republic:
______________ _______________
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Attachment
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Having been established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the
Lebanese Republic (hereinafter "the Agreement") pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006, which responded to the request of
the
Government of Lebanon to establish a tribunal of an international character
to try all
those who are found responsible for the terrorist crime which killed the
former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others, the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon
(hereinafter "the Special Tribunal") shall function in accordance with the
provisions
of this Statute.
Section I
Jurisdiction and applicable law
Article 1
Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal
The Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over persons responsible for
the
attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime
Minister
Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons. If the Tribunal
finds that
other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12
December
2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with the consent of the
Security
Council, are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice
and are
of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005, it shall
also have
jurisdiction over persons responsible for such attacks. This connection
includes but
is not limited to a combination of the following elements: criminal intent
(motive),
the purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the
pattern of the
attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators.
Article 2
Applicable criminal law
The following shall be applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the
crimes referred to in article 1, subject to the provisions of this Statute:
(a) The provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution
and punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and
personal
integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences,
including the
rules regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal participation and
conspiracy; and
(b) Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on "Increasing
the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle".
Article 3
Individual criminal responsibility
1. A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of
the Special Tribunal if that person:
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(a) Committed, participated as accomplice, organized or directed others to
commit the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute; or
(b) Contributed in any other way to the commission of the crime set forth in
article 2 of this Statute by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose, where
such contribution is intentional and is either made with the aim of
furthering the
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime.
2. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships, a superior shall
be
criminally responsible for any of the crimes set forth in article 2 of this
Statute
committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control,
as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
subordinates,
where:
(a) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information that
clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to commit
such
crimes;
(b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(c) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
3. The fact that the person acted pursuant to an order of a superior shall
not
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of
punishment if the Special Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
Article 4
Concurrent jurisdiction
1. The Special Tribunal and the national courts of Lebanon shall have
concurrent
jurisdiction. Within its jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall have primacy over
the
national courts of Lebanon.
2. Upon the assumption of office of the Prosecutor, as determined by the
Secretary-General, and no later than two months thereafter, the Special
Tribunal
shall request the national judicial authority seized with the case of the
attack against
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others to defer to its competence. The
Lebanese
judicial authority shall refer to the Tribunal the results of the
investigation and a
copy of the court's records, if any. Persons detained in connection with the
investigation shall be transferred to the custody of the Tribunal.
3. (a) At the request of the Special Tribunal, the national judicial
authority
seized with any of the other crimes committed between 1 October 2004 and
12 December 2005, or a later date decided pursuant to article 1, shall refer
to the
Tribunal the results of the investigation and a copy of the court's records,
if any, for
review by the Prosecutor;
(b) At the further request of the Tribunal, the national authority in
question
shall defer to the competence of the Tribunal. It shall refer to the
Tribunal the results
of the investigation and a copy of the court's records, if any, and persons
detained in
connection with any such case shall be transferred to the custody of the
Tribunal;
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(c) The national judicial authorities shall regularly inform the Tribunal of
the
progress of their investigation. At any stage of the proceedings, the
Tribunal may
formally request a national judicial authority to defer to its competence.
Article 5
Non bis in idem
1. No person shall be tried before a national court of Lebanon for acts for
which
he or she has already been tried by the Special Tribunal.
2. A person who has been tried by a national court may be subsequently tried
by
the Special Tribunal if the national court proceedings were not impartial or
independent, were designed to shield the accused from criminal
responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the case was not
diligently
prosecuted.
3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime
under this Statute, the Special Tribunal shall take into account the extent
to which
any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same act
has
already been served.
Article 6
Amnesty
An amnesty granted to any person for any crime falling within the
jurisdiction
of the Special Tribunal shall not be a bar to prosecution.
Section II
Organization of the Special Tribunal
Article 7
Organs of the Special Tribunal
The Special Tribunal shall consist of the following organs:
(a) The Chambers, comprising a Pre-Trial Judge, a Trial Chamber and an
Appeals Chamber;
(b) The Prosecutor;
(c) The Registry; and
(d) The Defence Office.
Article 8
Composition of the Chambers
1. The Chambers shall be composed as follows:
(a) One international Pre-Trial Judge;
(b) Three judges who shall serve in the Trial Chamber, of whom one shall be
a Lebanese judge and two shall be international judges;
(c) Five judges who shall serve in the Appeals Chamber, of whom two shall
be Lebanese judges and three shall be international judges;
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(d) Two alternate judges, one of whom shall be a Lebanese judge and one
shall be an international judge.
2. The judges of the Appeals Chamber and the judges of the Trial Chamber,
respectively, shall elect a presiding judge who shall conduct the
proceedings in the
Chamber to which he or she was elected. The presiding judge of the Appeals
Chamber shall be the President of the Special Tribunal.
3. At the request of the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber, the President
of the
Special Tribunal may, in the interest of justice, assign the alternate
judges to be
present at each stage of the trial and to replace a judge if that judge is
unable to
continue sitting.
Article 9
Qualification and appointment of judges
1. The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity,
with extensive judicial experience. They shall be independent in the
performance of
their functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from any
Government or
any other source.
2. In the overall composition of the Chambers, due account shall be taken of
the
established competence of the judges in criminal law and procedure and
international law.
3. The judges shall be appointed by the Secretary-General, as set forth in
article 2
of the Agreement, for a three-year period and may be eligible for
reappointment for
a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation
with the
Government.
Article 10
Powers of the President of the Special Tribunal
1. The President of the Special Tribunal, in addition to his or her judicial
functions, shall represent the Tribunal and be responsible for its effective
functioning and the good administration of justice.
2. The President of the Special Tribunal shall submit an annual report on
the
operation and activities of the Tribunal to the Secretary-General and to the
Government of Lebanon.
Article 11
The Prosecutor
1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of
persons responsible for the crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the
Special
Tribunal. In the interest of proper administration of justice, he or she may
decide to
charge jointly persons accused of the same or different crimes committed in
the
course of the same transaction.
2. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Special
Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any
Government or
from any other source.
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3. The Prosecutor shall be appointed, as set forth in article 3 of the
Agreement,
by the Secretary-General for a three-year term and may be eligible for
reappointment for a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General
in
consultation with the Government. He or she shall be of high moral character
and
possess the highest level of professional competence, and have extensive
experience
in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases.
4. The Prosecutor shall be assisted by a Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor and by
such
other Lebanese and international staff as may be required to perform the
functions
assigned to him or her effectively and efficiently.
5. The Office of the Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects,
victims
and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In
carrying
out these tasks, the Prosecutor shall, as appropriate, be assisted by the
Lebanese
authorities concerned.
Article 12
The Registry
1. Under the authority of the President of the Special Tribunal, the
Registry shall
be responsible for the administration and servicing of the Tribunal.
2. The Registry shall consist of a Registrar and such other staff as may be
required.
3. The Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and shall be a
staff
member of the United Nations. He or she shall serve for a three-year term
and may
be eligible for reappointment for a further period to be determined by the
Secretary-
General in consultation with the Government.
4. The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the
Registry.
This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor,
measures
to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and
privacy of
victims and witnesses, and such other appropriate assistance for witnesses
who
appear before the Special Tribunal and others who are at risk on account of
testimony given by such witnesses.
Article 13
The Defence Office
1. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Special
Tribunal, shall appoint an independent Head of the Defence Office, who shall
be
responsible for the appointment of the Office staff and the drawing up of a
list of
defence counsel.
2. The Defence Office, which may also include one or more public defenders,
shall protect the rights of the defence, provide support and assistance to
defence
counsel and to the persons entitled to legal assistance, including, where
appropriate,
legal research, collection of evidence and advice, and appearing before the
Pre-Trial
Judge or a Chamber in respect of specific issues.
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Article 14
Official and working languages
The official languages of the Special Tribunal shall be Arabic, French and
English. In any given case proceedings, the Pre-Trial Judge or a Chamber may
decide that one or two of the languages may be used as working languages as
appropriate.
Section III
Rights of defendants and victims
Article 15
Rights of suspects during investigation
A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall not be compelled
to
incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt. He or she shall have the
following
rights of which he or she shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to
questioning, in
a language he or she speaks and understands:
(a) The right to be informed that there are grounds to believe that he or
she
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal;
(b) The right to remain silent, without such silence being considered in the
determination of guilt or innocence, and to be cautioned that any statement
he or she
makes shall be recorded and may be used in evidence;
(c) The right to have legal assistance of his or her own choosing, including
the right to have legal assistance provided by the Defence Office where the
interests
of justice so require and where the suspect does not have sufficient means
to pay for
it;
(d) The right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she
cannot
understand or speak the language used for questioning;
(e) The right to be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person
has voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel.
Article 16
Rights of the accused
1. All accused shall be equal before the Special Tribunal.
2. The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to
measures
ordered by the Special Tribunal for the protection of victims and witnesses.
3. (a) The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to
the provisions of this Statute;
(b) The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused;
(c) In order to convict the accused, the relevant Chamber must be convinced
of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to this
Statute,
he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality:
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(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her
defence and to communicate without hindrance with counsel of his or her own
choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) Subject to the provisions of article 22, to be tried in his or her
presence,
and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of
his or her
own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance,
of this
right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case
where the
interests of justice so require and without payment by him or her in any
such case if
he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf
under the
same conditions as witnesses against him or her;
(f) To examine all evidence to be used against him or her during the trial
in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal;
(g) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot
understand or speak the language used in the Special Tribunal;
(h) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess
guilt.
5. The accused may make statements in court at any stage of the proceedings,
provided such statements are relevant to the case at issue. The Chambers
shall
decide on the probative value, if any, of such statements.
Article 17
Rights of victims
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Special
Tribunal
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at
stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Pre-Trial Judge or the
Chamber and
in a manner that is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused
and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by
the
legal representatives of the victims where the Pre-Trial Judge or the
Chamber
considers it appropriate.
Section IV
Conduct of proceedings
Article 18
Pre-Trial proceedings
1. The Pre-Trial Judge shall review the indictment. If satisfied that a
prima facie
case has been established by the Prosecutor, he or she shall confirm the
indictment.
If he or she is not so satisfied, the indictment shall be dismissed.
S/2006/893
30 06-61797
2. The Pre-Trial Judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such
orders
and warrants for the arrest or transfer of persons, and any other orders as
may be
required for the conduct of the investigation and for the preparation of a
fair and
expeditious trial.
Article 19
Evidence collected prior to the establishment of the Special Tribunal
Evidence collected with regard to cases subject to the consideration of the
Special Tribunal, prior to the establishment of the Tribunal, by the
national
authorities of Lebanon or by the International Independent Investigation
Commission in accordance with its mandate as set out in Security Council
resolution 1595 (2005) and subsequent resolutions, shall be received by the
Tribunal. Its admissibility shall be decided by the Chambers pursuant to
international standards on collection of evidence. The weight to be given to
any
such evidence shall be determined by the Chambers.
Article 20
Commencement and conduct of trial proceedings
1. The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment to the accused, satisfy
itself that
the rights of the accused are respected, confirm that the accused
understands the
indictment and instruct the accused to enter a plea.
2. Unless otherwise decided by the Trial Chamber in the interests of
justice,
examination of witnesses shall commence with questions posed by the
presiding
judge, followed by questions posed by other members of the Trial Chamber,
the
Prosecutor and the Defence.
3. Upon request or proprio motu, the Trial Chamber may at any stage of the
trial
decide to call additional witnesses and/or order the production of
additional
evidence.
4. The hearings shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to hold the
proceedings in camera in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
Article 21
Powers of the Chambers
1. The Special Tribunal shall confine the trial, appellate and review
proceedings
strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges, or
the grounds
for appeal or review, respectively. It shall take strict measures to prevent
any action
that may cause unreasonable delay.
2. A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence that it deems to have probative
value and exclude such evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed
by the need to ensure a fair trial.
3. A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the
interests
of justice allow, in written form.
4. In cases not otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, a
Chamber shall apply rules of evidence that will best favour a fair
determination of
the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and
the general
principles of law.
S/2006/893
06-61797 31
Article 22
Trials in absentia
1. The Special Tribunal shall conduct trial proceedings in the absence of
the
accused, if he or she:
(a) Has expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be present;
(b) Has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State authorities
concerned;
(c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps
have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to
inform
him or her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge.
2. When hearings are conducted in the absence of the accused, the Special
Tribunal shall ensure that:
(a) The accused has been notified, or served with the indictment, or notice
has otherwise been given of the indictment through publication in the media
or
communication to the State of residence or nationality;
(b) The accused has designated a defence counsel of his or her own
choosing, to be remunerated either by the accused or, if the accused is
proved to be
indigent, by the Tribunal;
(c) Whenever the accused refuses or fails to appoint a defence counsel, such
counsel has been assigned by the Defence Office of the Tribunal with a view
to
ensuring full representation of the interests and rights of the accused.
3. In case of conviction in absentia, the accused, if he or she had not
designated a
defence counsel of his or her choosing, shall have the right to be retried
in his or her
presence before the Special Tribunal, unless he or she accepts the
judgement.
Article 23
Judgement
The judgement shall be rendered by a majority of the judges of the Trial
Chamber or of the Appeals Chamber and shall be delivered in public. It shall
be
accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing, to which any separate or
dissenting
opinions shall be appended.
Article 24
Penalties
1. The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted person imprisonment for
life
or for a specified number of years. In determining the terms of imprisonment
for the
crimes provided for in this Statute, the Trial Chamber shall, as
appropriate, have
recourse to international practice regarding prison sentences and to the
practice of
the national courts of Lebanon.
2. In imposing sentence, the Trial Chamber should take into account such
factors
as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the
convicted
person.
S/2006/893
32 06-61797
Article 25
Compensation to victims
1. The Special Tribunal may identify victims who have suffered harm as a
result
of the commission of crimes by an accused convicted by the Tribunal.
2. The Registrar shall transmit to the competent authorities of the State
concerned
the judgement finding the accused guilty of a crime that has caused harm to
a
victim.
3. Based on the decision of the Special Tribunal and pursuant to the
relevant
national legislation, a victim or persons claiming through the victim,
whether or not
such victim had been identified as such by the Tribunal under paragraph 1 of
this
article, may bring an action in a national court or other competent body to
obtain
compensation.
4. For the purposes of a claim made under paragraph 3 of this article, the
judgement of the Special Tribunal shall be final and binding as to the
criminal
responsibility of the convicted person.
Article 26
Appellate proceedings
1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the
Trial
Chamber or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds:
(a) An error on a question of law invalidating the decision;
(b) An error of fact that has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by
the
Trial Chamber.
Article 27
Review proceedings
1. Where a new fact has been discovered that was not known at the time of
the
proceedings before the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber and that could
have
been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person or the
Prosecutor may submit an application for review of the judgement.
2. An application for review shall be submitted to the Appeals Chamber. The
Appeals Chamber may reject the application if it considers it to be
unfounded. If it
determines that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate:
(a) Reconvene the Trial Chamber;
(b) Retain jurisdiction over the matter.
Article 28
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
1. The judges of the Special Tribunal shall, as soon as practicable after
taking
office, adopt Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the conduct of the
pre-trial, trial
and appellate proceedings, the admission of evidence, the participation of
victims,
the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters and
may
amend them, as appropriate.
S/2006/893
06-61797 33
2. In so doing, the judges shall be guided, as appropriate, by the Lebanese
Code
of Criminal Procedure, as well as by other reference materials reflecting
the highest
standards of international criminal procedure, with a view to ensuring a
fair and
expeditious trial.
Article 29
Enforcement of sentences
1. Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the President of
the
Special Tribunal from a list of States that have indicated their willingness
to accept
persons convicted by the Tribunal.
2. Conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the State of
enforcement subject to the supervision of the Special Tribunal. The State of
enforcement shall be bound by the duration of the sentence, subject to
article 30 of
this Statute.
Article 30
Pardon or commutation of sentences
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted
person is
imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the
State
concerned shall notify the Special Tribunal accordingly. There shall only be
pardon
or commutation of sentence if the President of the Tribunal, in consultation
with the
judges, so decides on the basis of the interests of justice and the general
principles
of law.
S/2006/893
34 06-61797
Annex II
Attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004a
Following is an overview of the 14 cases in chronological order.
Number Date Type of explosion Area Victims
1 1 October 2004 Car bomb Dar El-Mraisseh locality, California
Street, Beirut
Marwane Hamadeh and driver
wounded, bodyguard killed
2 19 March 2005 Bomb New-Jdeidh, northern suburb of
Beirut
11 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
3 23 March 2005 Bomb Altavista shopping centre, Kaslik,
north of Beirut
3 persons killed, 7 persons
wounded and serious material
damage to buildings and cars
4 26 March 2005 Bomb Sid-El-Bouchria, north-east of
Beirut
6 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
5 1 April 2005 Bomb Plaza shopping centre, Broumana,
east of Beirut
9 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
6 6 May 2005 Bomb "Voice of Charity" radio station,
Jounieh, north of Beirut
11 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
7 2 June 2005 Victim's car Ashrafieh locality, Beirut Samir Kassir killed
8 21 June 2005 Victim's car Wata Msaytbeh, Boustany Street,
Beirut
George Hawi killed
9 12 July 2005 Car bomb Naccache area, Beirut Elias El-Murr and 2 other
persons wounded and
1 person killed
10 22 July 2005 Bomb Monot Street, Ashrafieh locality,
Beirut
13 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
11 22 August 2005 Bomb Zalka locality, near Promenade
Hotel, north of Beirut
11 persons wounded and
serious material damage to
buildings and cars
12 16 September 2005 Bomb Naoum Libki Street, Ashrafieh
locality, Beirut
1 person killed and 10 persons
wounded and serious material
damage to buildings and cars
13 25 September 2005 Victim's car Ghadir locality, suburb of Beirut May
Chidiac seriously
wounded
14 12 December 2005 Car bomb Mkalles, north of Beirut Gebran Tueni and 2
other
persons killed
a See S/2006/161, para. 55.

SECURITY COUNCIL, IN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, CONDEMNS GEMAYEL ASSASSINATION

21 November 2006
Security Council
SC/8873

Department of Public Information . News and Media Division . New York
Security Council
5569th Meeting (PM)

SECURITY COUNCIL, IN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, CONDEMNS ASSASSINATION
OF LEBANON'S INDUSTRY MINISTER

The Security Council condemned "unequivocally" this afternoon the
assassination in Beirut today of
Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, describing him as "a patriot who was a
symbol of freedom and of political
independence of Lebanon".
In a statement read out by Jorge Voto-Bernales ( Peru), its President for
November, the Council also
condemned any attempt to destabilize Lebanon through political assassination
or other terrorist acts, and
expressed grave concern at the assassination and its possible impact on
efforts to solidify democracy, extend
Government authority throughout its territory and complete the
reconstruction process.
The Council called upon all parties in Lebanon and the region to show
restraint and a "sense of
responsibility", and urged all States to cooperate fully in the fight
against terrorism. It welcomed the
Government's determination to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers
and sponsors of today's and other
assassinations.
Requesting the Secretary-General to continue reporting regularly on the
situation in Lebanon, the
Council underlined its readiness to continue its support of the legitimate
and democratically elected
Government of Lebanon.
The meeting started at 4:16 p.m. and adjourned at 4:21 p.m.
Presidential Statement
The full text of presidential statement S/PRST/2006/46 reads as follows:
"The Security Council unequivocally condemns the assassination in Beirut on
21 November 2006 of
Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, a patriot who was a symbol of freedom and
of the political independence of
Lebanon. The Security Council expresses its deepest sympathy and condolences
to the family of the victim
and to the people and Government of Lebanon.
"The Security Council condemns any attempt to destabilise Lebanon through
political assassination or
other terrorist acts. The Security Council is gravely concerned by this
assassination and its possible impact
on ongoing efforts by the Government and people of Lebanon to solidify
democracy, extend the authority of
the Lebanese Government throughout its territory and complete the
reconstruction process.
"The Security Council calls upon all parties in Lebanon and the region to
show restraint and a sense of
responsibility with a view to preventing any further deterioration of the
situation in Lebanon. The Security
Council urges all States, in accordance with its resolutions 1373 (2001),
1566 (2004) and 1624 (2005), to
cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism.
"The Security Council welcomes the determination and commitment of the
Government of Lebanon to
bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this and other
assassinations, and underlines its
determination to support the Government of Lebanon in its efforts to this
end.
"The Security Council reaffirms its previous calls upon all parties
concerned to cooperate fully and
urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of all
relevant resolutions concerning the restoration
of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty and political independence of
Lebanon, in particular resolutions 1559
(2004), 1595 (2005), 1664 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006).
"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to continue to follow
closely and report regularly
to the Council on the situation in Lebanon. The Security Council underlines
its readiness to continue to act in
support of the legitimate and democratically elected Government of Lebanon.

Letter dated 21 November 2006 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

United Nations S/2006/911
Security Council
Distr.: General
21 November 2006
Original: English
06-62578 (E) 211106
*0662578*

Letter dated 21 November 2006 from the President of the
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

The members of the Security Council have carefully considered your report on
the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon (S/2006/893), submitted
in
accordance with resolution 1664 (2006), as well as the presentation by your
Legal
Counsel (S/2006/893/Add.1).
They welcome the conclusion of the negotiation with the Government of
Lebanon, as requested in resolution 1664 (2006).
The members of the Security Council are satisfied with the Agreement
annexed to the report, including the Statute of the Special Tribunal.
With regard to the financing of the Special Tribunal, they support option 2,
as
set out in paragraph 49 of your report, and recommend therefore the
inclusion in the
Agreement of the corresponding article, which would read:
The expenses of the Special Tribunal shall be borne in the following
manner:
(a) Fifty-one per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by
voluntary contributions from States;
(b) Forty-nine per cent of the expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne
by the Government of Lebanon.
It is understood that the Secretary-General will commence the process of
establishing the Tribunal when he has sufficient contributions in hand to
finance the establishment of the Tribunal and twelve months of its
operations,
plus pledges equal to the anticipated expenses of the following twenty-four
months of the Tribunal's operation. Should voluntary contributions be
insufficient for the Tribunal to implement its mandate, the
Secretary-General
and the Security Council shall explore alternate means of financing the
Tribunal.
The members of the Security Council invite you to proceed, together with the
Government of Lebanon, in conformity with the Constitution of Lebanon, with
the
final steps for the conclusion of the Agreement.
They look forward to being kept informed of developments regarding the
establishment of the Special Tribunal.

(Signed) Jorge Voto-Bernales
President of the Security Council

Tuesday, November 21, 2006

Annan and Security Council condemn assassination of Lebanese Government minister

 
Annan and Security Council condemn assassination of Lebanese Government minister

21 November 2006 – Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Security Council expressed shock and condemnation today at the assassination of Lebanon’s Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, calling for restraint from all sides and urging national unity.

In a statement issued by his spokesman, Mr. Annan decried the murder of Mr. Gemayel, “who believed strongly in an independent, democratic and united Lebanon,” and offered his deepest sympathies to the late minister’s family and to the Lebanese Government.

Mr. Gemayel died after being shot in his car while travelling through the capital, Beirut.

Mr. Annan said in his statement that “such acts of terrorism undermine Lebanon’s stability, are unacceptable and have no place in a democratic and open society,” adding that “the perpetrators and instigators of today’s attack must be brought to justice to ensure an end to impunity.”

In a presidential statement read out by Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales of Peru, which holds the rotating presidency for November, Council members urged all parties in Lebanon and the wider region to “show restraint and a sense of responsibility” to avoid further destabilizing the country.

The Council also voiced grave concern about the efforts of the Lebanese Government and people to solidify democracy in the wake of the assassination, the latest in a series of high-profile killings in the country over the past two years.

The murder of Mr. Gemayel took place on the same day that the Council sent a letter to Mr. Annan offering its backing to the establishment of a special tribunal to deal with those alleged responsible for the assassination of then prime minister Rafik Hariri in February last year.

The Council set up the International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC) in April 2005 after an earlier UN mission found that Lebanon’s own investigation into the Hariri assassination was seriously flawed and that Syria was primarily responsible for the political tensions that preceded the killing. Its mandate runs until next June.

Serge Brammertz, the head of the IIIC, told the Council in September that evidence obtained so far suggests that a young, male suicide bomber, probably non-Lebanese, detonated up to 1,800 kilograms of explosives inside a van to assassinate Mr. Hariri. The bombing in Beirut also killed 22 others.

The IIIC has been tasked with probing 14 other bombings that have occurred in Lebanon since October 2004, and Mr. Brammertz said evidence points towards his earlier conclusion that many of them were connected.

UN Security Council backs special tribunal for Lebanon to deal with Hariri assassination

 
 

21 November 2006 – The Security Council today gave its support to the establishment of a special tribunal to try those alleged responsible for last year’s assassination of then Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others in a massive car bombing in Beirut.

In a letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan from Council President Jorge Voto-Bernales of Peru, which holds the rotating presidency for this month, the 15-member body said it was satisfied with the agreement reached by the UN with the Lebanese Government on the tribunal’s form and structure.

The letter follows a report by Mr. Annan on the tribunal and a presentation to Council members yesterday by Under-Secretary-General Nicholas Michel.

Mr. Annan’s report includes the statute needed to set up the “tribunal of an international character” to deal with the Hariri assassination, as well as any other attacks since October 2004 which are “connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005.”

According to the statute, the tribunal will have concurrent jurisdiction with Lebanon’s national courts, but primacy over those courts within its jurisdiction.

Its chambers will consist of one international pre-trial judge; three judges to serve in the trial chamber (one Lebanese and two international); five judges to serve in the appeals chamber (two Lebanese and three international); and two alternate judges (one Lebanese and one international).

The judges of the trial chamber and those of the appeals chamber will then each elect a presiding judge to conduct the proceedings in their chamber, with the presiding judge of the appeals chamber serving as president of the tribunal.

The prosecutor will be independent of the Lebanese Government and will be appointed by the UN Secretary-General for a three-year term that can be renewed as the Secretary-General decides in consultation with the Government. He or she will have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations, and should be assisted by Lebanese authorities where necessary.

The tribunal has the power to impose penalties leading up to and including life imprisonment for anyone found guilty of crimes committed.

In April last year the Council set up the International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC) after an earlier UN mission found that Lebanon’s own inquiry into the Hariri assassination was seriously flawed and that Syria was primarily responsible for the political tensions that preceded the attack. Its mandate runs out next June.

Serge Brammertz, the head of the IIIC, told the Council in September that evidence obtained so far suggests that a young, male suicide bomber, probably non-Lebanese, detonated up to 1,800 kilograms of explosives inside a van to assassinate Mr. Hariri.

The IIIC has also been tasked with probing 14 other bombings that have occurred in Lebanon since October 2004, and Mr. Brammertz said evidence points towards his conclusion that many of them were connected.

In their letter today, Council members said they backed the financing option that would mean Lebanon pays for 49 per cent of the tribunal’s expenses and the remainder is borne by voluntary contributions from other States.

They add that they expect the Secretary-General to begin establishing the tribunal when he has sufficient contributions to finance its formation and 12 months of operations, as well as pledges equivalent to another two years of operations. Should voluntary contributions be insufficient, the Council said it would explore alternate means of financing with the Secretary-General.

Ambassador John Bolton on Minister Pierre Gemayel assassination


Top Header Image of the State Department Logo and UN Headquarters
brown bar

USUN PRESS RELEASE #  347(06)  
November 21, 2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

 

 

Remarks by Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Assassination of the Lebanese Cabinet Minister Pierre Gemayel, at the Security Council Stakeout, November 21, 2006

Ambassador Bolton: Even as the Security Council considers the need to endorse the tribunal, to try the -- prosecution of those who committed the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, we are confronted with what appears to be yet another terrorist assassination in Beirut. It's a very great tragedy. Certainly our thoughts are with the family of Pierre Gemayel.

But this also makes clear that we have to support the democratic forces in Lebanon against this politically motivated assassination. This is not the way to change a government. It shows why we need the tribunal established as soon as possible, why it was correct to expand the mandate of the Brammertz investigatory commission, and why the tribunal needs the flexibility to try the perpetrators of the other political assassinations in Lebanon.

This is potentially a turning point in the history of that country and therefore of the region.
So we strongly support the Siniora government and all the democratic forces in Lebanon. We call on all states in the region to support the democratic government and to urge everyone's cooperation in finding the assassins of Pierre Gemayel as soon as possible.

Reporter: Ambassador, given the -- Mr. Gemayel's positions concerning the tribunal and concerning Syrian involvement in Lebanon, are you concerned that Syria was behind this?

Ambassador Bolton: I think the facts need to be developed. But if you look at the reports of Mehlis and Brammertz over the months, the evidence that links the Hariri assassination to the other political assassinations, I think people can draw their own conclusions.

Reporter: Ambassador Bolton, there's voices on the Security Council who say now is not the time to push ahead with the tribunal, given the instability in Lebanon.

Ambassador Bolton: How incredibly wrong that would be. How incredibly wrong that would be. Instability? They 're killing people in Lebanon. They're assassinating political leaders. Not the time to seek justice? There may be those on the Security Council who say it. Let them step forward and say it.

Reporter: And will there be a council reaction specifically on the assassination of Mr. Gemayel?

Ambassador Bolton: I'll have to consult with my colleagues on it. I think something like that may well be appropriate, but obviously this has just happened within the past hours.

Reporter: Ambassador Bolton, how fast do you think we're moving on approving the letter to the secretary-general concerning the tribunals, sir?

Ambassador Bolton: Sad to say, I hope we're going to move faster than we were before.
Okay. Thank you very much. 

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

Somalis Helped Hezbollah

NEW YORK TIMES

November 15, 2006
U.N. Says Somalis Helped Hezbollah Fighters
By ROBERT F. WORTH
UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 14 - More than 700 Islamic militants from Somalia
traveled to Lebanon in July to fight alongside Hezbollah in its war against
Israel, a United Nations report says. The militia in Lebanon returned the
favor by providing training and - through its patrons Iran and Syria -
weapons to the Islamic alliance struggling for control of Somalia, it adds.
The report, which was disclosed by Reuters on Monday, appears to be the
first indication that foreign fighters assisted Hezbollah during the 34-day
conflict, when Israel maintained a tight blockade on Lebanon.
The report also says Iran sought to trade arms for uranium from Somalia to
further its nuclear ambitions, though it does not say whether Iran
succeeded.
The 86-page report was issued by four experts monitoring violations of a
1992 United Nations arms embargo on Somalia, which was put in place after
the country lapsed into civil war and remains in effect. The report is to be
discussed Friday at the Security Council.
The panel does not say how the information was obtained. But the members had
access to information from the intelligence agencies of the Security Council's
15 current members, including Britain, France, China, Russia and the United
States, a United Nations official said.
Any involvement by Somalis would be surprising because Hezbollah's
effectiveness is widely attributed to its deep familiarity with the region.
Hezbollah officials could not be reached Tuesday night for comment.
An official at the Israeli mission to the United Nations said he had not
seen the report, and was not aware of any Somali fighters having taken part
in the conflict with Hezbollah. The official asked not to be identified,
citing diplomatic protocol.
While the sources of the information remain unclear, the report is dense
with details about arms shipments to the groups vying for power in Somalia.
It states that in mid-July, Aden Hashi Farah, a leader of the Somali
Islamist alliance, personally selected about 720 combat-hardened fighters to
travel to Lebanon and fight alongside Hezbollah.
At least 100 Somalis had returned by early September - with five Hezbollah
members - while others stayed on in Lebanon for advanced military training,
the report says. It is not clear how many may have been killed, though the
report says some were wounded and later treated after their return to
Somalia.
The fighters were paid a minimum of $2,000 for their service, the report
says, and as much as $30,000 was to be given to the families of those
killed, with money donated by "a number of supporting countries."
In addition to training some Somali militants, Hezbollah "arranged for
additional support to be given" by Iran and Syria, including weapons, the
report found. On July 27, 200 Somali fighters also traveled to Syria to be
trained in guerrilla warfare, the report says.
It also indicates that Iran appears to have sought help in its quest for
uranium in Dusa Mareb, the hometown of Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader
of the Islamist alliance in Somalia, which is known as the Council of
Islamic Courts.
"At the time of the writing of this report, there were two Iranians in Dusa
Mareb engaged on matters linked to the exploration of uranium in exchange
for arms" for the Council of Islamic Courts, says the report, which is dated
Oct. 16.
Those claims, if proved, could worsen global tensions over Iran's nuclear
program. Iran ignored an Aug. 31 deadline to suspend its uranium enrichment,
and the United States has been leading a United Nations effort to impose
sanctions.
The United Nations report is focused mostly on the increasingly volatile
situation in Somalia, where Islamists took control of the capital,
Mogadishu, in June from warlords backed by the United States.
Not only has the volume of arms flowing into Somalia grown, according to the
authors, but more sophisticated weapons like surface-to-air missiles are
being brought in. The conflict could grow into a regional war, with Somalia's
neighbors, Ethiopia and Eritrea, backing opposing sides.
The report also accuses Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria
of supplying the Somali Islamists with arms, advisers and fighters. It says
three nations - Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen - are aligned with the so-called
transitional government based in Baidoa, an inland city.
Asked about violations of the arms embargo, the report states, officials in
those countries either denied any involvement or failed to answer.
The report recommends that the Security Council blockade Somalia. It also
warns urgently against sending any peacekeepers to the country, saying such
a force could become "the catalyst that sparks a serious military
confrontation between the opposing sides.

Thursday, November 02, 2006

Statement by the President of the Security Council - 10/30/06

United Nations S/PRST/2006/43
Security Council

30 October 2006

Statement by the President of the Security Council.

At the 5559th meeting of the Security Council, held on 30 October 2006, in
connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The
situation in
the Middle East", the President of the Security Council made the following
statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council recalls all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in
particular resolutions 1559 (2004), 425 and 426 (1978), resolution 520
(1982)
and 1680 (2006), and resolution 1701 (2006), as well as the statements of
its
president on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18
June
2000, of 19 October 2004, of 4 May 2005, and of 23 January 2006.

"The Security Council reaffirms its strong support for the territorial
integrity, sovereignty, unity and political independence of Lebanon within
its
internationally recognized borders.

"The Security Council welcomes the fourth semi-annual report to the
Security Council of 19 October 2006 on the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004).

"The Security Council notes that important progress has been made
towards the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), in particular through
the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south of the country for
the first time in three decades, but it also notes with regret that some
provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) have yet to be implemented, namely the
disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the strict
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political
independence of Lebanon, and free and fair presidential elections conducted
according to the Lebanese constitutional rules, without any foreign
interference and influence.

"The Security Council commends the Lebanese Government for
extending its authority throughout its territory, particularly in the South,
and
encourages it to continue its efforts in this regard.
"The Security Council reiterates its call for the full implementation of
resolution 1559 (2004) and urges all concerned States and parties as
mentioned
in the report to cooperate fully with the Government of Lebanon, the
Security
Council, and the Secretary-General to achieve this goal.

"The Security Council reaffirms its support to the Secretary-General and
his Special Envoy in their efforts and dedication to facilitate and assist
in the
implementation of all provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006).
"The Security Council acknowledges the Secretary-General's intention to
revert to the Council in his next report on implementation of resolution
1701
and looks forward to his further recommendations on the relevant outstanding
issues."

Fourth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the SCl on the implementation of 1559

United Nations S/2006/832

Security Council

19 October 2006

Fourth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the
Security Council on the implementation of Security Council
resolution 1559 (2004)

I. Introduction
1. The present report is my fourth semi-annual report to the Security
Council on
the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004).

2. In the six months since my last report, of 19 April 2006 (S/2006/248),
Lebanon
witnessed first political standstill, then severe deterioration and
prolonged
instability.

3. Lebanon's National Dialogue reconvened on 28 April and 16 May 2006 to
discuss the two remaining issues on its agenda, the Lebanese presidency and
the
arms of Hizbollah, amidst an increasingly tense political climate both
domestically
and with regard to Lebanese-Syrian relations.

4. On 1 and 2 June 2006 protests and clashes erupted after a television
programme
appeared to parody the Secretary-General of Hizbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.
Youths
from the southern suburbs of Beirut blocked the road to the airport with
burning
tyres and engaged in clashes with youths from the north-eastern suburbs.

5. In this context, the National Dialogue met on 8 June 2006; in the
session,
Lebanese political leaders agreed on a written code of conduct stipulating
that they
would refrain from attacking each other, in order to decrease the rising
political and
sectarian tension. On 29 June, the National Dialogue convened for the last
time to
date and adjourned, having reached no further agreements.

6. On 12 July, hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah after
Hizbollah
launched an unprovoked attack across the Blue Line, abducting two Israeli
soldiers
and killing several others. I have outlined the course of events and effects
of the
conflict elsewhere in my reports on the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006)
(S/2006/670 and S/2006/730), which was adopted on 11 August 2006 and led to
a
cessation of hostilities that has remained in effect since 14 August.

7. A tense political climate has continued to prevail in Lebanon. In its
midst, in a
worrying return to last year's climate of frequent assassinations and
terrorist acts, a
senior Lebanese security official survived an assassination attempt while
driving on
a road in south Lebanon on 5 September. Four of his aides and bodyguards
were
killed in the attack and five were wounded.

8. In the early morning hours of 15 October, six Lebanese civilians were
hurt
when three rockets were launched into a building in downtown Beirut, close
to both
United Nations headquarters and the Grand Serail which houses the Prime
Minister's offices. This disconcerting incident followed two other attacks
which had
not caused any casualties, with similar rocket launchers and with hand
grenades
against police stations in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the latest attacks,
the
Government of Lebanon has expanded the presence of the Internal Security
Forces
in Beirut by 800 men.

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)
9. Since the Council adopted resolution 1559 (2004) on 2 September 2004,
there
has been considerable progress towards its full implementation. In April
2005, the
full withdrawal of Syrian troops, military assets and military intelligence
apparatus
was achieved. Shortly afterwards, free and fair legislative elections were
conducted
in Lebanon (see S/2005/673). In my last report, I stated that with the
agreements
reached in the Lebanese National Dialogue, significant further progress
towards the
full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) had been made.

10. Additional progress has been made in recent months with the significant
and
historic deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south of the country
for
the first time in three decades. Moreover, Lebanese troops have taken up
positions
along the eastern part of the Blue Line for the first time ever, and have
deployed in
significant numbers along Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic.
These
steps represent important progress towards the full extension of the
Government of
Lebanon's control over all Lebanese territory and the fulfilment of the
requirements
of resolutions 425 (1978) and 1559 (2004) and the Taif Accords.

11. However, resolution 1559 (2004), and in particular its provisions
calling for
the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and
the
strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and
political
independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the
Government,
has yet to be implemented in full.
A. Withdrawal of foreign forces deployed in Lebanon

12. In my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) of 12
September
2006 (S/2006/730), I stated that to the best of the ability of the United
Nations to
ascertain, the only foreign forces currently deployed in Lebanon were those
serving
under the banner of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Israeli
troops, who had entered Lebanon in the course of the recent conflict,
returned
beyond the Blue Line on 1 October 2006, with the exception of their
deployment in
the divided village of Ghajar. I expect this presence to end shortly in the
context of a
trilateral discussion on security arrangements for the village.

I have previously reported on the otherwise complete withdrawal of Israeli
forces from all
Lebanese territory, in full compliance with this aspect of resolution 425
(1978), and on the full
withdrawal of all Syrian troops, military assets and the military
intelligence apparatus from
Lebanon, in full compliance with this aspect of resolution 1559 (2004). The
Security Council
has endorsed my conclusions in both respects.

B. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence
of Lebanon

1. Syrian intelligence apparatus and activity in Lebanon

13. The Government of Lebanon has stated to me that its efforts to
consolidate its
full control over all security services continue. Allegations have at times
been made,
including by the Government of Lebanon, that there continues to be Syrian
intelligence activity in Lebanon.2

2. Establishment of mutual diplomatic representation

14. Subsequent to my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004),
the Security Council adopted its resolution 1680 (2006) of 17 May 2006,
which
encouraged the delineation of borders between the Syrian Arab Republic and
Lebanon and the establishment of full diplomatic relations and
representation.

15. I have stated my expectation of the early initiation of a process
between
Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, based on an agreed action agenda,
which
will eventually lead to the establishment of full diplomatic relations.3 I
reiterate my
expectation in the light of the Council's position, as expressed in
resolutions 1680
(2006) and 1701 (2006). Steps towards the establishment of diplomatic
relations
between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon would significantly contribute
to
the stability of the region.

3. Delineation of the border

16. In addition to its call contained in resolution 1680 (2006) on the
Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the
Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border, the Council again
emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government
of
Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in its resolution 1701 (2006).

17. In the context of the general need for a delineation of the
Syrian-Lebanese
border, the Government of Lebanon has informed me that Syrian border police
maintained sand barriers and positions inside Lebanese territory in several
locations
during the last six months. The Government of Lebanon further informed me
that
there were mobile positions, some of which were also manned by Syrian border
police on occasion. The apparent uncertainty over the border in the areas
concerned
highlights, once again, the need for a comprehensive border delineation
agreement
between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, in the best interest of both
countries.

2 The Syrian Government stated in a letter to me dated 24 April 2006 that it
would "like to
reaffirm once again that all its troops, military assets and security
apparatus withdrew from
Lebanon on 26 April 2005" (S/2006/259, annex).

3 In my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) of 12
September 2006
(S/2006/730), I noted the assurances given to me by President Assad and
reiterated my
expectation of the early initiation of a process between the two countries,
based on an agreed
action agenda, which would eventually lead to the establishment of full
diplomatic relations. I
must recall in this context the statements made by the representative of the
Government of the
Syrian Arab Republic in the Security Council after Prime Minister Siniora's
address on 21 April
2006 (S/PV.5417) and in the letter addressed to me from the Government of
the Syrian Arab
Republic of 24 April 2006 (S/2006/259).

18. As regards delineation of the border in the Shab'a Farms area, Prime
Minister
Siniora enquired in a meeting between us on 21 April 2006 as to possible
steps to be
undertaken, from the perspective of the United Nations, for the sovereignty
of the
Shab'a Farms to be transferred from the Syrian Arab Republic to Lebanon. I
responded to the Prime Minister in a letter dated 5 June 2006. Prime
Minister
Siniora and I have discussed the matter further, including when I visited
Beirut
during my recent mission to the region and in connection with the Government
of
Lebanon's seven-point plan.

19. In the light of Syrian statements indicating that the Shab'a Farms area
is
Lebanese and considering the alternative path suggested by the Government of
Lebanon in its seven-point plan, I continue to investigate carefully the
complicated
cartographic, legal and political implications of such an approach and will
revert to
the Council in due course.4 In the meantime, I wish to reiterate my urgent
call on
the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to undertake the necessary steps to
delineate
their common border, in fulfilment of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006)
and
1701 (2006). Such steps would significantly contribute to the stability of
the region.

4. Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity
20. Subsequent to my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004)
(S/2006/248), persistent and provocative Israeli air incursions,
occasionally
reaching deep into Lebanese airspace and generating sonic booms over
populated
areas, continued to be a matter of serious concern (see S/2006/560). The
Government of Israel has continued to maintain its claim that such
overflights are
carried out for security reasons.

21. Israeli overflights have also continued since the cessation of
hostilities
between Israel and Hizbollah went into effect on 14 August 2006. I expect
that such
air incursions and violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which stand in
contradiction
to resolutions 425 (1978) and 1559 (2004) as well as resolution 1701 (2006)
itself,
will cease fully.

22. The recent hostilities between Israel and Hizbollah saw an extended
period of
time in which Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty and territorial
integrity. With
resolution 1701 (2006), a cessation of hostilities has been established,
which both
parties have by and large abided by, as I have reported in my report on the
implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2006/730).

23. The Government of Lebanon has also informed me of another alleged
violation
of Lebanese sovereignty by Israel.5

4 According to the seven-point plan, the Security Council might place the
Shab'a Farms area and
the adjacent Kafr Shuba hills temporarily under United Nations jurisdiction
until border
delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled in
accordance with
international law.

5 The Lebanese Government asserted to me that the assassination of an
official of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad in Lebanon on 26 May 2006 had been carried out by an
intelligence network
operating under the instruction of Israel. A press release from the Lebanese
delegation, dated
21 June 2006, stated that the Department of Intelligence of the Lebanese
Armed Forces had
uncovered a terrorist network working for Israel. One of the alleged members
of the network,
the press release further asserted, had admitted to several assassinations
carried out in Lebanon
at the behest of Israeli security services, including that of 26 May 2006.
The Israeli Government
has denied these claims.

C. Extension of Lebanese Government control over all
Lebanese territory

24. In my last report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), I
noted that
a number of serious incidents had emphasized the necessity for the
Government of
Lebanon, through its regular security and armed forces, to extend its
control over all
its territory, in order to maintain quiet along the Blue Line. As I stated,
the
Government of Lebanon, as the sole legitimate authority vested with a
monopoly on
the use of force throughout its territory, had to do more to exercise its
control
accordingly.

25. During the hostilities, the Lebanese Government reaffirmed its
determination
to extend its control over all of Lebanon's territory and to establish its
monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence. Prime Minister Siniora's seven-point plan
envisaged
that the Lebanese Government would extend its authority over its territory
through
its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons or
authority
other than that of the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords. The
Lebanese
Council of Ministers adopted the seven-point plan as the official position
of the
Government of Lebanon on 27 July 2006. On 7 August 2006, the cabinet again
reaffirmed its commitment and decided to send 15,000 Lebanese soldiers to
the
south simultaneously with the withdrawal of the occupying Israeli forces
beyond the
Blue Line. The Council of Ministers also confirmed its readiness to accept
UNIFIL
support, if needed, in order to facilitate the deployment of the Lebanese
army troops
in the context of the implementation of the seven-point plan.

26. I wish to welcome again the significant and historic step taken by the
Government of Lebanon to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces to the south of
the
country. In addition to the first deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in
the
south in three decades, Lebanese troops have taken up positions along the
eastern
part of the Blue Line for the first time ever. As I have previously
reported, a
significant number of Lebanese troops have also been deployed along the
Lebanese
border with the Syrian Arab Republic.6

27. Since the cessation of hostilities came into effect in Lebanon on 14
August
2006, renewed reports of intercepted arms shipments have been brought to my
attention; such shipments would stand in contradiction to the arms embargo
imposed
by resolution 1701 (2006). I will endeavour to comply with my reporting
requirements on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), as expressed
in
paragraph 17 of that resolution, with regard to possible reports of arms
shipments. I
also call on all Member States, particularly Lebanon's neighbours, to ensure
full
compliance with the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 15 of resolution 1701
(2006).

6 As outlined in my last report on the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006) (S/2006/730), I
continue to believe that the imposition of an arms embargo, which is fully
consistent with the
Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006 that there should be no weapons or
authority in
Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, is a necessary measure given
the history of
arms traffic bound for Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. I also emphasized
the need for the
Syrian Arab Republic, in particular, to help enforce the provisions of
paragraphs 14 and 15 of
resolution 1701 (2006), given that it shares the sole land border with
Lebanon that is generally
open to traffic.

D. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

28. I continue to believe that disarmament must take place through a
political
process that will lead to the full restoration of the authority of the
Government of
Lebanon. If the ultimate purpose of disarmament is the establishment of a
strong
Lebanese State for all inhabitants of Lebanon, as the Taif Accords
stipulated, then
the disarming and disbanding of all remaining militias must be realized in
such a
way that it strengthens, rather than weakens, the central authorities. It is
a
definitional requirement of the state to enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate
use of
force throughout its territory. In that context, it is important that all
neighbouring
States abide by the arms embargo, as called for in resolution 1701 (2006).

1. Palestinian militias

29. The National Dialogue's decision to disarm Palestinian militias outside
the
camps has not been implemented within the six-month deadline, which ended on
26 August 2006. The National Dialogue, in its session on 16 May 2006, had
decided
to establish a committee tasked with following up on the implementation of
its
agreement.

30. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27
July
2006, according to which there should be no weapons or authority other than
that of
the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords, will further define a
political
process and a clear timeline for the full disarmament of Palestinian
militias in
Lebanon. I call for the issue to be settled as early as possible. I also
call on all donors
to support the efforts of the Government of Lebanon and of the United
Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

31. There have been a number of incidents underlining the importance of the
eventual full disarmament of Palestinian militias in Lebanon over the past
six
months. On 17 May 2006, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian
militia
Fatah-Intifada, which is headquartered in Damascus and maintains a number of
bases on Lebanese territory, engaged in clashes after an army patrol
approached a
newly established Fatah-Intifada position in eastern Lebanon and came under
fire. A
Lebanese Armed Forces soldier and a Palestinian militant later died from
wounds
sustained in the subsequent exchanges of fire; another Lebanese soldier was
detained for several hours before he was released. The Lebanese Armed Forces
eventually took over the base; the Palestinian militants implicated in the
incident
were later arrested.

32. On 26 May 2006, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was
assassinated
together with his brother in southern Lebanon by a car bomb. A major
escalation
occurred two days later along the Blue Line, when at least eight rockets
were
launched across the Blue Line into Israel (see S/2006/560). The Palestinian
Islamic
Jihad initially claimed responsibility, but later retracted its assertion.
Israel
retaliated with air strikes against Lebanese bases of the Damascus-based
Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); a
subsequent
major exchange across the Blue Line also involved Hizbollah and escalated
into the
firing of rockets and missiles across the Blue Line by Hizbollah and the
Israel
Defense Forces. Later the same day, the Lebanese Armed Forces sent equipment
to
clear rubble at a PFLP-GC base but were denied entry to the base. Also the
same
day, PFLP-GC leader Ahmad Jibril said in an interview with a Lebanese
newspaper
that his group coordinated all of their military action with Hizbollah, also
stating his
opposition to the disarmament of Palestinian militias in Lebanon.

33. Despite these incidents, I took positive note of the reopening of the
representative office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in
Lebanon on
15 May 2006. I have continued my dialogue on the issue of the Palestinian
militias
in Lebanon with the Chairman of PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, who has assured me of
his
full support for the restoration of the Lebanese Government's monopoly on
the use
of force throughout its territory.

2. Hizbollah

34. With regard to the armed component of Hizbollah, I wish to recall once
again
Prime Minister Siniora's address to the Council of 21 April 2006 (S/PV.5417)
and
the consensual decision of the Lebanese in the Taif Accords.7 The National
Dialogue extensively discussed the issue of Hizbollah's arms earlier this
year, but
did not reach agreement. Hizbollah continued to limit the authority of the
Government of Lebanon, especially in areas close to the Blue Line.

35. The eventual disarmament of Hizbollah in the sense of the completion of
its
transformation into a solely political party, consistent with the
requirements of the
Taif Accords, is a key element in ensuring a permanent end to the
hostilities and a
critical provision to be realized in the implementation of resolution 1701
(2006) and
in the full restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political
independence. A number of specific measures to further this purpose are
enumerated
in resolution 1701 (2006) and are in the process of being implemented, in
particular
the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free
of any
armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of
Lebanon and of UNIFIL, which would constitute an important step towards the
disarming of all militias in Lebanon.

36. I expect that the Government of Lebanon, pursuant to its decision of 27
July
2006, according to which there should be no weapons or authority other than
that of
the Lebanese State as stipulated in the Taif Accords," will further define a
political
process and a clear timeline for the full disarmament of Hizbollah in the
sense of the
completion of its transformation into a solely political party. I call for
the disarmament
of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to be settled as early as
possible.

37. I note that Hizbollah, through its representatives in the Lebanese
Council of
Ministers, agreed to the cabinet decision of 27 July 2006.8 At the same
time, I have

7 Prime Minister Siniora repeated in his address that "the future role of
Hizbollah's weapons in
defending Lebanon is a matter of national debate. That debate will be
carried out in the context
of a strategy agreed upon by all Lebanese concerning how best to defend
Lebanon, against the
backdrop of the provisions of the Taif Accords of 1989, United Nations
resolutions regarding
Lebanon and the continued occupation of the Shab'a Farms, as well as the
long history of
incursions and violations of Lebanese territory by Israel. Reconciling those
considerations with
the natural obligation of the State to be the sole provider of security to
all its citizens and
residents, and the right of the State to have a monopoly over arms and to
exercise its full
authority throughout the country, is a major challenge to be addressed in
the period ahead."

8 I have also taken note of the statements by Hizbollah Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah in his
address to a major rally in southern Beirut on 22 September 2006 that "we
are not saying that
our weapons will remain forever. It is not logical for these weapons to
remain forever. There is
bound to be an end to them". taken note of further statements by Hizbollah
representatives that stand in
contradiction to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

38. In this context, I note again that a dialogue with parties other than
the
Lebanese authorities is indispensable in order to realize the implementation
of the
mandate contained in resolution 1559 (2004) to disarm and disband all
Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias. I expect to continue my dialogue with such
parties, in
particular with the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, which maintain close relations with Hizbollah.

39. Against this background, I wish to reiterate my call on all parties with
the
ability to influence Hizbollah to support its transformation into a solely
political
party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords, as a means to
achieve
the full disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. I also
reiterate my
call to all Member States, particularly Lebanon's neighbours, to ensure
compliance
with the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006),
which is
a measure facilitating the full implementation of the relevant provisions of
the Taif
Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the
disarmament of militias in Lebanon.

E. Presidential election process

40. The issue of the Lebanese presidency was discussed in several rounds of
the
National Dialogue until the participants in the National Dialogue "agreed to
disagree"
on the subject in their seventh round of consultations. In this context, I
also recall
Prime Minister Siniora's address to the Security Council on 21 April 2006.9

III. Observations

41. Over the past two years, there has been considerable progress towards
the full
implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The Syrian Arab Republic has
withdrawn
its troops, military assets and military intelligence apparatus. Free and
fair
legislative elections have been conducted. The Lebanese National Dialogue
manifested further progress. In the past few months, there has been
additional
progress with the extension of the Government's control over Lebanese
territory, in
particular in the south and along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic.
However, resolution 1559 (2004), and in particular its provisions calling
for the
disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the
strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and
political independence
of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government, has yet
to be
implemented in full.

42. In the past six months, Lebanon has suffered a severe setback. Instead
of
making further strides towards completing its political transformation and
reaping
the economic rewards of political progress, Lebanon confronts challenges of
a
magnitude unseen since the end of the civil war. Moreover, since the end of
the
hostilities, a tense political climate has prevailed, with manifold
challenges
confronting the Lebanese in their quest to reconstruct their country, their
polity and
their economy.

9 Prime Minister Siniora stated that "the majority in parliament considers
the extension of
President Lahoud's term in September 2004 for three more years to have been
the result of
interference and coercion by Syria - which had great influence over the
Lebanese parliament at
that time - against all of the advice discouraging such heavy-handed
interference" (S/PV.5417).

43. The United Nations remains committed to supporting Lebanon, its
Government
and its people as they face the enormous task of recovering the momentum on
the
path to consolidating the Lebanese State as an authority of the people, by
the people,
for the people.

44. I would like to express my thanks to all countries that have already
provided
assistance to the Lebanese, be it in the form of troop contributions to
UNIFIL,
bilateral technical aid, or through financial support. Such assistance will
continue to
be needed as the Lebanese once again embrace their fate of economic and
political
reconstruction. I also emphasize that all such assistance should be lent in
ways that
contribute to the consolidation of the Government's monopoly on the use of
force
throughout its territory.

45. In the months ahead, much remains to be done. With the adoption of
resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006) and with repeated Lebanese cabinet
decisions to extend the Government's authority over all Lebanese territory,
a new
framework has been established for the full implementation of all provisions
of
resolution 1559 (2004). A catalogue of measures has been laid down that
constitute
a road map for the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The
Government
of Lebanon, with significant international support, is undertaking important
steps
that will help it to fully implement resolution 1559 (2004). Achieving this
goal,
however, continues to depend on both the Lebanese and on the cooperation of
parties other than the Lebanese.

46. In the months ahead, Lebanon will have to engage again in a truly
national and
inclusive dialogue. The disarming and disbanding of Lebanese and
non-Lebanese
militias, which lies at the heart of the political transformation Lebanon
has been
undergoing and is a necessary element to complete, at long last, Lebanon's
consolidation as a sovereign and democratic State, can only be achieved
through an
inclusive process that addresses the political and economic interests of all
Lebanese
and of those living in Lebanon.

47. It is my deep hope that the opportunities born from conflict will be
seized
upon and that Lebanon may once again rise from the ashes of destruction and
war. I
emphasize once again in this context that Hizbollah's transformation into a
solely
political party, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords, is a
key
element in ensuring a permanent end to hostilities and in the full
restoration of
Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

48. For the purpose of achieving this goal, on the path towards the greater
objective of consolidating the Lebanese State, it is indispensable that all
parties who
have influence in Lebanon support a constructive political process. I note
in this
context that the cooperation of outside parties is explicitly called for in
resolutions
1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006), and I join these calls.

49. The establishment of full diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the
Syrian
Arab Republic and their delineation of the shared border, including, in
particular, in
the Shab'a Farms area, through a bilateral agreement would constitute
significant
steps towards promoting peace and security in the region. Mindful of the
importance
of border delineation to the Lebanese, I am expeditiously working to
establish in
S/2006/832
10 06-57996
full the cartographic, legal and political implications of the approach
suggested in
Lebanon's seven-point plan and will revert to the Council. I also wish to
call for the
Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to address in their bilateral contacts the
issue of
Lebanese detainees in Syrian custody.

50. I reiterate my call on all parties and actors to support Lebanon's
reconstruction
and political transformation and to urgently take all enabling measures to
this end,
as outlined in the Taif Accords and in resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006)
and
1701 (2006).

51. I will continue my efforts for the purpose of the full implementation of
these
and all other relevant Security Council resolutions pertaining to the
restoration of
the territorial integrity, full sovereignty and political independence of
Lebanon and
the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace throughout the
entire
Middle Eastern region, consistent with all relevant Security Council
resolutions.