While the idea-concept
of a bill in Congress imposing sanctions on Syria
was introduced by a particular group, many
Lebanese-American Organizations worked relentlessly
to ensure the passage of the Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSRA).
The ones who opposed it are just few and well-known.
Among the supporters,
I will specifically mention the groups, with which I
am involved, namely the Lebanese Forces (LF) of
North America, the Lebanese Information Center and
the American Lebanese Coalition. I shall leave it to
other groups to further clarify their contribution,
for the sake of fairness and objectivity.
Here is an outline of
the efforts undertaken by the LF in North America,
the Lebanese Information Center in the US and the
American Lebanese Coalition:
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Letters, faxes,
e-mail campaigns, thousands of calls to members
of Congress from Florida to Maine and from
Maryland to Washington State, made in
conjunction with other groups. (See
Annex 1: Sample of the letter sent by LIC to all
members of Congress, House and Senate, in
support of the SALSRA)
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Fund raisers and
campaign contributions to members of Congress.
(Numerous contributions were made by
members of LIC, LF North America and ALC to US
Representatives who were supporting the SALSRA.
Recipients specifically included members of the
Middle East Subcommittee in the House like
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Eliot Engel, Robert Wexler,
Darrell Issa and others.)
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Position papers
and discussions with the US Administration,
particularly the State Department. The main
intent was to explain the purpose of the bill
and its importance to the success of the US war
against terror and to ask for their backing.
(It is no secret that the Administration
in general and the Bureau of Near East Affairs
at the State Department in particular, and for
multiple and complex reasons, were originally
opposed to the Bill. The State Department sent
letters in that respect to Congress, and at one
point, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA Ambassador
David Satterfield was going to testify against
the Bill. This had no effect whatsoever on our
position and efforts.)
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Meetings and
conference calls with our grassroots and
Lebanese-American communities all over the US to
mobilize them to lobby their representatives in
the House and in the Senate to vote for the
SALRSA.
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Endorsement of the
Bill by our representatives in the Maronite
Congress of 2002.
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My own
presentation and subsequent discussion at the
National Apostolate of Maronites convention of
2002, in support of SALSRA.
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Distributing
flyers, T-shirts and advertising for SALSRA by
members of LF and LIC,
And then, around the
time of the hearings,
-
the ad page in
Rollcall magazine, signed by 14
Lebanese-American organizations in support of
SALSRA. (See
Annex 2:Ad in RollCall)
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Attendance at the
congressional hearing, mostly by members of LIC,
LF and ALC, in a show of support for SALSRA.
A written testimony presented by LIC in support
of SALSRA, which was entered into congressional
records (See
Annex 3: The Syrian Threat- a paper by the LIC),
-
Discussions we had
with the American Task Force for Lebanon ahead
of the hearings to convince them not to testify
against the Bill,
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The "minority
letter" sent by ALC Board member Mr. Tom Harb to
ATFL members in support of SALSRA.
It is possible that
important work was done “inside” the Capitol by a
certain group or individual to lobby for this Bill.
However, a lot of work, as important if not more,
was done on the “outside”, at the same time, with
the Administration, with the various
Lebanese-American communities and with members of
Congress in the different states.
SALSRA would have
never passed without the support of the majority of
Lebanese-American organizations.
The US Administration’s reaction
The President’s
initial reaction to the Bill was lukewarm at best.
(“My approval of the Act does not constitute
my adoption of the various statements of policy in
the Act as U.S. foreign policy. Given the
Constitution's commitment to the Presidency of the
authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs,
the executive branch shall construe such policy
statements as advisory, giving them the due weight
that comity between the legislative and executive
branches should require, to the extent consistent
with U.S. foreign policy”. George W Bush-Dec 12,
2003
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031212-3.html )
US Administrations and
Presidents, particularly this President, do not
appreciate the imposition by Congress of foreign
policy actions. Congress can definitely influence
and pressure a President to adopt certain positions
on US foreign policy, but in the end, the American
Constitution grants this responsibility to the
Executive branch.
Change in US foreign policy with regards to Syria
It is rather naïve to
assume that the passage of the Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act “changed US
foreign policy”. It is really the other way around:
the change in policy by the Administration led to
the passage and signing of SALSRA. To believe that
President George W. Bush became convinced one day
that he should adopt a more aggressive attitude
towards Syria, just because Congress wants him to,
is not knowing George W. Bush at all…
The increasing
animosity of this Administration and this President
towards Syria is a result of multiple factors, some
strategic, related to the Global War on Terror and
to George W. Bush’s vision of the “forward strategy
of freedom” in the Middle East, and some tactical,
born out of frustration with Syria’s behavior in
Iraq, in Palestine, and, last but not least, in
Lebanon.
What drove Syria out of Lebanon?
SALRSA was no doubt an
achievement. It was a clear victory for the
promoters of democracy over the apologists and the
appeasers. It was also a major accomplishment of the
anti-Syrian lobby against the pro-Syrian political
machine in the US.
But if we had only
relied on SALSRA, like some wanted us to do, Syria
would still be occupying Lebanon today. SALSRA is
more like a statement of policy and one minor tool
to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions on
Syria. It was unrealistic and illogical to believe
that the Syrian Baath Regime would have been
affected by these sanctions alone to the point of
withdrawing from Lebanon. What drove Syria
out of Lebanon are two major factors:
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The international
community’s stance, led by the US and France,
which was manifested through United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1559, for which
Lebanese-Americans worked relentlessly, except
for (and this is unfortunate) those who
introduced SALSRA. (See
Annex 4: The American Lebanese Coalition and
UNSCR 1559)
-
The rallying of
the Lebanese, political and religious groups,
through the March 14th and the Cedar Revolution
movements to demand the withdrawal of Syria from
Lebanon.
To continue salvaging
Lebanon, we absolutely must preserve those two
elements: the international stance and the Lebanese
solidarity for the freedom of Lebanon.
How to keep the spirit of the SALSRA?
-
It is definitely
not by repeatedly attacking the Lebanese March
14 groups and leaders. These patriots continue
to be intimidated, threatened, and murdered for
opposing the Syrian Baathist rule and its
hegemony over Lebanon.
-
It is definitely
not by allying ourselves with the pro-Syrians in
Lebanon and all the remnants of the Syrian
occupation, e.g. Emile Lahoud, Omar Karame,
Sleiman Franjieh, Michel Murr, Talal Arslan, the
Syrian National Socialists, and their ilk.
-
Is it definitely
not by catering to Hezbollah, while knowing that
the SALSRA is especially focused on Hezbollah
and has clearly linked the sanctions against
Syria to its support for Hezbollah and other
terrorist organizations (See
Annex 5: Hezbollah in the Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Act).
Just recently, the chief sponsor of SALSRA in
the US House of Representatives, Congresswoman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, reiterated the condemnation
of the Syrian regime because of its support to
Hezbollah. (“The government in Damascus
has done nothing to address the principal
complaints regarding its support of terrorism
and weapons programs”. "Syria harbors Islamist
terrorists at home and sponsors them abroad,"
"Syria also continues to allow Iran to use
Damascus as a trans-shipment point to re-supply
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Regrettably the
Syrian-Iran alliance extends into other
problematic areas, such as proliferation."
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. June 7, 2006)
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It is definitely
not by alienating those Lebanese-Americans,
individuals and organizations who stood at the
forefront of the struggle to liberate Lebanon.
It is rather by
consolidating the alliance among all pro-sovereignty
movements in Lebanon and abroad, and especially in
the US to achieve a victory for Lebanon, in a
similar manner to our collective efforts during the
work for the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act.
Joseph Gebeily, MD
President
Lebanese Information Center
American Lebanese Coalition
© 2006
Lebanese Information Center – www.licus.org
